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Introduction 
 
The phenomenon of corruption and economic theory 
Corruption is often defined as the misuse of entrusted authority for personal benefit. 
The authority is usually public or political. A decision has been made that deviates 
from the official aim of the institution that holds authority. Through corruption some 
people have obtained benefits they would not get hold of otherwise. These people 
represent the two sides of corruption. One has offered a bribe, and the other has 
abused his or her office. Both parties to the transaction will benefit, though the way 
the spoils are shared between them will depend on their respective negotiating 
powers.1 The functions of public and political institutions are affected when the 
practice of making such agreements is common. The consequences in a country can 
be considerable. Several authors have found a correlation between economic growth 
and perceived extents of corruption in statistical studies that include a large number 
of countries.2 
Corruption has indeed motivated to research, and several of its welfare consequences 
have been examined in an economic perspective. Today it is bizarre that some of the 
early contributions defended corruption in terms of promoting economic growth. 
Huntington (1968) described corruption as the way of approaching "an over-
centralized bureaucracy" (Huntington, 1968:386), an opinion he shared with Leff 
(1964). This interpretation has largely fallen out of favor in economic theory, as 
elsewhere. Myrdal (1968) was one of the first to challenge the ‘grease money’ model 
by showing how bribery creates incentives for civil servants to put pressure on 
potential bribers, and actually causes bureaucratic delays.3 A broader critique was 
provided by Rose-Ackerman (1978) who described corruption as an obstacle to 
welfare from several different perspectives, including that of firms. The conclusions 
have been supported, specified and elaborated in a number of studies, including those 
by Lui (1985), Hillman and Katz (1987), Besley and McLaren (1993); several authors 
have explained the persistence of the problem (Andvig and Moene, 1990; Banerjee, 
1997; Tanzi, 1995); and we got case studies of the phenomenon that played important 
roles in communicating the nature of the problem, see for example Wade (1982) and 
Klitgaard (1988).  
During the 1980s and up until earlier 1990s, the main development in this field of 
economic theory was concerned with the broader rent-seeking perspective. This trend 
started with the early works of Tullock (1967), Krueger (1974) and Bhagwati (1982). 
The welfare implications of various forms of rent-seeking were determined, as were 
                                                                          
1 See Rose-Ackerman (1999), Bardhan (1997) and Aidt (2003) broader explanation and categorization 
of different circumstances of corruption.  
2 See Mauro (1995), Mo (2001), Gyimah-Prempong (2002), Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004), Kaufmann, 
Kray and Mastruzzi (2006). 
3 This theory was empirically supported by Kaufmann and Wei (1999). 
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the propensity of various actors to take part in rent-seeking. However, very few 
authors made a distinction between legal and illegal forms of rent-seeking, and much 
of this literature lacks the perspective that is necessary to understand corruption.4 
Lambsdorff (2002) explains why the welfare consequences from corruption differ 
from those of legal rent-seeking. He points particularly at the analytical significance 
of personal benefits obtained by the one who receives a bribe; legal rent-seeking will 
often occur as an annoyance to the decision-maker in question. 
The focus on corruption in economic research increased significantly after Mauro’s 
(1995) influential paper determining a correlation between corruption and poor 
economic growth, and the World Bank's focus on this problem. The consequences of 
corruption have now been shown to materialize in very different ways.5 I will not 
present a complete overview of this literature. However, an important feature of 
corruption turns out to be its ability to produce less direct welfare consequences. For 
instance, corruption may encourage civil servants to seek positions that offer the best 
opportunity to obtain bribes, in that way influence the function of public institutions.6 
It may result in deliberated delays and obstacles in the reform of business regulations 
in order to obtain personal benefits for civil servants, such as those relating to the 
issue of licenses and permits, or the persistence of inefficient business-regulations 
that easily could be reformed. The resulting transaction cost imposed on firms is in 
itself a barrier to trade and investments, and has been shown to have serious 
consequences for the development of trade and industry, especially in developing 
countries.7  
In spite of the many facets of corruption, the problem is generally called a “hidden 
phenomenon”. The parties involved will try to keep their arrangement as secret as 
possible. The problem is nevertheless perceivable, though difficult to prove, difficult 
to estimate, and difficult to attack through laws and regulations. Yet we believe that 
the extent of the problem differs between business sectors, firms of different size, 
firms that operate under different degrees of competitive pressure, geography and 
local political situation. The challenge of collecting empirical information that 
supports such assumptions is obvious, and despite the many attempts to explain the 
phenomenon of corruption, its mechanisms and its consequences, there are still a 
number of issues that need further examination. The present study aims at 
contributing in this respect, by exploring various challenges related to business 
corruption.  
                                                                          
4 See Buchanan, Tollison and Tullock (1980) for a collection of the pioneering rent-seeking literature. 
McNutt (2002) provides a more contemporary review.  
5 See Rose-Ackerman (2004) for an annotated review of the empirical research and Aidt (2003) for a 
recent survey of economic analyses of corruption. 
6 See Acemoglu and Verdier (1998). 
7 See Rao (2003) for an introduction to the economics of transaction costs. The problem is also well 
described by De Soto (1989). An overview of the many business obstacles that could have been 
reformed is presented by the IBRD/World Bank (2005). Data on corruption and the business climate 
are provided by Batra, Kaufmann and Stone (2003). 
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Business corruption 
This form of corruption is defined by the involvement of private companies, and is 
usually motivated by corporate profits. In contrast to the term ‘political corruption’, 
or ‘petty corruption’, where we focus on the interests of politicians or civil servants, 
we usually emphasize the perspective and the interests of the bribers when applying 
the term business corruption. As noted, however, there are two parties involved. 
Thus, while the circumstances considered in this thesis are examined primarily from 
the perspective of business corruption, they clearly count as political corruption from 
another perspective.8  
The problem of business corruption has been highlighted by a number of scandals in 
the recent years, such as ExxonMobil in Kazakhstan, where payments were made in 
Kazakh officials to obtain a share the Karachaganak oil and gas field; the Lesotho 
Dam project, in which eight international construction companies were charged with 
bribery after they allegedly paid bribes to win contracts for a large dam project; or the 
Titan Corporation’s unofficial payments to the President of Benin to get important 
business advantages.9 The media will often describe such cases as fraud, theft, greed 
and undeserved advantages. Like corruption in general, however, the consequences of 
business corruption are usually wider, and related to the inefficiencies introduced in a 
system that in some way is supposed to ensure welfare in a society.  
The consequences will often depend on the specific benefits obtained by the bribery. 
For example, when bribes are offered to obtain some form of tax evasion, neglected 
security controls, or exemption from certain standards or rules, the firm’s benefit 
appear as a reduction in its expenditures. The consequences to society would, 
accordingly, be a reduction in state revenues, reduced security for employees or for 
the public, and/or environmental consequences. Another category of benefits provide 
the firm with an exclusive market position; these could include exemption from trade 
barriers, waived regulations, and the chance to operate a monopoly. The likely results 
for the business are higher prices for goods or services in production; for the society it 
means lower consumer surplus. The classical examples, perhaps, are those of 
procurement. Firms offer bribes to obtain business contracts that they would probably 
not obtain in a legal procedure. This can take place in public tenders, but also 
between firms. Large companies will often have significant procurement expenses, 
and they also have procurement routines that can be violated by bribery. The 
consequence of tender-corruption will usually be an inferior combination of price and 
quality of the goods or services rendered.  
The present study describes some of the mechanisms behind these consequences. It 
begins by explaining the distinct methodological challenges related to empirical 
                                                                          
8 Shleifer and Vishny (1998) describe several important aspects of the connection between politicians 
and firms in the light of corruption. Heidenheimer and Johnston (2002) present a collection of 
contributions on political corruption. See also Clarke and Xu (2004) for an empirical study of the 
characteristics of firms that are involved in corruption. 
9 See, for instance, www.againstcorruption.org or www.transparency.org for more information about 
cases of business corruption.  
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research on corruption. In spite of these challenges, the thesis continues by an attempt 
to collect information about business corruption. This information is applied in two 
theoretical analyses of the phenomenon, one about firms’ responses to the problem, a 
second about their propensity to take part. A final chapter in this thesis explains some 
of the consequences of business corruption, in terms of industrial organization. I will 
shortly describe the different studies, and finally summarize some of their policy 
implications.  
 
This thesis: Incidents, mechanisms, and consequences 
(i)  Estimating levels of corruption; methodological challenges  
Observed differences in the degree of the problem have motivated estimations of the 
extent of corruption within countries. The World Bank and Transparency 
International both collect survey results on a significant scale, and make estimates of 
the local levels of corruption in a number of countries on the basis of the reported 
perceptions of business people, civil servants, ordinary people, country analysts and 
other experts. These estimations are then applied in research to determine correlations 
between the phenomenon of corruption and other parameters. The best known 
collection of estimates in this respect is the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) of 
Transparency International.10 This index ranks countries according to the perceived 
extent of corruption locally.  
The first chapter of this thesis discusses some of the methodological and theoretical 
problems associated with assessing levels of corruption and discusses the practice of 
ranking countries according to perceived levels of corruption. A main problem with 
the CPI is that all forms of corruption in a country are supposed to be included. It is 
not made clear for the respondents how to classify the local extent of corruption, and 
thus there is no clear distinction between the illegal and the immoral, between 
political corruption and petty corruption, or between the supply and demand side of 
corruption. This makes it difficult to understand the contents of the index.   
This chapter highlights the implications of the methodological problems when 
corruption rankings are used in research. Reliance on an index, such as the CPI, can 
weaken analysis, and thus affect conclusions about corruption. Besides, the composite 
corruption index simplifies a complex phenomenon far too much. The information 
will not provide the data that is required to understand the phenomenon. Detailed 
empirical information about business corruption is needed to verify the incidence, the 
mechanisms and the consequences of the phenomenon. Any theory about corruption 
will have only limited value if there is no empirical support to the mechanism under 
scrutiny.  
The study of the corruption index; its limitations, and the implication of these 
limitations, implied inquiry into several of the main challenges related to empirical 
                                                                          
10 See www.transparency.org 
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information about the incidence of corruption. The discussion in Chapter 1 thus goes 
beyond the role of Transparency International and its index.  
 
(ii)   The business survey, Norway 2004  
As noted, a major criticism of existing rankings of countries according to perceived 
levels of corruption is that they do not provide the detailed empirical information that 
is required to verify the incidence of business corruption, determine the mechanisms 
involved, and assess the correlations with other variables. Survey results can make an 
important contribution to research on business corruption, provided detailed 
information about methodology (including questionnaire design, sample size, rate of 
response) are made available. Properly conducted surveys can indeed help to 
compensate for the limitations of the CPI if the aim is to understand the extent of the 
problem in a given country, market or institution. See Svensson (2003) for a general 
discussion and results from empirical studies in Uganda.  
The third chapter of this thesis reports on an attempt to collect detailed empirical 
information about business corruption through survey work (Søreide, 2006). The aim 
was to collect data for analytical work, to test for the presence of correlations, to 
identify research questions, and to support analytical results. The resulting survey 
data provided the empirical basis for two analytical studies, presented here as 
Chapters 3 and 4.  However, the study also aimed broadly at collecting more general 
information about firms’ attitudes, preferences, and choices in respect of business 
corruption.  
The survey project was conducted in cooperation with the Confederation of 
Norwegian Enterprise (NHO), and had three components. It began with a pilot study 
involving interviews with executives in charge of international sales and marketing in 
seven large Norwegian firms. A mail questionnaire containing close to 100 questions 
relating to corruption was then developed and circulated to more than 500 firms, to 
which 82 top managers in Norwegian exporting firms responded. Several issues were 
examined in this study: (i) the grey zones between illegal business corruption and 
similar legal practices that have welfare consequences that resemble those of 
corruption. (ii) The role of competitive pressure and firms’ preferences when exposed 
to corruption-related challenges. (iii) Firms’ options and choices when they lose 
contracts because competitors offer bribes. (iv) The effectiveness of procurement 
rules to prevent tender corruption. (v) The coherence between codes of conduct and 
actual business practice in respect of corruption related issues.  
The survey-project included a smaller survey of Norwegian embassies in countries 
outside the OECD region. Embassy officials were asked about their perspective on 
local business practices and their potential role in anti-corruption work. The embassy 
survey complemented the business survey by providing an idea of the Norwegian 
firms’ corruption-related challenges from a perspective other than the firms 
themselves.  
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(iii)  The reaction to corruption 
One of the key results revealed by the business survey was that Norwegian firms 
rarely react to corruption, even when they have lost important contracts as a result. 
The paper presented in Chapter 3 in this thesis explores this disinclination to take 
action in the light of market structures, business efficiency, judicial institutions, and 
political corruption.  It develops some theories about how these four variables deter 
firms from reacting against corruption, and, in particular, how the potential for 
collusion reinforces the incentives to remain silent.  
The analysis begins by exploring several of the pragmatic issues that a firm may 
consider when encountering corruption.  One issue is whether a reaction to corruption 
may spoil opportunities to cooperate with competitors in some form of cartel 
agreement. A second aspect is the expected response from judicial institutions; if the 
response is expected to be weak or non-existent, there may not be a point in speaking 
out about corruption. And thirdly, a firm will seldom expect support to an anti-
corruption reaction in a market where there are secret ties between firms and 
politicians in key positions. Considered in combination, the various impediments to 
anti-corruption reaction are shown occur under different circumstances. When 
conditions in market structure suggest that the best response would be to take action, 
political conditions may favor inaction. When a potential whistle-blower expects 
support from local politicians or legal institutions, the given offender may be 
impervious to sanctions; its role in the market will not be altered by the threat of 
prosecution. As a result, firms rarely take action against corruption. 
 
(iv)  Business corruption, uncertainty and risk aversion. 
The business survey conducted in 2004 revealed not only that firms would seldom 
speak out about the problem if they lost contracts due to corruption but that very few 
of them would leave a market as a result.  Many firms reported that they accepted that 
corruption was “part of the game”, and that they preferred to “adjust to the local 
business culture”. Adjustment to local business culture could seem to imply that firms 
might adopt procedures that would be considered unacceptable in Norway. However, 
reliable data on the extent to which this adjustment entails illegal business practices 
are very difficult to obtain. The choice between a legal and illegal business approach 
is still a basic issue of business corruption, and this is examined in Chapter 4.  
The focus of the study is the specific distinction between legal and illegal business 
practice, and how a firm’s strategy may be subject to various uncertainties. Business 
corruption can bring about substantial benefits for the firm that practices it. The 
success in the choice of strategy will though depend on uncertain information about 
the extent of corruption, and there will usually be a risk of sanctions if caught in the 
crime.  
The hazards associated with business corruption prompt the question of how different 
attitudes towards risk may influence the propensity of a firm to offer bribes. 
Intuitively, one might assume that risk neutral or risk attracted firms are more likely 
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to offer bribes than their risk averse competitors. This paper demonstrates that this is 
not necessarily the case: firms that are risk averse can in fact have a stronger 
propensity to offer bribes. The presence of business corruption implies that the option 
of staying honest carries a higher risk of losing contracts. When the marginal 
expected benefit of offering bribes exceeds the risk of being caught in the crime, even 
the most risk averse firms may offer bribes to protect themselves from the potential 
loss associated with honesty.  
 
(v)  Business corruption, privatization and industrial organization 
One of the consequences of illegal business corruption is demonstrated in the fifth 
and final chapter. This study was conducted in collaboration with my supervisor, 
Kjetil Bjorvatn (Bjorvatn and Søreide, 2005). It was motivated by empirical 
conclusions that market reform and privatization, commenced in many countries to 
improve market efficiency, had failed to produce the expected welfare improvements 
(Puntillo, 1996; Black et al., 2000; Stiglitz, 2002; Kikeri and Nellis, 2004).  
The study explores analytically the effects of business corruption in the context of 
privatization and analogous transactions such as the sales of licenses and concessions. 
The study demonstrates a connection between the final acquisition price on the 
privatized item and political corruption. This price is likely to be higher when 
government officials responsible for the sale are corrupt, rather than honest or just 
moderately corrupt. In spite of this, the model predicts that a stronger propensity 
among responsible politicians to embezzle state revenues may reduce these 
politicians’ benefits from corruption. The more concerned the politicians are about 
corrupt benefits, the cheaper they are to buy.  
However, the more important result from this study, in terms of welfare 
consequences, relates to the resulting industrial structure in markets where 
privatization of firms has occurred. The analysis predicts that privatization in 
countries with highly corrupt government results in a higher degree of market 
concentration than in countries where governments are benevolent. These results 
correspond to the conclusions by Ades and Di Tella (1999), that corruption is more 
common in countries that are less open to foreign trade.  
 
 
4  Policy implications of the research 
The various findings presented in this thesis are highly relevant in a policy 
perspective given the global importance of combating corruption. The policy 
implications of particular findings are discussed in the specific papers. However, 
there are some issues that appear particularly generic and that are therefore relevant to 
devising effective anti-corruption policies.   
The first issue concerns the distinction between legal and illegal business activity. To 
combat corruption we need legal clarifications of the problem and we need to reduce 
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the grey zones of business corruption. A main challenge in this respect is probably the 
interlinkages between politics and industry. Diplomatic conventions of esteem and 
respect still inhibit the establishment of measures and policies to deal with corruption; 
they can even prevent political discussions about counter-efforts. However, as is 
explained in Chapter 1, we also need more operative definitions to estimate the 
problem, and we need to extend the language of corruption. When no legal definition 
of corruption applies to the specific circumstance, we should perhaps apply words 
such as fraud, theft, grabbing, unethical business practices, marketing directed at 
individual decision-makers, political pressure, quid pro quos, etc. A related problem 
is the presence of “legal” corruption, i.e. practices that seem corrupt but are not 
actually illegal under local law. In these cases, judicial reform is required, though 
difficult to carry through. In addition, court systems in many countries will require 
significant upgrading if they are to be capable of taking on the challenges of political 
corruption. 
Another side of this policy implication relates to the propensity of those affected by 
corruption to actually report about the case, and get it investigated and prosecuted. 
The survey results, combined with the analysis in Chapter 3, suggest that firms need 
to be made more aware of the advantages of reporting cases of corruption and carry 
through court cases. Whistle-blowing could be particularly important to firms that 
invest directly in foreign markets (FDI). Many respondents to the business survey 
suggested the worry of having competitors who offer bribes to a main motivation 
behind bribery. This worry underscores the importance for firms to make credible 
signals about an honest business approach. One way of signaling this attitude is to 
blow the whistle about cases of corruption, and take cases to court.  
Official control systems are obvious targets of anti-corruption efforts. The analyses in 
Chapter 3 and 4, however, describe the importance of “efficient sanctions” on those 
apprehended in corruption; penalties for corruption that correlates with the offender’s 
revenues and the gains obtained by the bribery. Internal security systems within firms 
have proved effective in some cases of corruption.11 The survey work revealed, 
however, that these security systems were not considered efficient by many 
respondents, and several of the people interviewed for the study described this 
security work as a challenge.  
A policy aspect that seldom is included in anti-corruption efforts is the role of 
antitrust authorities in preventing and combating business corruption. Antitrust 
systems reduce the opportunity for corrupt politicians to siphon off cartel profits, and 
they can reduce the potential of firms to acquire monopoly powers through business 
corruption. This is explained in Chapter 5. This chapter also explains why the welfare 
result of privatization and similar market reforms highly depends on the procedure of 
the reform. The efficiency of tender procedures is described as limited by the 
respondents to the survey in Chapter 3, and it functions worse in the cases of large 
                                                                          
11 One example is an IBM corruption case from 1993, where the ex-head of state-run Banco Nacion 
allegedly had accepted bribes from the local unit of computer maker International Business Machines 
Corp. in order to secure the firm a $250 million contract. The case was uncovered by IBM security 
systems, and the SEC was informed by the firm.  
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contracts compared to smaller tenders. This is an issue that needs critical attention 
from a policy perspective, not only in public procurement but also in cases of 
privatization and the sales of licenses and concessions. Corruption can influence the 
industrial structure significantly, and reduce consumer surplus.  
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Abstract 
This paper emphasizes the importance of collecting information on corruption, while 
still stressing critical aspects of the most applied sources of such information, the cross-
country composite corruption indices. Are these indices damaging and misleading or are 
they informative and useful? The paper points to the implication of the lack of a clear 
distinction between legal and illegal payments or ways of gaining influence. It 
summarizes the main limitations of Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions 
Index (CPI), underscores the problem of expecting perceptions to be reliable, and 
discusses the problem of incorrect understanding and usage of the index. Publicity does 
not necessarily mean progress, and the construction of the CPI should be influenced by 
the way this index is applied by the public. A final question is whether it is possible to 
increase the CPI's value by creating incentives for states to improve their achievements 
under, for instance, the OECD anti-bribery convention. 
 
 
                                                 
1 This paper was prepared for the IV Global Forum on Fighting Corruption, Brasilia, Brazil, 7-10 June 
2005. I wish to thank Susan Rose-Ackerman, Bertil Tungodden, Jacob Svensson, Johann G. Lambsdorff, 
Kalle Moene and Aslak Orre for valuable comments. 
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 1  Information about corruption 
The extent of corruption in a society is often debated on the basis weak information. 
Data on corruption will usually have limitations since people involved in the crime 
seldom will speak out about their practice. However, there are several reasons why 
information about this problem is required. It is important to understand the 
phenomenon, explaining changes and determining efficient countermeasures. As a part 
of this, it is important to estimate the impact of anti-corruption initiatives that have been 
introduced. 
     
The impact of most anti-corruption efforts is uncertain. Incentives to take part in 
corruption are not necessarily removed by more stringent regulation, and are hardly 
reduced if the probability of being detected in and convicted of corruption is not 
increased. There has, for example, been several international judicial improvements in 
controlling corruption in a number of countries, often as part of the implementation of 
new international conventions or as part of procurement reform. The enforcement of 
such improvements appears to be a challenge in many countries. When it comes to the 
OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transactions, there have been few court cases of cross-border corruption since 
its implementation, and the effect of the reform has been difficult to determine. The 
OECD evaluation process, the Phase 2 reports on Japan and the UK, highlights the fact 
that there is more to anti-corruption efforts than conventions (OECD, 2005a, 2005b).2 In 
procurement reform too, we need information about the extent of corruption to monitor 
the actual anti-corruption impacts. In a business survey of Norwegian exporters 
conducted last year, 55% of the firms that participated, all of them with long experience 
in international markets, had no trust in procurement rules as an obstacle to corruption. 
Only 6% thought procurement rules could limit corruption efficiently (Søreide, 2006). 
     
Another demand for information about the extent of corruption relates to aid. The 
problem of corruption is now widely recognized as a considerable obstacle to the 
efficiency of development aid.3 Several donors have started to require a verification of 
corruption control as one of several conditions for continued aid, a policy that may 
prove important in encouraging critical improvement of governmental and judicial 
institutions in poor countries. Information about the level of corruption and the 
bureaucratic business environment are also important aspects in multinationals' entry 
decisions, which in many cases are far more important in raising developing countries' 
revenues than is aid. 
     
                                                 
2 The OECD examiners expressed concern about the complete lack of bribery cases actually investigated 
and brought to court in Japan and the UK. The press in both countries had reported widely on several 
cases of alleged bribery of foreign public officials. 
3 For more explanation, see Alesina and Weder (2002) and Svensson (2000), and also Tavares (2003) 
who finds a correlation between development aid and reductions in the levels of corruption. See 
information on the Bush Administration's Millennium Challenge Account: http://www.mca.gov/ (includes 
the evaluation of countries). 
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The need for information about the extent of corruption has triggered a number of 
empirical studies. Several institutions have developed corruption-related criteria on 
which they rank countries. By far the most famous index of this sort is the Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI), published yearly by Transparency International (TI).4 This 
index aims to measure what people think about corruption, and is not presented by TI as 
true facts about the actual levels of corruption. The CPI is an "index of indices"; it is 
composed from a number of different sources that all provide a relevant ranking of 
countries. The World Bank has constructed a similar index, which is part of its efforts to 
estimate the quality of governance.5 The World Bank's approach to estimating 
corruption is similar to the methodology TI applies to make their ranking; several of the 
sources are the same, and the two indices correlate well. The main objectives behind the 
indices are to raise awareness, enable statistical research to understand and better 
confront the problem, and to encourage governments in their anti-corruption efforts. 
 
The present paper explains that also significant challenges are presented by these 
corruption indices, and it raises a particular concern about their significance for 
developing countries. Some of the problems relate to the construction of the indices, 
others to the way in which the information is referred to. I will shortly explain how 
these indices are constructed and notify about some of the ambiguities in this 
information. Then I turn to their contents and discuss the problem of an unclear 
distinction between illegal and "legal" corruption. I discuss the common practice of 
interpreting these indices as reliable information about actual extents of corruption 
within a country, and I raise concerns that common misinterpretation of the CPI can be 
damaging. Proposals follow, first about how the challenges related to the CPI can be 
reduced, second on how its value as an anti-corruption tool can be enhanced. The paper 
concludes by summarizing the main arguments. 
 
2   Limits of the CPI 
 
 Corruption estimation has been a topic of much debate, mainly since the CPI was first 
published in 1995. Since then, Transparency International has become the most 
important institution in collecting and distributing corruption-related information. The 
CPI is one of several ways in which TI systematizes such information. This index is the 
most famous and applied source on information about the level of corruption in 
countries, and therefore the issue of debate in this paper: to what extent is this detailed 
ranking fruitful and useful? Should its information be referred to with more caution? 
While the CPI gets the most attention, many of the comments on this type of estimation 
are relevant also to the World Bank index. TI and the World Bank are fully aware of 
measurement problems, and do indeed encourage debate.6 Some of the recent 
                                                 
4 http://www.transparency.org 
5 http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance 
6 TI publishes every year a background paper to the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) in which the 
methodology is explained (Lambsdorff, 2004). The World Bank describes their project, the methodology 
and various measurement problems in several papers; see Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999) 
and Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005). 
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contributions, to which I will return, are Svensson and Reinikka (2003), Andvig (2004), 
Rose-Ackerman (2004), Weber (2005) and Galtung (2005). 
 
2.1  Construction and interpretation 
The elements in the construction of the composite corruption indices are data from 
externally conducted polls and surveys and a method of scaling these data into one 
index. The data are collected by independent institutions, these are non-profit 
organizations and consultancy companies, and the respondents are business people, the 
general public and country analysts. When the surveys include several issues, only the 
data on corruption is applied for the corruption index. The assessment of a country is 
based on several data sources, and the data must represent current conditions, as well as 
a ranking of countries. 
     
Each survey is given equal weight when integrated into the index, independently of age 
and correlation to the other surveys. For aggregation and accurate ranking, data from the 
different sources have to be standardized and converted into the same scaling system. 
This is mainly done by transforming the standard deviations and the means in the 
different sets of data, to fit with the mean value and standard deviation of the index 
from the previous year. When this is done for all the sources, the index is estimated by 
computing the simple mean for each country. The result is a CPI score between 0 and 
10 for each country included in the index. Lambsdorff (2005) describes and explains the 
specific formula. 
 
The strength of the composite indices lies in their ability to be more informative than 
individual data sources. However, given all the information about the methodology and 
the sources, the content of the index continues to be unclear to many of us. What does it 
mean that China is ranked number 71 with a score of 3.4, while the UK is ranked 
number 11 with a score of 8.6? The lack of a standardized approach to estimating the 
level of corruption makes it difficult to know whether the rankings reflect the number of 
transactions affected by corruption, legal or illegal activities, the level of bribes or the 
cost to society. 
     
The relation between numbers on the ranking is unclear, and the ranking must be 
considered ordinal. A ranking of 6 does not imply that the country in question has twice 
the amount of corruption compared to a country with a ranking of 3; it just means that 
the former country has "more corruption".7 The index is still readable as a presentation 
of the countries' ranking, but it is often referred to as if these precision problems were 
not present. It is also difficult to interpret a dynamic dimension of the index. The media 
pays significant attention to changes in the relative position of countries. "Is our country 
                                                 
7 A cardinal index with a known mathematical ratio between two levels of corruption on the CPI would 
depend on how corruption is being measured (which is debated in the following sections). To illustrate 
the problem of imprecision in the present measure, assume that a bribe represents 10% of all payments in 
country X, while it represents only 2% of half of all transactions in country Y. If measuring the volume of 
corruption, that is the total sum paid in bribes, country X would be ten times more corrupt than country Y. 
If measuring the number of corrupt transactions, country X would be twice as corrupt as country Y. 
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performing better this year?" However, if country X is ranked below country Y one 
year, then placed above it the next, it is difficult to tell if there has been a reduction of 
corruption in country X, or if there has been an increase of the problem in country Y. 
The change is also likely to be a matter of arbitrary fluctuations within the error band. A 
change of the score from one year to the next can of course represent a true change in 
the perceived level of corruption within a country. However, it can also be explained by 
a change of the mean and standard variation of the whole sample of countries, an 
inclusion of new sources, or an improvement in the methodology. Transparency 
International aims at using the most reliable and up to date sources, which also means 
that the contents of the underlying studies vary. 
     
The problems related to definition and quantification mean that empirical research on 
corruption is also affected. There have been a number of studies in which the correlation 
between the level of corruption, as measured either by the World Bank indicator or TI's 
CPI, and some other phenomena is analyzed, such as economic growth, inequality, 
religion, barriers to trade, the level of foreign direct investment, and so on.8 Independent 
of the quality of the calculation behind such studies, the extent to which we can rely on 
the conclusions is uncertain when the underlying information is weak. 
 
2.2  Crimes or legal activities? 
There have been numerous discussions about how corruption should be defined. A 
major problem is that the word is applied to activities that are both legal and illegal. 
This means that it is difficult to tell whether a bad score on a corruption index refers to 
officially permitted activities or to violations of the law. Some people will say that all 
kinds of corruption-like activity are harmful, and it is not important to distinguish 
between them. Others will consider this matter in the light of defamation, restrict the 
use of the term corruption to its legal sense, and try not to label people, companies or 
countries as "corrupt" unless there is good reason to assume that laws have been 
violated. When trying to estimate even less precise aspects of a society, such as the 
quality of governance or social capital, it is obvious that these are subjective and 
uncertain qualities. As for corruption, which also is a legal term, we do not have 
international consensus on the term's meaning, which should ideally have been in place 
before we started ranking countries based on people's subjective perceptions of its 
extent. 
 
The impediments to reach such an international consensus are significant. The legal 
definitions of corruption and cross-border bribery of public officials differ somewhat 
from country to country. Even within countries there are doubts and discussions about 
the boundary between legal and illegal activities. Most jurisdictions have far too few 
precedents for this sort of legislation. No detailed judicial discussion will be undertaken 
in this paper. The following three grey zones are important, however, because (a) they 
are common to most countries, (b) they have not been clarified by the new international 
                                                 
8 See Rose-Ackerman (2004) and Lambsdorff (2005) for annotated reviews of empirical research on the 
causes and consequences of corruption. 
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conventions, (c) they are causing most of the ambiguities about the term corruption, and 
(d) they tend to inhibit welfare improvements. 
 
(i) Facilitation payments     
Unofficial fees paid to get things done, and smaller bribes demanded for services that a 
public official is expected to provide in any case, such as the issuing of licenses or 
customs clearance. The justification for facilitation payments is often based on a lack of 
bargaining power. The question of whether the person who makes the payment commits 
an offence according to the cross-border legislation on corruption will depend on 
judicial details in his/her/its country of origin.9 
 
Marketing  
(ii) Marketing targeted at specific individuals who represent a client, either a public or 
private institution, where expensive gifts and excursions are offered to encourage 
informal relations with the potential client. Many firms claim this kind of marketing to 
be essential. While procurement rules are usually in place for large contracts to ensure 
free and fair competition, there will always be legal ways around these statutes. There 
are loopholes in the rules of exception which allow for direct negotiations, and there are 
ways of making it appear as if the procurement rules have been respected, by violating 
the rules of communication, for instance (Søreide, 2006). This form of influence deters 
competition, and thus welfare improvements. 
 
Political pressure 
(iii) Political pressure applied to influence the outcome of tenders on big contracts. This 
kind of pressure is conducted with the help of subsidies, export-credit deals, aid to the 
buyer linked formally or informally to the purchase, commercial pricing issues and 
trade barriers, tied defence/arms deals, or threats of political sanctions or specific voting 
in international organizations. These practices are difficult to attack legally, as they are 
carried out by political leaders at the highest state level. 
     
Domestic judicial clarifications will not automatically solve the CPI's problem of 
unclear legal meaning of the term corruption. Countries differ, for instance, inherently 
in their degree of institutionalizing influence on important financial decisions. In the 
USA it is legal to finance political parties. This is a form of lobbyism in which private 
firms pay huge amounts in campaign finance.10 The border between lobbyism and 
corruption can be unclear. In its legal form, however, it may lead to political support for 
                                                 
9 Most discussions on the grey zone of facilitation payments concentrate solely on the question of its 
cross-border legal status or its status according to the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, not its legal 
status locally (as if this were less important). It is therefore a disappointment that this issue is poorly 
described by the OECD anti-bribery convention, which leaves it to each single jurisdiction to determine 
whether these payments, if made to public officials in foreign countries, are legal or not. Bribes of more 
than $20, 000, for instance, should be illegal. When it can be defined as a "facilitation payment", the 
payer normally fears no corruption charges, due to unclear laws. 
10 Democratic challenges related to campaign finance are well described by Ackerman and Ayres (2002), 
and also by the recent Abramoff affair, in which a Republican lobbyist, prosecuted for bribery, tax 
evasion and fraud, is now willing to witness against a number of members of Congress and other officials. 
The Financial Times, Jan. 05, 2006. 
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changes that mainly benefits individual firms or their executives, while consumer 
welfare is reduced. In many other countries, private influence on politics is not legalized 
or institutionalized in a similar manner. In other words, while payments made to 
influence specific political issues are legal in some places, this is called corruption in 
others. The outcome can be equivalent. The extent to which the respondents to the CPI's 
different surveys make a distinction at this point is not known; whatever they do will be 
wrong in terms of definitions. It is wrong to describe the practice as corruption when the 
payments are completely legal. In an international ranking of corruption, it would also 
be wrong not to include similar ways of buying influence.11  
 
An index score is supposed to cover all kinds of corruption, from huge oil contracts to 
the payments made to get assistance when giving birth. Being this all-encompassing, the 
index fails to distinguish between the forms of corruption that represent welfare 
problems, and the corruption that functions as a substitute for prices or public solutions 
in cases of weak or absent public institutions. Rose-Ackerman (1999) makes an 
important distinction at this point. She explains why the basic feature of the market does 
not necessarily depend on the extent to which public services are legally privatized, or if 
more informal solutions are in function, and organized by means of facilitation 
payments/informal rates. The welfare implication depends on the presence of markets 
and the supply of the many different services requested, not necessarily on how the 
payments correspond to formal rules. The variation across countries, in the 
achievements made on how to organize or institutionalize public services, depends on 
their quality of governance, GDP level, political system, political stability, and so on. 
Weak states will easily come out as more corrupt when informal solutions, illegal 
payments and bribes occur to replace wages, for instance in the lack of governmental 
financial transfers to local providers of public services, such as education, health care, 
or infrastructure. To the extent to which this is a measurement problem for the CPI 
ranking, it is limited by the fact that the group of countries with widespread and harmful 
corruption overlaps considerably with the group of those that are unable to offer public 
services that they are required by law to supply.12 
 
2.3  Perceptions and the actual extent of corruption 
Measuring perceptions of corruption is meant to be a best possible solution to get 
indications of true levels of corruption in a situation with vast measurement challenges. 
Measuring different people's perceptions of corruption provides in itself interesting 
information about people's opinion. Some problems arise, however, when these data are 
treated as reliable information about the actual extent of corruption in a country. 
                                                 
11 This problem points at the need to increase our vocabulary when discussing corruption-related 
problems, and make the language more precise, perhaps by use of words like political grabbing, pre-
determination of contracts, business climate qualities, deliberated bureaucratic delays, business 
corruption, fraud, theft, “legal corruption”,  facilitation payments, and quid pro quos. 
12 See Miller, Grødeland and Koshechkina (2001) for an in-depth study of local citizens' experience of 
bureaucratic corruption. Galtung (2005) points to another related problem of surveying these forms of 
corruption, and says that "90% of the world is missing" in the CPI because the underlying surveys ignore 
large parts of the economies. 
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Many of us would consider newspaper headlines or court cases unreliable estimates of 
the actual frequency of corruption. Whereas regular media coverage of corruption might 
inform on freedom of speech, the media can be biased and interested in scandalizing the 
problem, or it may be controlled by the state. The number of court cases on corruption 
in a given country would not necessarily be a better indicator. The judicial system may 
not have the capacity to investigate and prosecute all the cases that emerge. In addition, 
the police force may lack the necessary independence, or may even be corrupt itself. 
However, the individual's opinion, and the view of the survey respondents who form the 
basis for the construction of the indices, will be influenced by the same sources, the 
media and court cases, and it is a question how detailed a country ranking should be 
made when based on perceptions. 
 
One challenge is related to the quantification of the problem, which is highly 
ambiguous. It is not clear to what extent the level of corruption reflects the frequency of 
corrupt acts, the damage done to society or the size of the bribes. The polls and surveys 
behind the CPI ask different questions related to corruption, and do not cover precisely 
the same issue. Some sources aim at political corruption, while others ask about lower-
level bureaucratic corruption. Most of the polls and surveys ask for a general opinion on 
the magnitude of the problem ("how widespread" is the problem), usually not the 
respondents' personal experiences, which basically means that they ask for people's 
subjective intuition of the extent of something unobservable. Given the discussion in the 
previous section, it is even unclear what this unobservable phenomenon is. 
     
The respondents are, without explicit definitions, asked to quantify "the misuse of 
public office for private or political party gain" and encouraged to rate "the severity of 
corruption within the state." This strong reliance on individual perceptions makes the 
interpretation of the index too dependent on assumptions of how people develop their 
opinions. Rumours, prejudices or media attention have an impact on experts as well as 
on ordinary people. TI, being concerned about this matter, also states on their web page 
that the most important sources of information about corruption are media, friends and 
contacts. Of course, if several individuals share a perception of reality, the perception 
may reflect the truth, but this is far from obvious. 
 
There are several reasons why a gap between perceptions and the actual level of 
corruption is to be expected. I will first discuss some problems due to ambiguities about 
definitions, and than go on to some systematic biases. People's perception of more or 
less of something is instinctively based on comparison. An estimation of the level of 
corruption, as an inexperienced quantification, may be based on comparison with the 
situation in a neighbouring country, the situation in countries where corruption is more 
or less frequent, what the situation ought to be, or their personal high ethical values. The 
problem of corruption in Italy may seem negligible compared to the situation in Bolivia. 
Compared to Sweden, however, Italy faces a big challenge. While corruption must be 
expected to vary between state institutions, economic sectors and professions, we 
cannot expect respondents to describe the average level of corruption within the country 
in question. The CPI should accordingly not be applied as an indicator of this average. 
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The respondents' perceptions will also differ with their different perspectives, their 
background, wealth and experience. And, ironically, one of the more severe challenges 
to the objectivity of the CPI is probably its own fame. Many of the respondents, the 
experts in particular, "know" the level of corruption from the index published the 
previous year, and the most recent CPI will automatically be correlated with the 
previous ones. Andvig (2004) explains these problems by describing how informational 
cascades can easily develop and complicate the measurement of true levels of 
corruption.13 
 
The World Bank and Transparency International both make the assumption that the 
stochastic errors across the sub-indicators are independent. Given the respondents' way 
of developing their perceptions of the level of corruption, however, such dependence is 
likely to occur, as the different underlying surveys seldom ask for each individual 
respondent's own experience, but rather their general impression of the problem. One 
specific bias that has got some attention recently is a "poor is bad" effect: that poor 
countries are perceived to be corrupt simply because they are poor while rich countries 
come out as clean because they are rich.14 Kaufmann et al. (2005) analyze this bias for 
the quality of governance, and conclude that the variance in the estimated quality of 
governance due to the measurement error must be implausibly strong for this effect to 
be significant. Their conclusion relies to a large extent on the above-mentioned 
assumption, that measurement error is uncorrelated across the different sources of data. 
Whether this bias is significant for the estimation of corruption levels is unclear. Weber 
(2005), who applies TI's Global Corruption Barometer to distinguish between 
respondents' perceptions and reported experiences, finds more evidence for this type of 
bias among the subjective variables. 
 
2.4  Implications of publicity 
We know that the unreliability of the CPI as an indicator for actual extents of corruption 
implies that countries are perceived as less or more corrupt than they actually are. TI's 
openness about the estimation problems increases the organization's credibility. One 
problem, though, is that the background documents and warnings about how to read the 
index are not, apparently, read by the public. Incorrect interpretation in the press is the 
rule rather than the exception, and, based on the CPI, countries are referred to as "the 
third most corrupt country in the world" and so on. The fallacy in this interpretation of 
the CPI, as true information about the extent of corruption, is described in the 
discussions above. In addition, the CPI does not include all countries, i.e. corruption can 
be even more frequent in the countries not included in the CPI. 
 
                                                 
13 Andvig (2004:347) explains: "the experts read the same reports and gauge other experts' statements. 
Since the assessments are often not based on individual experience, when expert X claims that corruption 
in country A is very high, expert Z has no clear evidence to the contrary, so when knowing X's statement 
it may be optimal to make an assessment close to hers. Informational cascades may easily develop in this 
context." 
14 See Glaeser et al. (2004) for a broader discussion of this problem. 
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The broad media attention paid to the CPI is often considered a value as it may improve 
the public's awareness of problems related to corruption. This is a value that clearly 
depends on perspective. Incorrect interpretation may have damaging implications, and 
developing countries are the most vulnerable to this problem. A poor ranking is 
undeniably a message to the world about flourishing corruption, fraud and bribes, about 
low ethical values, about greed, and about lousy politicians. The scepticism that 
develops towards the country and its inhabitants, the honest as well as the dishonest, 
may encourage anti-corruption campaigns. Whether anything is achieved in the form of 
welfare improvements is difficult to tell if this achievement balances for the local 
economic consequences, in the form of possible lost private investment and aid, for 
instance. 
     
It is also difficult to gauge the local aggregated response to a signal of widespread 
corruption. Everybody will denounce this kind of practice in public, of course, but there 
will also be those who see new opportunities as it is apparently easy to obtain benefits 
with the help of corruption. Foreign firms may happen to worsen the local market 
culture by offering bribes or gifts above the "usual level".15 In this way, the publishing 
of a poor corruption rating can contribute to higher levels of corruption in countries 
where the actual extent of corruption is lower than indicated by the CPI. 
     
This self-fulfilling prophecy problem is general and also present when information 
about the extent of other forms of undesired activities in a society is published, such as 
tax evasion, the breaking of speed limits, smuggling, and so on. Information that a 
specific offence is common has different effects on individuals. We still wish to be 
informed, but it is important to consider and limit possible undesired consequences. 
 
The publicity around the CPI has indeed raised attention to the problem of corruption 
and thus probably had an impact on corruption control in a broader sense. It is, though, 
a challenge to single out the different mechanisms and determine their impact. During 
the years of the CPI we have seen far more international cooperation on this issue, 
significant judicial improvements and the removal of tax deductibility for cross-border 
bribery. Even so, the problems that prompted these efforts appear to be present at least 
to the same extent as one decade ago. Kaufmann et al. (2005) find no reason to assume 
that corruption is on the decrease worldwide.16 The effect of anti-corruption efforts may 
still be positive. It takes some years to have a bearing on attitudes and choices, and we 
do not know what the situation would have been if these efforts had not been made. 
 
                                                 
15 See Hellman et al. (2002) for a study of foreign investors' propensity to take part in local corruption. 
16 Kaufmann et al. (2005:14) find "substantial disagreement among sources about even the direction of 
changes in global averages of governance", and the measurement problems prevent the production of 
credible empirical results on global levels of corruption. 
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 3  Proposals 
Given the noted limits to the CPI, we can hardly conclude that it is right to rank 
countries in the way it is being done in this index; it simplifies a complex phenomenon 
far too much. One solution is, of course, to accentuate the remarkable collection of data 
behind the composite corruption indices, and let the interpretation of a corruption level 
be up to each individual reader. These single indices and rankings, based on one 
individual question or a more measurable issue, for instance, do not bear the same risk 
of misinterpretation as all the information is visible. This is also a solution in research. 
The contribution to science is, for example, no less important if, rather than studying the 
correlation between economic growth and the CPI, we analyze the connection between 
GDP and the average number of procedures a firm has to go through to start up a 
business in different countries. If combined with one similar regression on firms' 
reported facilitation payments and one on the quality of antitrust institutions, it is far 
easier for the reader to comprehend the meaning of the study, and make his or her own 
interpretation of the link between growth and the more general but indefinite level of 
corruption.17 
 
There are also several alternative approaches to information about the extent of 
corruption. This paper will not provide an overview, just a few relevant comments.18 
Svensson and Reinikka (2001, 2003) describe the use of local surveys to obtain more 
detailed information on the extent of corruption. Public expenditure tracking surveys 
(PETS) and business surveys in particular are able to provide more accurate information 
for the quantification of corruption locally, and also its implications and its geographical 
and sector-related variation. More projects of this type are expected. Donors concerned 
about the problem of providing aid to countries with a low score on the CPI will more 
frequently require PETS as a form of control and evaluation. Another relevant indicator 
of corruption is the functioning of antitrust institutions, or surveys that aim at gathering 
such information.19 Corruption is not a problem if competition in all markets is free and 
fair, an understanding that can be applied to estimate the extent of corruption in several 
ways.20 
                                                 
17 Creativity in the search for relevant empirical information will often imply a need for theoretical 
studies to support or understand relations and incentives which point to connections between corruption 
and other, more measurable, phenomena. Our intuitive assumptions about correlations are not always 
sufficient, which is demonstrated in a few recent examples. The role of the media in controlling 
corruption is not necessarily as obvious as is often assumed (Vaidya, 2005); a bureaucratic crackdown 
may not lead to the expected reduction of corruption levels (Bjorvatn et al., 2005); whereas the role of the 
security of property rights in promoting growth may actually help us understand the link between 
corruption and inequality (Glaser et al., 2003). 
18 See the web pages of Transparency International and the World Bank for more information. 
19 The connection between competition and firms' propensity to offer bribes is not clear in the literature 
on corruption, partly because it is difficult to include in empirical estimations the dynamic aspect of how 
bribery may lead to market power (Svensson, 2003; Søreide, 2006). 
20 One approach is that applied by Transparência Brasil and Santa Catarina Supreme Audit Institution, 
which have collected information and compared prices on public purchases made by municipalities of the 
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Yet, these alternative approaches cannot replace the information provided by an index 
of corruption that informs about the estimated perceptions about the level of corruption 
in a large number of countries. It will never be possible to rank right on this issue. The 
estimation problems should not discourage TI, but rather encourage continued critical 
debate about presentation and methodological improvements. 
 
3.1  Reduce precision in the presentation of the CPI 
One overall ambition in the work to develop corruption indices will of course be to 
increase precision in the estimates. When presented to the public through newspapers, 
most readers are likely to assume that the precision is of the order of the steps in the 
ranking (one decimal), and that a country with the score 7.3 is less corrupt than a 
country with a score of 7.1. Further, the CPI is generally perceived by the public as an 
estimated corruption level, not as a perceived corruption level. 
     
Together with the ranking of countries, TI publishes the margins of error, which 
indicate the "error bands". These are usually an order of magnitude higher than the 
precision in the ranking. As an example, a country like Malta, with the score of 6.8 on 
position 25 in the CPI of 2004, has an uncertainty band of 5.3 to 8.2; it could therefore 
be less corrupt than Canada on position 12 or more corrupt than Suriname on position 
49. But since these uncertainty bands are rarely communicated to the audience by the 
press, the current presentation with decimal accuracy is misleading to many readers. 
The following specific points are noted: 
 
(1) The margins of error are determined by the variability in the perception of the 
different sources behind the CPI. In theory all these sources will not be independent, 
and may be influenced by the same errors. The ranking is still made with the 
assumption that the margins of error are uncorrelated. 
 
(2) Being a representation of perceptions, the margins of error refer only to variation in 
the perceptions, which do not include the total potential divergence between true and 
perceived levels of corruption. The fact that the CPI uncertainty estimates only indicate 
scatter among its sources, and not uncertainty in estimated corruption level, is well 
illustrated by a country score for Bolivia, for example, which is ranked 112 at score 2.3, 
with an uncertainty band only from 2.2 to 2.4. Such precision in a corruption estimate 
would be far from realistic. 
 
As already mentioned, the position of the ranking can have consequences for countries 
and their inhabitants. This particularly applies to a perceived negative development 
from one year to the next, even if this will usually be far from significant, considering 
the large uncertainty bands. For these reasons, it is suggested that the precision of the 
CPI, if it is going to be published on the basis of its present methodology, will be 
                                                                                                                                               
Brazilian state Santa Catarina since 1997. They also monitor how announcements of public procurement 
tenders compare with the requirements of the law. https://www.transparencia.org.br 
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reduced from decimal precision to whole numbers. This means that all the countries 
with a score of 9.5 and above would get a 10, from 8.5 to 9.4 would become 9, and so 
on.21 Within each of these classes no ranking should be published. 
     
The steps of the ranking would then be much closer to the uncertainty estimate for each 
country. Given the way the current CPI is used and misused, this might be a more 
ethical way of presenting the index, as the level of precision reflects the uncertainty 
better. For most countries, it can be assumed that they belong to the class in which they 
are ranked, or one class below or above. The few countries with a larger than +/- 1 error 
estimate can be marked with an asterisk (*) in the table. With a more compact 
presentation of the 2004 index, as shown in the table, it is more likely that newspapers 
referring to the index would be able to publish the whole table of countries rather than 
focus on which countries are marginally better or worse than their own country, which 
is a common way of presenting the index today.   
 
 
                                             TABLE 1: SUGGESTED PRESENTATION OF THE CPI 
Angola, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Cameroon, Chad, Congo (Dem. Rep.), Cote d’Ivoîre, Ecuador, Ethiopia, 
Georgia, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Myanmar, 
Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, 
Venezuela, Yemen, Congo (Rep. of), Zimbabwe
2
Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Belarus*, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, China, Dominican Republic, 
Egypt, Eritrea, Gabon, Gambia, India, Iran, Jamaica, Lebanon, Libya, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, 
Morocco, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Palestinian Authority, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, 
Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Tanzania, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam, Zambia
3
Belize, Bulgaria, Brazil, Colombia, Croatia, Cuba*, Czech Republic, El Salvador, Ghana, Greece, Latvia, 
Mauritius, Mexico, Namibia, Panama, Peru, Poland, Seychelles, Slovakia, Sri Lanka, Suriname*, Thailand, 
Trinidad and Tobago
4
Cyprus, Costa Rica, Hungary, Italy, Jordan, Kuwait, Lithuania, Malaysia, Qatar, South Africa, South Korea, 
Tunisia
5
Bahrain, Botswana, Estonia, Israel, Oman, Portugal, Slovenia, Taiwan, Uruguay, UAE* 6
Barbados, Chile, France, Japan, Malta*, Spain7
Austria, Belgium, Germany, Hong Kong, Ireland, Luxembourg, USA8
Australia, Canada, Netherlands, Norway, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, UK9
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, New Zealand10
Ranking 2004, Countries (Listed in alphabetical order)CPI
* For these countries the uncertainty in the estimate is more than +/- 1  
 
Even if this suggestion implies that details in the information collected are not to be 
released, it does not obscure the index, and it does not discourage the use and publishing 
of information that is actually available.22 Because the CPI is frequently perceived and 
                                                 
21 One intuitive solution could be a categorization in groups that do not overlap in their standard 
deviation. However, the standard deviations are too large for this approach, and there will always be 
overlap between the groups. 
22 A leap from one stage to another will perhaps appear larger with this suggestion. Some countries will 
be closer to the border of their category than others, and the difference between Zambia and Angola, for 
instance, will seem to be larger than it perhaps is. It is therefore important to emphasize that each country 
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used as a true corruption level estimate, it should be considered wrong to rank countries 
on a decimal scale when the true uncertainty in the estimates is one order of magnitude 
higher. The change suggested would probably not take away the interest among 
newspapers in referring to the CPI, but it could take away some of its possible negative 
consequences. A reduction of precision in the presentation would probably not limit the 
value of the index when being used for statistical research. 
     
3.2  Increase the CPI's value as an anti-corruption tool 
A challenge in present anti-corruption work is to ensure the enforcement of new 
international conventions. This challenge requires: (1) actual cooperation across 
countries to enable better control of economic crime, and (2) incentives for governments 
to actually investigate and prosecute "their own" companies for bribery of public 
officials in foreign countries (even if the offences have helped them obtain large 
contracts with an impact on the trade balance). In a globalized world we need to 
evaluate governments not only by their domestic performance but also by their cross-
border achievements. A corruption ranking should ideally include also estimates of the 
conduct of representatives of governments and countries, individuals or firms when they 
operate internationally. Separate information about national levels would still be 
included. However, a CPI ranking of countries with an international aspect included 
could make a difference in several ways: 
 
(i) Governments would get a poorer rating if "their" companies were perceived to be 
taking part in cross-border bribery, or if their politicians appeared to be applying 
political pressure, of the kind mentioned in Section 2.2, to obtain political or industrial 
benefits. Governments' incentives to ensure honest conduct outside their own borders 
would perhaps be somewhat strengthened.23 
 
(ii) The problem of variation across countries in their willingness to sign, implement or 
enforce the OECD anti-bribery convention would be reduced. Companies from 
countries without this judicial improvement in place may now consider it a benefit to be 
able to operate without this restriction.24 Such a CPI change would perhaps reduce the 
difference between exporters in this sense, because countries would be rated 
independently of their governments' attitude to this OECD convention. 
 
(iii) It would encourage better consistency in the foreign politics of rich countries which 
operate with corruption control as one condition for development aid. The situation now 
is usually that a donor government which finds a certain country too corrupt and 
                                                                                                                                               
is estimated to belong to the class in which it is placed, or one class above or one below. The countries 
with an asterisk can even belong to two classes up or down, given the estimated error band. 
23 The problem of bribe-offering competitors would be reduced if governments really were to restrict their 
own companies from offering bribes abroad. In addition, incentives to support international anti-
corruption work would be stronger. 
 
24 See Montigny (2004), who describes this problem by explaining how the OECD convention may 
function as an obstacle to the development of honest trade in African countries. 
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therefore ineligible to receive financial assistance, at the same time finds it 
unproblematic that "their" companies conduct trade or investment in the same poor 
country. When this trade leads the poor aid-dependent country to receive tax revenues 
which by far exceed the amounts that it is relevant to supply in the form of aid, the 
policy appears somewhat inconsistent. This inconsistency is even more apparent in 
cases where the exporting firms are state-owned. Trade and investment are crucial in 
economic development, and should not be hindered by these aspects. Nevertheless, 
most governments in rich countries may need more encouragement to monitor the ways 
in which their firms operate in countries where the relevant institutions fail to function 
in a welfare-enhancing manner. 
 
4  Conclusion 
The comments on the composite corruption indices can be clarified by an invented 
example on intelligence. Assume that we have one survey of mathematical skills in 
twenty different countries, another one on politicians' abilities to read in fifty countries, 
a third on language skills in seventy different countries, and a fourth on children's 
abilities to build Lego castles. Each individual survey may provide important 
information for its purpose. It is only when we put them all together to rank countries 
according to the citizens' intelligence level that the difficulties occur. When it comes to 
corruption rankings, we do not claim that people are stupid, but we do, without reliable 
information, indicate that they are committing crimes.25 
     
There is clearly a need for information on corruption, and Transparency International 
and the World Bank both make important contributions. The following aspects of 
composite corruption rankings are problematic, even so. (1) We do not know if the CPI 
refers to legal or illegal activities; (2) the lack of consensus on the meaning of the term 
corruption makes it difficult to understand the criteria behind the ranking; (3) the ratio 
between the different scores has no significance and is not constant; (4) individual 
perceptions of hidden activities are not reliable and can be systematically biased; (5) the 
weaknesses are not comprehended by the public and the ranking is generally not 
referred to with the necessary care; (6) its value for statistical studies is uncertain; (7) its 
value for poor countries in which corruption is a huge challenge is uncertain. 
     
Given that the practice of corruption rankings probably continues, this paper has 
presented two proposals about reform of this practice: a reduction in the precision of the 
CPI, and the inclusion of information about the countries' cross-border achievements. 
The first suggestion is indeed possible and realistic. The second suggestion, however, is 
inconsistent with the estimation problems already mentioned, and is proposed mainly to 
raise the debate. The methodological challenges of the CPI could have been even larger 
with such aspects included. New underlying surveys would have to be conducted and 
there would be the additional challenges of controlling for the difference in the extent of 
                                                 
25 This problem is even more relevant for the UN's Human Development Index. 
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trade and sorting out large firms' country of origin.26 But the number of values 
associated with the CPI would have been higher.  
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Abstract 
This paper presents a study of corruption in international markets from the 
perspective of Norwegian firms. The study consisted of three parts, (i) interviews 
at executive level in seven large firms, (ii) a business survey, where 82 exporting 
firms with a headquarter in Norway responded to a questionnaire, and (iii) a 
survey of Norwegian embassies outside the OECD region. The study, that broadly 
aimed at information about firms’ challenges, their experiences, and their 
preferred strategies, had six particular issues in focus: (1) The choices firms make 
when experiencing a business climate that is worse than expected prior to entry in 
the given market; (2) firms’ common reluctance to speak out about the problem 
when they lose business opportunities because of corruption; (3) the connection 
between corruption and market power; (4) the significance of procurement 
procedures and how they are violated; (5) the grey zones of facilitation payments, 
marketing strategies, and political pressure; and (6) business strategies versus 
codes of conduct. The study was conducted in collaboration with NHO, the 
Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise.  
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1  Introduction  
Despite recent efforts to combat corruption in international business, it is difficult 
to tell whether such corruption is decreasing. It is probably premature to evaluate 
the general impact of the relatively new international anti-corruption 
conventions.1 New rules may take many years to affect attitudes and choices, 
especially in an area such as corruption. The phenomenon is not only hidden, 
rules and norms are also inconsistent and variable, firms invoke moral 
justifications for breaking the law, and politicians and states have been 
unconvincing in their efforts to combat this crime.  
 
Even so, it is not too early to discuss potential impacts of the new legal initiatives 
on firms’ actual choices. Although improved regulation will enhance business 
integrity and conformity to professional standards of conduct, we must still expect 
that business executives will calculate probable gains against possible losses, even 
for illegal or unethical practices. The cost of being caught in corrupt practice may 
have increased as a result of the new international regulations. However, unless 
the probability of being caught in the crime also increases, the impact of these 
regulations may not be very significant.  
 
Increasing the risk for those involved in international business corruption is a 
considerable challenge for two reasons. First, the probability of being subject to 
local prosecution in host countries is generally low. The risk of being detected is 
low when corruption is common, and if detected, the chances of having charges 
withdrawn by bribing the prosecutor, or someone above the prosecutor, increases 
with the level of corruption. Accepting payoffs may also ensure a certain level of 
income for individuals in key government positions, and hence diminish their 
motivation to investigate this crime.2  
 
Second, the most important international treaty dealing with cross-border 
corruption has several weaknesses. This treaty, the OECD Convention Against 
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, makes 
it illegal to offer bribes to public officials in foreign countries. It has been ratified 
by 36 countries, including the home countries of most major multi-nationals.3 
However, most states wish to increase the probability of “their” domestic 
companies getting contracts in foreign countries, and thus have few incentives to 
                                                 
1 The OECD convention against bribery of foreign public officials in international business 
transactions has been in effect since February 1999. The UN convention, an agreement on the 
criminalization of a broad range of corruption-related activities and co-operation on investigation, 
was introduced in 2003. See the paper by Kaufmann et al. (2005) for an investigation of possible 
improvements in various governance indicators, corruption included.  
2  Andvig and Moene (1990) describe this dynamics of corruption levels. 
3 For more information, see http://www.oecd.org. The OECD country evaluation reports on the 
implementation of the OECD anti-bribery convention are particularly interesting in this respect. 
See also http://www.u4.no/ for an overview of other important anti-corruption conventions.  
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encourage investigations of “their own” firms, even if contracts are obtained in a 
way that appear to violate the treaty. When the enforcement of new cross-border 
rules is the responsibility of each individual jurisdiction, it can, accordingly, be 
difficult to put this type of international convention into effect. A Transparency 
International (TI) report which compares the implementation of the OECD-
convention in the signatory states does describe some progress, but there is 
significant variation between countries in their level of enforcement, and the total 
number of cases based on the OECD convention, internationally, has so far been 
low (Heimann et al., 2005).  
 
To better understand international business corruption and the challenges of 
curbing this problem, we need more research on details in how the different facets 
of globalization such as the increase of international trade, cross-border 
competition, and legislative cooperation, affect the differences in business 
climates across the globe and the strategic choices of the players. The World 
Bank’s business surveys are important contributions in this respect (Batra et al, 
2003). Nevertheless, a number of issues related to corruption and similar 
problems are not included in these studies. Given this background, I conducted a 
survey of Norwegian exporters during 2004, which asked close to 100 questions 
related to corruption. The study was motivated by the following six questions: 
 
1. Where are the main grey zones? The definition of corruption varies, in 
layman’s language as well as in legal terms. There are different forms of 
corruption; they have different consequences, and the tolerance of corruption will 
often vary with the circumstances. This study explores three areas in which the 
judicial status of corruption is unclear. In each area the impact on public officials 
is very similar to corruption, although the persons involved defend the practices as 
not being corrupt. The three areas are:   
 
(i) Facilitation payments, or smaller bribes paid to get things done. The defense of 
facilitation payments is often based on a lack of bargaining power.   
(ii) Marketing targeted at specific individuals, where expensive gifts and 
excursions are offered to encourage informal relations with the potential client. 
Many firms claim this kind of marketing to be essential.  
(iii) Political pressure, for instance in the form of subsidies, export-credit deals or 
aid, sometimes also presented as threats of political sanctions. These practices are 
difficult to attack legally, as they are carried out by political leaders at the highest 
state level.  
 
2. Will competitive pressure make firms more or less inclined to offer bribes? The 
link between competition and corruption is not clear in the relevant literature. It 
has been argued that market power enables corruption because net profits are 
required to cover the expenses of making bribe payments. However, empirical 
studies that find a positive correlation between corruption and market power may 
have failed to include an important dynamic aspect. Firms in competitive markets 
pay bribes to obtain market power, and thereby change the industrial organization. 
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Given such a correlation, it can be the case that competitive pressures lead to a 
higher propensity to offer bribes in an effort to obtain monopoly power. Besides, 
the amount offered in a bribe can be covered by the total contract, and the cost of 
making a bribe payment will depend on the relative bargaining power of those 
involved. Competitive pressure is only one of several qualities we shall consider 
in exploring which firms are involved in bribery. 
 
3. Which strategy do firms prefer when competitors offer bribes? And what are 
the options for a firm that loses important contracts because competitors offer 
bribes? In general, it can (i) leave the specific market and shift its business to 
other regions or lines of business; (ii) complain, speak out, and try to improve the 
underlying situation for the better; (iii) adjust to the local business climate, make 
the right contacts, and be patient; or (iv) offer a bribe if that seems required. This 
study explores the prevalence of these four reactions, and studies how they 
correlate with other qualities and choices.  
 
4. What may explain a reluctance to speak out? There is reason to take a closer 
look at option (ii) above, because, while private firms often are the most likely to 
understand that corruption has taken place between a competitor and a client, they 
often seem reluctant to speak out about the problem. There are alternative 
channels for responding to suspected crime. A firm can follow formal procedures 
and appeal to the client or the tender authorities, or it can encourage local 
authorities to look into the deal. Given sufficient proof, it can itself bring the case 
to court, either locally or in the home country of the bribing firm. Other options 
are to go through intelligence services, embassies, newspapers or anti-corruption 
groups, or just submit a letter of complaint to the firm that has paid a bribe. Do 
any of these things happen and under what conditions?  
 
5. To what extent can procurement rules be expected to prevent corruption? The 
bidding process for large contracts is one of the main arenas for business 
corruption. Many countries have reformed their procurement procedures in recent 
years in order to ensure fair and unbiased competition for public contracts. This 
study explores the ability of procurement procedures in preventing corruption, and 
aims at identifying particular challenges in this respect. It also asks if the presence 
of tender rules has an impact on the way firms seek to influencing clients.  
 
6. Do they practice what they preach? A visible and unquestionable attitude 
against corruption at the highest levels of a firm is important to prevent the 
temptation of bribery throughout the organization. However, the promises of 
business leaders and the words in their codes of conduct will not always have an 
impact on their actual incentives and choices. This project has collected 
information about various measures introduced internally in firms to prevent 
corruption, such as codes of conduct and anti-corruption control routines, and has 
considered these issues in the light of the firms’ reported strategies when 
operating in challenging business climates. By addressing embassy officials, the 
study also raises the question of countries’ political commitments to international 
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anti-corruption conventions. What is the attitude of representatives of states who 
are located in countries where corruption is considered a significant problem?  
 
The structure of this chapter follows roughly the order of these questions. First, 
however, the methodology and details behind the survey is then addressed. This 
part is followed by a summary of the embassies’ and firms’ reported experience 
with corruption. The question of which firms are involved in corruption is then 
addressed. This section includes the results on competitive pressure, but reports 
also about the significance of other features such as size, sector, length, type of 
international experience and home country norms. The third and the fourth 
research questions, on firms’ strategic choices and their reluctance to react against 
corruption are addressed in a third section called ‘responses to corruption’. This 
section also describes the firms’ reported motivation to take part in corruption. 
The fourth section provides results and comments on corruption and tender 
procedures, a section that also includes the results about political pressure. The 
fifth and final section is called ‘internal control and anti-corruption measures’, and 
examines the responding firms’ tendency to practice what they preach. The three 
grey zone areas are each discussed in their most relevant section.  
 
2  The survey  
The study consists of three parts, (i) a pilot study with interviews at the executive 
level in seven large firms, three of them being on the FT list of the 500 largest 
companies4; (ii) a business-survey, where executives in 82 firms with 
headquarters in Norway responded to a questionnaire, and (iii) a survey of 
Norwegian embassies outside the OECD-region, to which 24 embassies 
responded. The survey was carried out with the cooperation of the Norwegian 
Confederation of Norwegian Business and Industry (NHO), the largest business-
association in Norway.  
 
Norwegian industry, chosen for practical reasons, provides an interesting case for 
exploring the above-mentioned issues. Norwegian industry is outward oriented 
and well exposed to international attitudes and business cultures. Its most 
important sectors of operation are among those described by TI’s Bribe Payers 
Index as the more exposed to corruption, such as oil and gas, power transmission 
and construction. Nevertheless, Norway scores well on international corruption 
rankings and has been commended by OECD for its implementation of the new 
anti-corruption treaty. The tension between operating in markets in which 
corruption is considered a problem and accepting a clear obligation to respect the 
treaty’s restrictions on bribery in foreign markets is thus sharply presented to 
many Norwegian firms.  
                                                 
4 http://news.ft.com/companies. These firms were Telenor, Statoil and ABB, while the other 
companies in the pilot study were Jotun, Aker Kværner, Eidesvik Shipping, and DNV (Det Norske 
Veritas). I am grateful for their time and cooperative attitude.  
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About half the individuals responding to the business survey were managing 
directors, another two out of five were executives responsible for sales and 
marketing. The remaining respondents had other functions in the management 
group; they were country managers or members of the board. The respondents, all 
first contacted individually by the business organization, were supposed to have a 
direct responsibility for the firm’s main areas of operation, other than social 
responsibility, security issues or public relations. Promises of anonymity and 
confidentiality were important concerns when arranging for the delivery of and 
response to the questionnaires, and NHO assisted appreciably in assuring the 
credibility of these promises. The 82 responses represented a response rate of 16-
17 percent of the about 500 CEOs who initially received the questionnaire. Given 
the length of the questionnaire and the sensitivity of the issues, this compares well 
to the response rate of several comparable surveys.5   
 
The trade and investment patterns of survey respondents’ firms correspond with 
public statistics on Norwegian exporting industries. Most of the firms were mainly 
Norwegian owned, and 84 percent had their headquarters in Norway. Two out of 
ten had a state ownership share of more than 50 percent. The firms not owned by 
Norwegians were mainly owned by other Europeans. The size of the firms varied: 
45 percent of the responding firms had an annual turnover of less than NOK 100 
million (hereinafter “small firms”). One third had sales of between NOK 100 
million and one billion (“medium-sized firms”), and 23 percent were above NOK 
one billion in turnover (“large firms”) (one billion NOK is about $150 million). 
The sectors of operation were as follows: 20 percent of the responding firms 
operate in construction, 20 percent in oil, gas, and power transmission6, 15 percent 
in agri/food industries, 13 percent in telecommunications and IT, 8 percent in 
heavy industry, 8 percent in other types of service, 6 percent in consulting, and 5 
percent in light manufacturing. Shipping, a significant part of Norwegian industry, 
is included in construction, oil, heavy industry or transportation, depending on 
their main group of clients. Tourism, transportation, civil aerospace, banking, 
finance, insurance, and the pharmaceutical industry are sectors less represented 
among the respondents to this survey.  
 
All the firms operated internationally. One third had done so for more than 30 
years, and about half for 10-30 years. The surveyed firms operated throughout the 
world, although most concentrated in Europe and USA/Canada. Other regions 
were represented in the following order: East European countries and Central 
Asia, Asia other than mainland China, Latin America and the Caribbean, Sub-
Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, mainland China and Oceania. 
Almost half the firms produced goods outside Norway. More than one third said 
that they carry out projects for foreign governmental institutions.  
 
                                                 
5 Like for instance, Graham and Harvey (2001), CRG (2002) and Batra et al. (2003). 
6 For the sake of anonymity, oil and power are put together in the same category. 
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Competitive pressure is important to understand the behavior of firms but is 
difficult to measure. This survey attempted to get at this issue through the 
following question: “Are the prices for your main products or services forced to a 
level that makes it hard to make profits?” Given this question, 44 percent operated 
under competitive pressures. There appeared to be no clear pattern of competitive 
pressures across sectors in the surveyed firms, except in agri/food industries, 
where a clear majority finds it difficult to make profits. The price pressure was 
also reported to be strong in construction, oil, gas, and power transmission and 
was lower in telecommunications/IT. The large firms did not appear to be less 
exposed to pressure on prices than the small firms.  
 
The responses are analyzed using non-parametric statistics and the results do not 
allow for statistical generalizations. The results outlined here are the reported 
frequencies in the given data, cross-tabulations in the responses, and the results of 
probit analyses. Correlations described as “significant” or “clear” are statistically 
significant at the five percent level or better.7 However, the reliability of empirical 
research on corruption is always uncertain (Søreide, 2005). Respondents have 
incentives to protect the reputation of their sector and, in this case, Norwegian 
firms in general. Bribery is usually known only to a very small number of persons, 
and might also be hidden from high-level employees. The lack of actual 
knowledge about the phenomenon makes it probable that many respondents base 
their beliefs on occasional incidents. It may even induce some respondents to 
overstate the problem and claim corruption to be more widespread than it really is. 
Thus, when designing or interpreting surveys on corruption, one must recognize 
that the results, for various reasons, may be biased. One of the goals of the present 
survey design is to base the value of the material on what the respondents say, 
while recognizing its limitations in reflecting the firms’ actual choices.  
 
To understand what the respondents say it is important to be aware of definitions 
and common terminology. In this setting, the pilot study was important to make 
the questionnaire fit with the perspectives of business executives and their 
everyday vocabulary. Although this study concentrates mainly on bribery in 
procurement contracts, it should be noted that it is common to distinguish between 
the following terms. Grand corruption refers to the bribery of politicians or 
bureaucrats with influence over large projects and important contracts. High level 
corruption is sometimes described as crony capitalism, in which political 
networks dominate important private assets, or state capture, in which private 
firms are able to influence public power to their own benefit.8 Petty corruption is 
at the other end of the scale: small payments offered to or demanded from persons 
representing a lower level of an institution, such as local tax collectors, customs 
                                                 
7 The cross-tabulations are studied using chi-square statistics. Note also that most numbers are 
presented in percentages, even if the number of respondents is below 100. Ten percent is therefore 
the response from 8 persons. Most respondents have responded to all questions, and, n, the total 
number of responses to each question, is equal or close to 82 in all tables or presentations of the 
results. 
8 This is thoroughly discussed in the paper by Hellman et al. (2000).  
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officers, health personnel or bureaucrats providing firms with the required 
licenses or permits. The relevant business term is facilitation payments, which, 
according to Transparency International, refers to payments “made to secure or 
expedite the performance of a routine or necessary action to which the payer of 
the facilitation payment has legal or other entitlement.” See for instance The 
World Bank/IBRD (2005) for an overview of various bureaucratic obstacles to 
business in different countries and the types of challenges that are sometimes 
reduced by a “facilitation payment.”  
 
A firm bribes actively if it offers a bribe where payments are not requested, while 
passive bribery means acquiescing to demands for bribes; the difference between 
the two will often be unclear. The present study does not make this distinction, 
since it is assumed that corruption for important business contracts generally is a 
result of shared understanding between the parts involved.9 Private-private 
corruption denotes the situation when one firm bribes a representative of another 
firm, neither of them representing a public institution. Judicial definitions of 
corruption will not always include situations in which a public institution is not 
involved. The participants in this study do not seem to discriminate, finding 
corruption a challenge irrespective of whether the client is a public institution or a 
private firm. It is important, therefore, to note that some of the business practices 
reported in this study may not be covered by international anti-corruption 
legislation.10  
 
During several of the interviews the term corruption was itself a strain on the 
conversation. Terms sometimes preferred were undue business practices, pre-
determination of contracts, bid rigging, silent digression from ethical rules, 
extralegal activities, ties and connections, inducements and shabby or low quality 
business climate. The use of such terms may indicate a lack of exact knowledge 
about the business practices used by other firms and also a reluctance of 
executives to describe practices, either their own or those of competitors, by using 
terms that describe unquestionably criminal activities.  
 
 
 
                                                 
9 Although the issue of bargaining power is important in understanding corruption, as is well 
described by Rose-Ackerman (1978), it was not a central research topic in this study. 
10 There is, in spite of vast improvements in the rules, a significant grey zone between legal and 
illegal business practices, particularly when it comes to payments made to reduce barriers to 
business or certain marketing strategies directed towards specific individuals. Recent judicial 
documents, such as the anti-corruption conventions of the Council of Europe, the OECD and the 
United Nations allow for alternative ways of gaining influence by referring to actions that 
obviously have a “corrupt intention” or proposals for “improper advantage”. 
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3 Experience of corruption  
This section summarizes the firms’ general experience with corruption, the extent 
to which this is considered a problem, and also responses regarding the firms’ 
direct involvement. The smaller embassy survey complements the business survey 
by providing an idea of the Norwegian firms’ corruption-related challenges from 
respondents other than the firms themselves, and I shall describe these results 
before I turn to the firms’ responses.  
3.1 The embassy perspective 
Ambassadors are among the public officials who are best able to follow up and 
monitor the recent improvements on international anti-corruption legislation. 
Embassy representatives usually reside in a specific country for a significant 
period of time, they observe its society with the eyes of a foreigner, and they take 
part in political gatherings. At the same time, they are expected to know the local 
markets and industries in order to be able to advise home-country firms entering 
the local market, as well as to inform home-country public institutions. 
Ambassadors will often become involved if home-country citizens commit some 
kind of crime locally. What is the embassy representatives’ view on local business 
corruption in their country of operation? Do they ever make any effort to react 
against the problem?  
 
This part of the study was conducted as a mail survey to which 24 out of 44 
Norwegian embassies outside the OECD-region responded to nine questions. 
Eleven of the responding embassies are in developing countries and 13 are in 
middle-income countries. There are no significant systematic differences between 
their responses. The participating embassies can not be identified, and I cannot 
say for certain if it always were the ambassador him or herself who responded.  
 
The main impression from these responses is that local embassy representatives 
experience corruption in the poor or middle-income country which they are 
located as a real challenge for Norwegian and other foreign firms:  
 
i) Nineteen of these respondents said that corruption is frequently or always part 
of the business culture, and only three respondents considered this problem 
seldom to be an issue in local business.  
 
ii) Eighteen respondents found the business climate in their country of operation 
clearly inferior to what they observe in Norway. These 18 respondents also 
assumed that a refusal to make irregular or informal payments will reduce foreign 
firms’ opportunities to do business in the specific country. A weak majority 
believed that foreign firms that operate in the local market adopt business 
practices that most likely deviate from their own official codes of conduct.  
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iii) Twenty-one of these 24 respondents assumed that Norwegian firms operating 
in the specific area are sometimes or often confronted with challenges related to 
illegitimate business practices, irregular payments, and corruption. Adjustment to 
local practices and informal conventions will, according to a clear majority, often 
imply business procedures that would be considered less acceptable in Norway.  
 
Given this depressing picture of the local business culture, what would the 
embassies recommend Norwegian firms to do if entering the specific markets? 
Would they recommend firms “to adjust to the local business culture, even if it 
could imply business behavior that would not be accepted in Norway”? In the 
given setting it was reasonable to interpret this question as asking whether the 
embassy-respondent would recommend some kind of bribery. Fourteen of the 
respondents stated that they would never give such advice. More than one third 
were in doubt on this issue, and one out of five embassy-representatives were 
prepared to give such an advice.  
 
However, the embassies were also ready to support firms that actually lose 
contracts because of corruption and give advice on how to handle such a situation. 
A clear majority would mention the issue to local authorities, and only five would 
probably not do so. Eleven embassies had actually taken this kind of action and 
had raised the issue of corruption at high political level. Six of these eleven said 
they had done so several times.  
3.2  The firms’ experience 
With this background, I will now consider the firms’ responses. The results in this 
business survey are consistent with the embassy survey; corruption is influencing 
the operations of many firms. Two thirds of those responding to this survey 
actually thought they had lost a contract because of corruption; almost half of 
these were convinced that they had done so.11 Forty-two percent found unethical 
business practices to be common; one third had decided not to operate in a 
specific country because of corruption or similar problems; and half of those with 
production located outside the OECD region found corruption to impede these 
activities. Only one third of the respondents had seldom or never been confronted 
with problems related to corruption when operating in foreign areas, and just 26 
percent had never had reason to believe that competitors have influenced tender 
procedures unduly.  
 
                                                 
11 The response on lost business due to corruption, a question which in this study was not 
restricted to a specific period of time, is higher than the average result of a business survey carried 
out by CRG during 2002. In the CRG study, 27 percent of the responding firms believed that they 
had lost business contracts because a competitor paid a bribe during the last year, almost 40 
percent during the last five years. The responses from the five countries included in the CRG 
survey differed significantly. Fifty-six percent of Hong Kong firms claimed to have lost business 
due to corruption during the past 12 months, compared to 16 percent of UK firms (CRG, 2002). 
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Given these reported challenges, does it ever happen that the responding firms 
take part in corruption themselves? The category of corruption most frequently 
admitted was “facilitation payments.” This is a form of corruption which has an 
unclear legal status to many business people, and which several respondents and 
interviewees justified.12 Half the respondents said that they never make “irregular 
payments to get things done,” 24 percent said they seldom do so, and 17 percent 
admitted that they sometimes or frequently make this kind of payment. The sizes 
of facilitation payments varied. The majority would not offer facilitation 
payments or at least not pay more than $2000. Some firms would offer payments 
between $2,000 and $8,000, and just a few would pay $15,000 or more to get 
things done. There was no clear link between the size of these payments and the 
size of the responding firms. Almost half of the respondents who paid facilitation 
payments said that they did not have any problems respecting present regulations 
in this field.  
 
The respondents were then asked if whether is necessary to offer valuable gifts or 
pay bribes to clients, directly or through an agent, to be able to operate in certain 
countries. While many respondents did not have sufficient information, as many 
as 27 percent of the total found valuable gifts or bribes a prerequisite in certain 
regions (see Table 1 for variation between sectors in this response). This number, 
even if substantial, appears at first sight to represent a significant improvement 
compared to a PriceWaterhouse-Coopers (PWC) survey among the largest 
Norwegian firms in 1998. This survey found that 62 percent of the respondents 
considered it necessary to offer gifts to be able to operate in or get contracts in 
developing country markets.  
 
However, the indicated improvement of attitudes probably does not reflect a 
similar change in actual business practices. The PWC survey appears to reflect 
general attitudes in a year when international attention to corruption was still 
fairly low. The present survey, in contrast, asked about the respondents’ own 
experiences. It also asked for their opinion in the post-Enron year of 2004, after 
the implementation of the OECD anti-bribery convention and several information 
campaigns, just after a corruption scandal in a large Norwegian company, and 
during a time when corporate social responsibility was a main topic of debate. 
Moreover, it asked the respondents to mark the specific areas where they 
considered bribes a prerequisite “to be able to operate”, areas in which they 
actually had business experience. The regions mentioned most frequently were 
much the same as those pointed out by the respondents to the aforementioned 
World Bank survey as particularly challenging and where corruption is a real 
                                                 
12 The examiners who conducted the OECD evaluation of Norway’s implementation of new anti-
bribery rules were concerned that information about facilitation payments was not sufficiently 
communicated to the business sector (OECD, 2004:28). This concern is justified by the present 
findings. The unclear legal status of facilitation payments and other forms of corruption is not 
always improved by the literature on business risks. Poole-Robb and Bailey (2002:59) is just one 
example: “It appears that what is and is not a bribe is a matter of presentation and perception in 
much the same way as the concept of corruption itself”.  
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business constraint (Batra et al., 2003: 51). Nevertheless, the World Bank survey 
found that there are always many firms that are able to operate in the most 
challenging markets without having to pay bribes, and we do not know how much 
effort firms that do pay bribes have put into the reform of their business practices.  
 
When the respondents were asked about their own direct involvement in 
corruption, nine percent admitted having accepted a request from an agent, an 
adviser or a consultant for money that would most likely be used for bribery; 
another six percent said that they probably had done so. A few firms admitted that 
during the last decade they had tried to obtain a contract, a license, or a concession 
in a way that was important to keep confidential.  
 
 
4 Which firms are involved in bribery?  
The most important differences in attitudes and exposure to corruption are related 
to company size, competitive pressure, industry group, and the extent of 
experience from international markets. However, the connection between these 
qualities and corruption is not straightforward; it is not obvious how to separate 
the impacts of different characteristics, and different categories of firms can be 
exposed to different types of corruption. These problems should be kept in mind 
in this section, as we discuss some important factors that determine which firms 
are most likely to be involved in corruption.  
4.1 Size  
The corruption scandals exposed in the media are often those involving famous 
and large companies. However, is it really the case that business corruption 
mainly entails firms of a certain size? Can we actually generalize about corruption 
in this sense? The results of this study suggest that we can, and we can also 
assume that size matters in these questions. Large firms were significantly more 
likely than smaller firms to consider the international competition for important 
contracts biased in their own respective industry. The large firms found 
themselves more able to influence the outcome of tender procedures, they more 
frequently thought that they had lost contracts because of corruption, and they 
were clearly more exposed to the problem of political pressure on international 
tenders.  
 
There are a few aspects that have to be considered when large and small firms are 
compared in their problems with corruption. Large firms will usually be involved 
in a higher number of projects and they enter into more contracts. Their 
probability of experiencing corruption now and then will thus be larger per se, but 
not necessarily in each single business transaction. There are also differences 
between large and small firms in the way they are exposed to or involved in 
corruption. Large firms will more often operate in markets where alternatives to 
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active bribery are possible, such as political donations or political pressure, and 
where they can have contacts that make them able to avoid demands for bribes 
requested at lower bureaucratic levels. Smaller firms may not take part in public 
tenders on large construction projects, contracts with a relatively high risk of 
corruption. Being part of a larger bid is still suggested by several of the small 
firms in this survey as being a common motivation for bribery.  
 
Given these considerations, we can still generalize about size and the results in the 
present study reveal a clear tendency of large firms of being more involved in 
business corruption. However, in the aforementioned World Bank study they 
distinguished between different types of corruption: grand corruption and state 
capture as ways of influencing laws and regulations, on one side, and lower-level 
corruption, bureaucratic red tape, and facilitation payments, on the other. They 
found smaller and younger firms to be more constrained by corruption as they 
were more likely to be the victims of grand scale corruption and state capture, 
leading to lost contracts, and reduced transparency and predictability of laws and 
regulations. Large firms were more likely to be involved in political and “state 
capture” forms of corruption (Batra et al., 2003).  
4.2 Sector 
The results from this survey are not able to provide a full picture of the variations 
in the different business sectors’ exposure to corruption. However, business sector 
comes out as a critical factor in the choices of firms, and certain industries appear 
significantly more likely to be exposed to corruption than others.  
 
Firms in telecom/IT, oil, gas and power generation, and construction clearly had 
more doubts about the capacity of tender rules to prevent corruption. These firms 
more often believed that tender specifications are designed to fit with the offer of 
one specific company, they more frequently thought that competitors win 
contracts by help of political pressure, and they were more likely to negotiate all 
through the tender procedures themselves.  
 
Firms in oil, gas and power generation would more often admit that they “during 
the last decade had tried to obtain a contract, a license or a concession in a way 
that is important to keep confidential” (a result that is significant only at the 10 
percent level). Table 1 describes responses about the firms’ frustrations because of 
corruption. Answers from firms in “construction and heavy industry” are 
compared to those from firms in “oil, gas and power transmission,” which have 
been treated as one sector in this survey. The percentages are those who have 
responded sometimes or frequently to the given questions, as opposed to seldom or 
never. The numbers in the sector-columns are the share of total response within 
each sector, i.e. holding sector as dependent variable.  
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TABLE 1 
Different sectors, different exposure to corruption 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: several of the indicated correlations in this table are not statistically significant. *This question is 
presented in a way that fits with the alternative responses; the reported response here is probably or for 
certain. **The respondents described which regions where this is the case, and the percentages in the table 
represent those who find this required in one or more regions.  
 
 
The sectors perceived to be most exposed to corruption according to the 
mentioned TI Bribe Payers Index, are “public works/construction,” “arms and 
defense,” and “oil and gas.” Telecommunications and power 
generation/transmission are ranked number five and six. Heavy manufacturing 
and IT are ranked less corrupt by the TI respondents. Even if the TI ranking is 
based on a completely different question, the results are comparable with the 
findings in this study. Also a study conducted by Control Risk Group in 2002 (see 
endnote 12) places the same sectors as being the more corrupt. However, 
according to the CRG study, “oil, gas and mining” were the most likely to give up 
an otherwise attractive investment because of corruption, and also the firms most 
likely to review their business practices on account of new laws in this field. 
Telecommunications firms were found to be the least likely to be deterred by 
corruption, and also the least likely to review their practices (GRG, 2002).  
4.3 Competitive pressure 
The large size of business bribes in media cases about corruption might give the 
impression that firms with large profits are more involved in this way of making 
business than firms that are exposed to competitive pressure. Nevertheless, the 
results in this survey do not support that intuition: firms that consider themselves 
too pressured on prices to make profits actually come out as more exposed to 
corruption, and also more likely to find bribery required to be able to operate in 
58%40%27%
Is it necessary to offer valuable gifts or pay a bribe to clients or public 
officials, directly or through an agent,  to be able to operate in certain 
countries?**
29%26%17%When operating in foreign markets, do you ever have to make irregular “additional payments” to get things done?
76%78%67%Have you ever lost contract(s) because of competitors’ unethical business practices?*
47%37%34%Has your company ever decided not to operate in a specific country or region mainly because of corruption or similar problems?
53%57%42%Do you ever have reason to believe that your competitors influence tender procedures unduly?
Oil, gas
&
power
Constr.
& 
heavy 
industry
All
Percentage responding 
sometimes or frequently.
Question 
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certain markets.13 Table 2 presents some of the results on the reported exposure to 
corruption as a function of size and competitive pressure.  
 
 
TABLE 2 
Exposure to corruption, givendifferences in turnover and competitive pressure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: L, M and S refer to large, medium and small firms. High and low competitive pressure refer 
to the answers when asked whether prices for main products are reduced to a level that makes it 
hard to make a profit.   
 
Firms exposed to competitive pressure more frequently experienced a gap 
between formal and informal rules, and they more often decided not to operate in 
a specific country, region, or segment of the market because of corruption. By 
separating the firms that were strongly pressured on prices from those just usually 
pressured on prices, we get a similar pattern: the former are significantly (at the 5 
percent level) more likely to believe that the tender procedures have been rigged, 
they negotiate all through the tender procedures themselves (without following the 
rules), and they have more often problems with corruption in their FDI-
operations.  
 
This result implies that firms in competitive environments are no less exposed to 
corruption and similar undue business practices, and thus not less likely to 
become involved in bribery, compared with firms with more market power. This 
is interesting because several authors have suggested a positive correlation 
between firm profitability and bribe payments in developing countries, see for 
instance Myrdal (1968), Ades and Di Tella (1999), Kaufmann and Wei (1999), 
Clarke and Xu (2002) and Svensson (2003).  
 
 
There are, however, explanations for these inconsistencies. First, the different 
studies describe different forms of corruption, and competitive pressure will have 
different impacts on lower level bureaucratic corruption and facilitation payments, 
on one side, and procurement contracts and higher level business corruption, on 
the other. Second, firms exposed to competitive pressure will more frequently lose 
                                                 
13 The result is controlled for size and sector. 
42%22%25%39%42%34%Our firm has decided not to operate in a country mainly because of corruption or similar problems
73%47%56%65%84%66%We think/are convinced that we have lost a contract due to corruption
HighLowSML
Competitive
PressureTurnover
TotalResponse
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contracts with products that are close or equal to the winning bid in their price and 
quality. They will thus be more inclined to believe that they actually had the best 
offer when they lose contracts, and they will perhaps suspect corruption more 
frequently. Third, there are some dynamics in the connection between competitive 
pressure and corruption that is difficult to measure by statistical studies. 
Corruption may provide the briber with relatively more contracts than what more 
honest competitors manage to acquire, which means that the firm turns profitable 
and is no longer in the category of competitive market firms. Companies 
experience competitive pressures and use corruption to limit their impact. This is 
a problem that emphasizes the link between corruption and industrial 
organization, and underscores the role of antitrust bodies in anti-corruption policy 
decisions. 
4.4 The length of experience from international markets  
The number of years a firm had operated in international markets had a significant 
impact on several responses in this study. Not surprisingly, firms with long 
experience had more often lost contracts because of corruption. However, they 
were also more likely to believe that competitors operate unduly in the present, 
they more frequently found the outcome of tender procedures to be pre-
determined, and they more often admitted to having obtained a contract, a license 
or a concession in a way they considered important to keep confidential. 
Interestingly, they were more likely than any other category to consider corruption 
a problem in the competition for Scandinavian procurement contracts. 
Nevertheless, longer experience did not make the firms more tolerant to 
corruption. They were close to the average in considering this problem “never 
acceptable.”  
4.5 The type of experience from international markets 
Whereas the length of experience from international markets apparently had no 
impact on the firms’ stated tolerance for corruption, the type of experience made a 
significant difference. Firms with parts of their production located in foreign 
countries were clearly more inclined to consider corruption acceptable, for 
instance “if the contract is necessary to avoid insolvency,” “when there is no other 
way of operating in the market,” or just because it can “make the firm end up with 
an important contract.” Firms with production located in foreign countries more 
frequently believed that “competitors influence tender procedures unduly,” they 
more often thought that they had lost contracts because of corruption, and they 
generally had a lower trust in tender procedures. They did not admit more 
involvement in corruption than other firms.  
 
Firms that carry out projects for governmental institutions represent a category 
that many of us associate with corruption. Nevertheless, this type of experience 
did not seem to make the firms more tolerant to corruption or reduce their trust in 
tender procedures. However, these firms’ responses differed significantly from the 
46
  
average in two ways. They reported far more frequently about demands for quid 
pro quos, like the use of local resources, the building of additional infrastructure, 
or other contributions to the local society. And, they more frequently admitted to 
having obtained a contract during the last decade in a way that is “important to 
keep confidential.”  
 
Aid-financed business ventures are another important cross-cutting category. 
International aid to developing countries is sometimes mentioned as a field 
particularly exposed to corruption. The risk of corruption is present at several 
stages of the procedures, beginning with the choice of a contractor for the project. 
In this survey, only 16 of the responding firms had carried out projects financed 
by multilateral or bilateral aid. Half of those had the impression that corruption is 
more common in aid-funded projects than in other projects. In most other respects 
this category did not differ significantly from the average; they were not more 
tolerant to corruption, they had anti-corruption codes of conduct in similar degrees 
as other firms, and they did not differ in their confidence in procurement 
procedures. However, these firms reported significantly more often, and also more 
definitely, that they had “accepted a request from an agent, an adviser or a 
consultant about money that probably would be applied for bribery.”  
4.6 Home country norms and activities abroad  
A final question in this section is whether firms from countries perceived to be 
less corrupt have a lower propensity to make bribe payments. Lambsdorff (2001), 
who linked the level of corruption in import markets with bilateral trade statistics, 
found significant differences between exporters with regard to their tendency to 
offer bribes. Also, TI found by their Bribe Payers Survey that firms from different 
countries differ in their propensity to offer bribes in foreign markets. This implies 
that we should expect Norwegian firms to be less involved in corruption because 
the levels of corruption in Norway are perceived to be low. Since it surveyed only 
Norwegian firms, this survey was of course incapable of testing such a hypothesis.  
What we did, however, was to ask the business people about their views.  
 
While the firms’ “home country norm” is difficult to identify, most respondents 
did not consider corruption an important problem when operating inside of 
Scandinavia. More than half found the competition for important Scandinavian 
contracts to be relatively free and fair.  Nevertheless, when it comes to active 
bribery in foreign countries, 41 percent of the respondents claimed that there is no 
difference between firms from Scandinavian countries and firms from other 
OECD countries.14   
                                                 
14 The fact that firms from OECD countries are responsible for about 70 percent of world trade in 
goods and services (www.unctad.org), makes it relevant to search for distinctions between OECD 
countries in their firms’ propensity to offer bribes. Nevertheless, the OECD-convention on cross-
border bribery and the vast attention to corporate social responsibility in the OECD region, makes 
it plausible to find the largest differences between OECD countries, on the one hand, and countries 
without this kind of restriction, on the other. See also Montigny (2004) who describes the 
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When asking the respondents whether Scandinavian firms were more or less 
exposed to corrupt demands than competitors from other countries, including non-
OECD countries, 56 percent said that there is no difference. These results are not 
qualified to produce general conclusions. When such a large share of the firms 
admit that home country corruption levels make no difference, it still questions 
the strength of this impact on the business practices applied internationally. Given 
the increasing multinationality of big firms, it also seems likely that the firms’ 
culture of origin will become less important in this regard.  
 
5 Responses to corruption  
The presence of a challenging business climate can obviously force a foreign 
company to make choices that it can avoid when operating in markets where 
corruption is less common. We have so far discussed which firms are most 
inclined to be involved in corruption themselves. However, a study of the 
mechanisms of corruption raises questions that go beyond this information. In this 
section we shall consider the firms’ reported choices when competitors get 
contracts by offering bribes. We shall also explore the purposes of bribery: what 
are the actual benefits obtained?  
5.1 Strategic choices 
In general, judicial systems preserve existing values by making already accepted 
behavior legal or unaccepted behavior illegal. When it comes to corruption, it has 
not always been clear what the commonly accepted behavior is.15 In the past, 
although corruption was illegal locally in most host countries, cross-border 
bribery was tax deductible under domestic regulations in many home countries. 
This may explain why there has been, and still is, a certain acceptance of the 
bribery that goes on in countries where the problem is perceived to be common.16 
New international rules have been vital in raising the profile of cross-border 
bribery and in criminalizing its practice. One consequence, however, is that it has 
become more difficult to tell whether firms act in respect of the law, or if they just 
pretend to do so. A cynical gap between actual and asserted business practices is 
not a consequence of the new rules themselves, but may perhaps occur if the new 
rules are not sufficiently enforced. In Europe there are very few court cases 
involving large scale corruption or cross-border bribery. Despite improved co-
                                                                                                                                     
difference between firms from countries with restrictions on cross-border bribery and firms from 
other countries as a challenge and an obstacle to the development of sound industry and trade in 
African countries: Many “clean” firms prefer alternative markets for fear of being involved in 
corruption, and African countries are left with an “adverse selection” of foreign investors. 
15 See an interesting and relevant discussion by Bardhan (1997).  
16 One recent example is the Swedish Foreign Ministry’s refusal to sanction bribes for exports to 
Vietnam, claiming that “one sometimes has to pay bribes to do business in this country” (BBC 
Monitoring Service, 11.03.2004). 
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operation in international crime prevention, the probability of being caught is very 
small for firms involved in corruption.17  
 
This study approached this issue by asking the respondents if they ever found it 
difficult to respect the law. Forty-four percent of the total did sometimes find this 
difficult, 33 percent never found it difficult, while the rest were not familiar with 
the relevant legal regulations. Table 3 combines the sub-group of those who could 
find it difficult to respect the law with some results on attitudes and exposure to 
corruption. The percentages in the table are those responding “yes” or 
“frequently,” as opposed to “no” and “seldom.” 
 
Those who sometimes found the laws difficult to respect are also those who are 
more likely to be exposed to corruption or to be actively involved themselves. 
However, the group of firms that found it difficult to respect the law is also more 
familiar with the relevant legislation and the OECD anti-bribery convention. This 
result can be interpreted in at least two ways: (i) those who found the law easy to 
respect may not be fully aware of the legal status of corrupt practices, or (ii) firms 
that are more exposed to and frustrated by corruption are also more aware of new 
rules.  
TABLE 3 
Corruption and other undue business practices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The reported response represents those who responded ‘often’ or ‘frequently’. On the third question, 
however, (‘required to pay), the response represents those who responded by pointing to specific 
geographical regions. The dependent variable for the subgroup is response within that category.  
                                                 
17 In this regard, the USA comes out as more resolute than Europe. Cross-border bribery has been 
forbidden for US firms since 1977, when the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) was 
introduced. There have been a number of court cases in which firms have been heavily penalized. 
One recent example is Exxon Mobil’s bribery of a Kazakhstan public official to get access to the 
country’s largest oil field. 
48%30%
Are you familiar with the OECD convention against the bribery of foreign public 
officials? 
13%6%
Has your own company, during the last decade, tried to obtain a contract, a license or 
a concession in a way that is important to keep confidential?
35%15%
Has your own company ever accepted a request from an agent, an adviser or a 
consultant about money that would probably be used for bribery? 
32%27%
Is it necessary to offer valuable gifts or pay a bribe to clients or public officials, 
directly or through an agent, to be able to operate in certain countries? 
29%17%
When operating in foreign markets, do you ever have to pay some irregular 
“additional payments” to get things done? 
52%32%
Do you ever experience a gap between formal and informal rules in any of the areas 
where you operate?  
Not always easy to 
respect the lawTotalQuestion
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5.2 Tolerance of corruption   
When respondents were asked directly, their acceptance of corruption was low. 
Some respondents, about six percent, still tolerated or defended corruption if the 
contract was “necessary to avoid insolvency” or “if corrupt practice is common to 
get contracts.” Other respondents, 18 percent, found corruption acceptable “if 
there is no other way of operating in the market.” The majority, 58 percent, found 
it to be never acceptable.  
 
Even so, the disapproval of the crime is challenged in the respondents’ daily 
business life. Whereas a large share of the firms claimed to have lost contracts due 
to corruption (66 percent), only five percent would actively lodge an appeal to the 
customer or the tender authorities if encountering a competitor who they 
suspected of bribery. Twenty-six percent would seek a formal explanation from 
the client under such circumstances. Such an explanation is a routine part of any 
formal tendering process, however, so a firm’s request cannot be considered an 
active response to corruption.  
 
If formal complaints are ignored or rejected, only 13 percent would try to respond 
in alternative ways, for instance, through political channels, in branch fairs, or 
through journalists. As many as 45 percent say that they would prefer not to react 
by any means if they were in this situation. A majority of these firms agree with 
the statement “corruption is part of the game.” Among the persons who claim that 
corruption is never acceptable, 35 percent say that they prefer not to report or 
react against the practice. These responses question the reported intolerance of 
corruption. Many respondents seem to consider corruption a fact of life where 
their own reactions will have no more than a marginal impact. This assumption is 
supported by the 65 percent who claim that they would have been more inclined 
to respond to bribery if it took place in a country where corruption is perceived to 
be uncommon.  
 
What explains this common lack of response to corruption? If competitors pay 
bribes, the companies lose not only their fair chance of gaining the contract but 
also the cost of taking part in the tender, often a significant amount of time and, at 
least for the large firms, it can amount to several million Euros. In spite of these 
losses, they prefer not to complain or claim for compensation.  
 
The most plausible explanation is perhaps the lack of proof in these cases. It will 
often be impossible to verify that corruption has taken place, and there is, of 
course, a general reluctance to accuse somebody of being “corrupt” without clear 
evidence. However, firms that have participated in a tender where the outcome 
has probably been affected by corruption will often have reason to be confident of 
their suspicion. They may have been asked for bribes themselves, they pick up 
reliable rumors, or by other means they realize that the tender procedure is flawed.  
 
In an effort to explore this issue, the respondents were asked to rank alternative 
explanations. The result is presented in Table 4.  
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TABLE 4 
Absence of reaction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The respondents were asked to rank the explanations suggested in the questionnaire. This table 
describes the total score based on a summary of the alternatives, ranked as numbers one and two. 
 
 
Lack of proof and concern about sanctions from accused firms are not major 
factors. The most important reason for staying silent is a worry about future 
business cooperation. Accordingly, if one loses business because a competitor 
paid a bribe, it prefers not to react against the practice out of concern for future 
business cooperation with other firms in the market.  
 
More surprisingly, the firms that never cooperated officially with other firms in 
the market were just as concerned about losing future business cooperation as 
those that did occasionally have this kind of cooperation.18 This worry was 
somewhat higher among firms able to make more profit than is usually possible in 
a competitive market. By contrast, the firms that operated under higher 
competitive pressure on prices were more worried about sanctions from clients 
than about lost business cooperation with other firms. These differences are 
interesting because they suggest that profitable firms are relatively more 
dependent on good relations to other firms in the same line of business; a result 
that could be explained, for instance, by theories on collusion.  
5.3 Local business practices and the use of agents and advisers 
Given that firms seldom raise their voice to report corrupt suspicions, they are left 
with two options when operating in challenging business environments: exit from 
the market or adjust to local business practices. About half the respondents say 
                                                 
18 One explanation is the formulation of the question, as it encourages distance from the practices 
of one’s own business unit. However, the high number of firms that claimed to have lost contracts 
due to corruption makes it reasonable to assume that most answers were based on the firms’ own 
experiences. 
5%I do not know
0%Other reasons
12%Lack of proof
15%Lack of knowledge about the illegality of the act
18%Concern about sanctions from customers
31%Concern about future business cooperation
5%Concern about sanctions from other companies
5%Concern about sanctions from the bribing companyIndependently of the 
experiences of your own 
business unit, what do you 
think is the most common 
reason for a company to keep 
quiet when encountering a 
competitor in bribery?
%ResponseQuestion 
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that they would adjust to the local business culture if they had lost contracts due to 
corruption—or they would accept corruption as “a part of the game.” Table 5 
describes these responses. 
 
TABLE 5 
Corruption as an obstacle to business 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 “Adjustment to local practice” can of course refer to legitimate ways of behaving 
and doing business, but it does also include the option of active bribery. One way 
to get around anti-corruption laws is to go through agents, consultants, and joint 
venture partners. The firms’ benefit of using such intermediaries was therefore a 
relevant issue in this project, and the respondents were asked to rank the 
importance of different qualities that an adviser can have.  
 
The firms were clearly most interested in ties to relevant decision-makers. Almost 
50 percent of the respondents ranked this alternative number one although they 
still avoided the relatives of persons in high-ranking positions. Agents able to deal 
with local formalities were most frequently ranked number two. Other advisers 
were ranked in the following order: international business advisers and/or country 
analysts, local business advisers without ties to the government, lawyers with the 
relevant competence, bureaucrats and politicians. In addition, 44 percent of the 
responding firms said that they had contacts positioned at, or with access to, a 
high level of the government in countries where they operate.  
 
The importance of ties to decision-makers is often justified by referring to cultural 
differences in the ways of doing business. As part of globalization, however, 
business practices are becoming standardized. Work towards a standardized WTO 
government procurement agreement is progressing; the EU has introduced new 
tender rules, and standardized bidding procedures are already widely applied, 
including in developing countries. The impact of these initiatives is partly 
dependent on the motivation of firms to respect the procedures, rather than just 
assume that personal ties are what really matters. As long as firms do not 
recognize this responsibility, the emphasis on agents and ties will continue. And 
certainly, the more emphasis there is on ties to decision-makers, the stronger the 
suspicion will be that firms are involved in corruption and the less reason there 
will be to expect free and fair competition.  
28%I do not know
13%We report the case in alternative ways
5%We retreat from the country
24%We adjust our strategies to the local business culture
28%No big reaction, corruption is part of the gameIf you generally choose not 
to complain [about 
bribery], or if complaints 
are ignored or rejected, 
what do you typically do? 
%ResponseQuestion 
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5.4 Motivation behind bribery  
Increasing sales is perhaps the main motivating factor for the choice of any 
business strategy, corruption included. Given this main driving force, there are 
still differences in what firms seek to achieve with the help of bribery. This study 
gathered information about the purposes behind corruption, and even about “the 
underlying motivation behind the crime.”  
 
Table 4 presents the respondents’ rankings of given suggestions about the direct 
purpose of secret ties to clients. The questionnaire did not ask about the 
respondents’ own motivation, but rather that of other companies in their line of 
business. The present data should therefore not be applied as a basis for general 
conclusions about the respondents.  
 
TABLE 6 
The purpose of bribes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The table is a summary of the responses most frequently ranked numbers 1, 2 or 3.  
 
If tender rules are applied, it becomes more difficult for representatives of the 
customer, whether it is a public institution or a large firm, to promise the potential 
briber a specific contract. Without such a guarantee, the “price” offered, which in 
this case is a bribe, is reduced accordingly, sometimes down to the level of 
“marketing expenses.” If a guarantee of the contract is not obtainable, firms are 
left with less direct ways of influencing the choice of contractor - ways that 
provide the firm with some kind of advantage vis-à-vis competitors. As a 
consequence, many of the respondents suggest that secret information about 
evaluation criteria or tender specifications are common purposes of bribery.  
 
However, the respondents suggested that bribes are most often paid to obtain a 
contract through direct negotiations, which means the abandonment of tender 
procedures altogether. Common justifications for direct negotiations are the 
familiarity of operators with similar equipment, the uniformity of spare parts, a 
14%I do not know
0Other benefits 
1%Reduced political risk 
1%Promises of neglected quality controls
15%Secret information about the other companies’ bids
19%Secret information about evaluation or tender specifications
26%Obtain the contract through direct negotiations
5%Improve economic conditions, such as tax reductions
7%Being part of a bid for a larger contract or concession
14%Adjustments in tender specificationsIf companies in your 
line of business operate 
unduly, for instance by 
establishing secret ties 
to specific decision-
makers, what would 
you suggest that they 
typically would be 
aiming at? 
%AnswersQuestion 
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preference for previous suppliers, or the fact that a tender procedure would be too 
expensive or time consuming. Although these justifications can be legitimate, they 
may also enable corruption. Note also, the firms’ interest in direct negotiations 
underscores the importance of tender rules for reducing corruption. There is no 
logic in offering bribes to avoid tender procedures if these rules are not 
functioning.  
 
The respondents were asked to suggest the most important underlying motivation 
for companies in their line of business to offer bribes. The survey question is 
based on George Moody-Stuart’s (1997:21) explanation of why companies pay 
bribes. The respondents were given three alternatives in addition to the obvious 
goal of getting a contract. Table 7 presents the results.  
 
 
TABLE 7 
The underlying motivation behind bribery 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The third alternative motivation behind bribery, persuading decision-makers to 
buy goods or services which they basically do not need, had a surprisingly low 
rate of response. However, one might anticipate a bias against this alternative 
because most producers have a strong belief in their own products. We cannot 
expect salespersons to believe that their products are not needed. Besides, goods 
purchased from multinationals will often be expensive and technologically 
advanced. Moody-Stuart suggests that military hardware is the classic example of 
this kind of corruption.  
 
The second alternative, goods that would not have been chosen in a fair 
competition, refers to products or services that are of poor quality or are 
overpriced. The buyer demands compensation, a bribe, for choosing the specific 
product because better alternatives exist. This motivation is probably quite 
common but still was suggested by only 21 percent.  
 
The alternative suggested most frequently, by more than half of those who had a 
view, was the concern about losing contracts simply because someone else have 
bribed the decision-makers. The majority of bribers appears to be motivated by a 
lack of trust in their competitors. This result reveals a considerable information 
problem, but also a challenge when it comes to the firms’ internal controls and the 
measures they take against corruption.  
31%4. I do not know
5%3. Persuading decision-makers to buy goods or services that otherwise would not have been 
demanded
21%2. The goods or services offered would not have been chosen in a fair competition
43%1. The fear of losing contracts because someone else has bribed the decision-makers
%Alternatives
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6 Corruption and tender procedures 
This section continues the discussion about how corruption works. What we shall 
consider now is one of the main arenas of business corruption, and discuss some 
challenges in its regulation. We have already referred to the tender procedure, 
where the competition for public contracts is supposed to follow explicit rules to 
ensure fair and “clean” competition between the bidders. However, there is little 
information about the efficiency of procurement rules in preventing corruption, 
and the distinction between acceptable business practices and corruption is often 
ambiguous. Firms competing for a contract will often try to influence the tender 
procedure and the tender specifications, as well as try to influence the officials 
directly responsible for the contract. Influence on tender procedures is not only 
conducted by the firms. A considerable fraction of the respondents to this survey 
also consider political pressure a common problem in international tenders.   
6.1 Influence on tenders 
Marketing strategies verge on corruption when customers’ agents are offered 
benefits of significant private value, particularly when the benefits have a job-
related aspect, such as business excursions and tickets to events to which job 
contacts are also invited. Several of the persons interviewed for the survey 
admitted that the intention behind these gifts is similar or identical to the purpose 
behind bribery. Among the respondents, 26 percent offer valuable tickets to 
clients, while 36 percent offer excursions. These practices are clearly more 
common in sectors perceived to be more exposed to corruption. The survey 
explored the meaning of “gifts” in this setting. During interviews it was made 
clear that the “gifts” or “bribes” requested can be very small, even in countries 
where the level of corruption is perceived to be high. In countries where gifts are 
often expected, it can be sufficient to offer small gifts at values far below what we 
would call bribery - “ridiculous items like cheap souvenirs or chocolate,” in the 
words of one interviewee. Firms that misinterpret a culture may offer gifts that are 
too valuable, thus encouraging corruption and disturbing the local business 
culture. However, the PWC survey of Norwegian firms in 1998 found that gifts of 
rather small value create a bond between business partners that is able to influence 
the outcome of tender procedures.  
 
Other ways of influencing clients are less direct. For instance, due to their 
undoubted expertise, firms are frequently asked to advise clients on technical 
aspects of tender specifications, even if they are among the competitors for the 
contract. This consultative service will in some cases represent an opportunity to 
influence the specifications in a direction that benefits the firm itself or one of its 
associates. Table 8 reports some of the survey findings on firms’ influence on 
tenders. A majority of those who operate in markets where it is possible to 
influence tenders, where the winning bidder is determined ahead of time, or where 
negotiations are common all through the tender procedure, describe the 
competition in the market as “often biased.”  
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In addition to the Table 8 results, two thirds of the respondents found it essential 
or an obvious benefit to obtain or maintain a relationship to a potential customer 
prior to prequalification for a contract; only 24 percent found this to be 
unimportant. Early contacts were considered more important by respondents in 
firms that operate under competitive pressure, compared to those in less 
competitive lines of business.  
 
 
TABLE 8 
Influence on tenders 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note, the percentages represent those responding yes/frequently/often, as opposed to no/never/seldom. 
*Almost a fifth of those reporting communication all through the tender claim that the communication is 
being copied to all tender participants.   
 
6.2 Predetermination of contracts 
Pre-tender contact may reflect biased tender procedures, but this is not invariably 
an indicator of corruption. Although early and mutual trust is necessary to make 
illegal corrupt deals on big contracts, there are also cases where it leads to 
personal relationships that are more decisive for a customer than a bribe offered 
by a newcomer. A more obvious sign of unfair competition is the high reported 
frequency of contracts that are designed to fit with the offer of one specific 
tenderer (Table 8, second question). The technical tender procedure may appear 
correct on the surface even though the qualifications have been set to give a 
comparative advantage to the bribing company. This firm will thus offer the 
lowest price, and the formal procedures appear satisfactory. Such bid rigging will 
often affect the choice of technology, a choice that typically has more 
consequences the larger the project. The choice of technology will, for instance, 
often directly affect what subcontractors are used, and also smaller firms can have 
incentives to influence the relevant decision-makers on large projects. Note, 
however, that pre-selection of bidders is not necessarily a result of corruption. 
Clients may be obligated to use tender procedures, regardless of justified 
preferences for a specific company, for instance because of satisfaction with its 
past performance. According to the persons interviewed, pre-selection is also 
applied by clients to control the spread of contracts when there are few 
competitors in order to reduce their possibilities to operate as a cartel.  
49%*Will there often be negotiations between tender participants and decision-makers during the tender procedure? 
41%Does it ever happen that tender specifications are designed to fit with the offer of one specific company? 
33%Are you ever able to influence or asked to advise clients on tender specifications?
TotalQuestion
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6.3 Do tender rules prevent corruption? 
Pre-selection and pre-tender contact make it reasonable to consider the efficiency 
of tender rules in controlling corruption. In fact, as many as 55 percent of the 
respondents did not think that tender rules could prevent this problem. Fifteen 
percent said that tender rules do function as an obstacle, while only six percent 
considered tender rules to be an efficient obstacle to corruption. However, as 
briefly discussed already, there are significant variations between firms in their 
opinion about procurement procedures. Firms with production located in several 
countries and/or many years of experience from trade in international markets had 
significantly lower confidence in the ability of procurement procedures to prevent 
corruption. And, the longer the experience from international markets, the 
stronger was the firms’ propensity to negotiate all through the tender procedures.  
 
The most important quality in this regard was the size of the responding firms: the 
larger the firms, (i) the “better” their possibility was to influence tender 
specifications; (ii) the more frequently they suspected that the outcome of a tender 
was determined ahead of the procurement procedure; (iii) the more often they 
believed that political pressure had an influence on the competition for important 
contracts, and (iv) the lower their trust was in procurement procedures to ensure 
fair competition. These results emphasize the challenge of designing procurement 
procedures for large international tenders. What we also can conclude is that 
common procurement procedures make a significantly better defense against 
corruption when the participating firms are small and medium sized.19  
 
6.4 The rules of communication 
One specific problem that may enable corruption seems to be that rules of 
communication are often neglected in tender procedures. Although access to 
information and transparency are important in ensuring fair competition, it is 
crucial to keep critical information about the bids as secret as possible. 
Communication rules are supposed to prevent the distribution of such critical 
information, which for obvious reasons is a frequent object of bribery. A central 
element in most formal tender rules is the way the contact between client and 
bidders should take place once the tender process has started. At this stage, the 
rules often require that communication between one firm and the client is copied 
to all tenderers. Nevertheless, the results presented in Table 8 reveal a high 
tendency for negotiations to occur at all stages of a tender, too often without 
having critical information copied to other tender participants.  
 
Also this procurement-related problem is clearly more common among the largest 
firms. The contracts are of course larger and more complex at this level, and they 
                                                 
19 See Søreide (2005) were I discuss these results in light of the EU procurement reform. Della 
Porta and Vannucci (1999) describe many different ways of cheating on tender rules. Corruption 
can obviously take place in spite of such procedures.  
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will often include details that need thorough discussion. These are, however, 
aspects that will also make it easier to cover up corruption. I discussed this issue 
with the people interviewed in the pilot study, who represented large firms. They 
generally associated a lack of respect for these communication rules with 
unacceptable business procedures, and found it “very problematic” when the rules 
were not followed. This group considered the rules of communication particularly 
important for complex contracts.  
 
Although a low respect for communication rules seems to reduce the efficiency of 
tender rules designed to prevent corruption, it should, again, be noted that a 
violation of communication rules is not necessarily a result of corruption or a lack 
of respect for the rules among firms taking part in a tender. To hold down prices 
or to make a certain firm win the tender, the client may have an incentive to 
inform one or several of the competing tenderers about the secret tender 
information.  
 
6.5 Political pressure  
The outcome of tenders on big contracts is sometimes affected by political 
pressure to the benefit of one specific firm, specifically when the client is another 
government. The pressure takes the form of a subsidy, such as an export credit 
deal, aid to the buyer linked formally or informally to the purchase, diplomatic or 
political pressure, commercial pricing issues, impediments to trade, or tied 
defense/arms deals.  This kind of pressure may reduce the prospect of ending up 
with the outcome most beneficial to the host country’s citizens. The link to 
corruption becomes clear when the privileged firm has paid its own government to 
put pressure on the client.20 However, the local welfare implications of such 
political influence are, of course, independent of the type of ties between the 
bidding foreign firm and its own government, and even without such a payment, it 
resembles corruption. The buyer is, in effect, bribed by the contractor’s 
government, while the responsible minister can refer to jobs and exports.21  
 
Only one out of five respondents to this survey had received assistance from 
Norwegian governmental institutions to guarantee the financial aspects of the deal 
or to ensure a specific contract in other ways. One third believed that competitors 
had obtained contracts this way. The TI Bribe Payers Survey found significant 
differences in the propensity of governments to influence the international 
business ventures of domestic firms - the USA, France, and the UK appear to be 
particularly active. Several respondents to the present survey considered political 
                                                 
20 The pressure can also be a threat of political sanctions. According to people interviewed for this 
survey, in some countries firms sometimes pay their national politicians, for instance in the form 
of party financing, to sanction a client, or the client’s government (when the client is a firm), after 
the contract has been given to “the wrong firm”, a competitor. 
21 “…without mentioning the fact that such jobs are in fact subsidized” – from an article in The 
Economist, ”Don’t be salesmen”, 1 February 1997 
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pressure to the benefit of international competitors a significant disadvantage and 
called for more political assistance from Norwegian authorities. Some also said, 
however, that Norwegian authorities tend to prefer Norwegian firms in 
governmental tenders and that foreign competitors probably consider this a 
comparable disadvantage.  
 
Quid pro quo is a different form of political pressure, still connected to big 
contracts, but now instigated by local political authorities. It refers to a reciprocal 
exchange in which the chosen firm provides benefits for local governments and 
their constituents. For example, a multinational firm might promise to build a 
school or infrastructure, or to use local human resources during their operations in 
the given country. In the present study, 18 percent reported that they frequently 
experienced a request for a quid pro quo, 33 percent seldom, and 35 percent never 
met such a request. Local content demands are clearly more common among the 
large firms, compared to small- and middle-sized ones, and appears - from this 
limited material - more common in construction and oil, gas and power 
transmission than in other areas of business.  
 
It has been argued that social responsibility, or the inclusion of such local content, 
is a form of bribery as it may induce a government to choose a particular bidder. 
About half the respondents to the survey conducted by the Control Risk Group 
thought that companies made donations to charities now and then for the purpose 
of gaining a business advantage (CRG, 2002). It is, however, legitimate to hope 
for an improved reputation in return for generosity. And local content will not 
necessarily influence the choice of bidder. The same local content can be expected 
from any winning bidder, independently of which firm is selected. Besides, such 
benefits are unlikely to provide private profits to the public contracting official 
although it may benefit incumbent politicians seeking reelection. Even if the 
development implications of local content in business contracts varies a great 
deal22, it is important not to lump this practice together with the criminal act of 
bribery.  
 
7 Internal control and measures  
Although the general emphasis on corporate social responsibility seems to have 
changed attitudes in many firms, its impact on the extent of international business 
corruption has not been convincing thus far. Many firms that operate in 
international markets are still not prevented from taking part in unethical business 
practices by their own codes of conduct or by home-country regulations. Other 
firms may continue to pay bribes, in spite of such codes and rules, perhaps in fear 
of losing contracts because competitors pay bribes. This study explores the 
responding firms’ internal anti-corruption measures and their views of 
                                                 
22 See for instance the paper by Heum et al. (2003) 
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management’s responsibility in dealing with allegations of corruption inside their 
firm 
7.1 Codes of conduct, control- routines and campaigns 
Internal anti-corruption measures introduced by firms vary significantly. Eighty-
nine percent of the large firms in this study have internal written codes of conduct 
that restrict employees from paying bribes, compared to only 19 percent of the 
small firms. Altogether, 36 percent of the total have such codes. Even more firms, 
48 percent, say that they have routines to detect bribery carried out by employees 
on behalf of the firm. There is a clear overlap between these groups: almost 70 
percent of those with routines to detect bribery conducted by employees also have 
anti-corruption codes of conduct, while those without routines do not have codes 
either.  
 
However, only 21 percent believed that their routines to detect corruption were 
efficient. The fact that 74 percent claimed to have efficient routines to detect other 
economic offences, like false consultancy fees, fake invoices, or illegal 
transactions made, for instance, to avoid taxes, makes it plausible to assume that 
firms’ control mechanisms are less able to detect bribery than other forms of 
economic crime. Several of the interviewees also admitted that they needed advice 
about how to introduce efficient controls to detect corruption offered on behalf of 
the firm. When it came to the detection of bribes received by employees, 30 
percent said they have relevant control routines, and 13 percent had actually 
detected an employee engaging in corruption.  
 
Almost half the firms encouraged employees to report the case internally if they 
uncovered bribery or other types of crime carried out by the firm. Eleven percent 
would actually not encourage employees to do so, whereas 35 percent said that 
they did “not actively” encourage employees to speak out. The category of firms 
which encouraged “internal whistle-blowing” overlapped significantly with the 
group of firms that never offer “additional payments to get things done.” And, the 
firms which sometimes offer this type of facilitation payments were mainly in the 
category which find it less important to encourage employees to speak out.  
 
During the past decade, NHO, the business organization, has arranged several 
anti-corruption conferences and informed their members about the problem of 
corruption and the importance of keeping to professional standards of conduct. 
When asked about the impact of these campaigns, 35 percent already had a clear 
attitude against bribery while 26 percent, with a significant majority of large 
firms, found the campaigns to have influenced their views. A significant ambition 
of the NHO campaigns was to inform firms about the implementation of the 
OECD anti-bribery convention and its implications for firms’ business practices. 
Although the questionnaire reminded the respondents about its content, as many 
as 70 percent of the respondents still were not familiar with the convention. This 
number is surprisingly large, especially as a considerable share of the respondents 
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claimed to be aware of the NHO’s distribution of anti-corruption information. 
Only 26 percent said that the relevant employees are informed by the company of 
the content of the OECD convention. These firms were mainly large.  
7.2 Company culture and the responsibility in case of scandal 
When asked about the main reason for not paying bribes when operating in 
foreign markets, one of the most frequent answers was “it is not part of our 
company culture.” Codes of conduct may reduce the demands for bribes as it 
becomes easier for representatives of the firm to reject such requests, and future 
expectations about bribes will be reduced. However, does it follow automatically 
that such codes also reduce a firm’s potential for losing contracts because 
competitors make use of unethical business practices?  
 
The CRG (2002) study finds that firms from countries where anti-corruption 
codes are common, the USA and the UK, are less exposed to corruption in the 
sense that these firms report a lower tendency to lose contracts because 
competitors pay bribes. By contrast, the present survey does not find any lower 
exposure to corruption among those with best practice codes. There are in fact 
significantly more losses of contracts reported due to corruption in the group of 
firms that have implemented anti-corruption codes, compared to the category 
without such codes. What this means is that the Norwegian firms that have 
introduced best practice codes are also most likely to be those that are most 
exposed to such problems. Moreover, respecting codes of conduct in such a 
setting is likely to increase a firm’s propensity to lose contracts due to corruption. 
This perhaps obvious implication is often neglected in anti-corruption debates.  
 
The commitment to anti-corruption codes will also depend on the executives’ role 
in and attitude to corruption. Top executives are, in addition to the board, 
officially responsible for a firm’s operations, and there are reasons to believe that 
decisions about bribery are made at the same level. When CRG (2002) asked 
which sections of a company were most likely to be involved when bribery 
occurs, the most common response was “senior management.” In the present 
study, the respondents represented senior management, and most of them said that 
they would have been informed if bribery had taken place on behalf of the firm. 
More than half, 55 percent - mostly small and medium sized firms - would 
“certainly” have been informed, and 29 percent would “probably” have been 
informed if bribery had taken place to obtain a contract or a significant benefit.  
 
Some of the respondents, nevertheless, admitted that it might be difficult to 
control their agents. Almost one third (29 percent) did not think they would be 
able to discover whether a considerable part of the compensation to an agent was 
used for bribery, compared to 54 percent who positively thought it would be 
possible to notice this. Only 16 percent said that they would not know whether the 
firm took part in corruption, a response that may reflect the fact that several 
respondents were in charge of just one branch of a multinational firm and thus 
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were not responsible for the operations of other divisions. In addition, some firms 
have employees in positions that may provide them with incentives to pay bribes 
out of their private pocket to increase their chance of doing business and hence 
their personal career opportunities. The bribe in such cases is still paid on behalf 
of the firm.23  
 
Executives’ tendency to avoid unpleasant information about “grease” payments 
and bribery taking place in foreign countries of operation was perhaps more 
common in the past. In this material, only 18 percent had actually considered it a 
benefit not to be informed if an agent applies his/her compensation to 
questionable payments, compared to 70 percent who would never consider this a 
benefit.  
 
Accordingly, when there is a deviation between actual and asserted business 
practice, the accountability appears to lie, both formally and actually, with those 
who promulgate anti-corruption codes of conduct. The risk of corruption is, 
therefore, connected to executive decisions and to the probability of being caught 
engaging in a corrupt practice. Firms that carry out projects as a joint venture or a 
consortium face the additional risk of cooperating firms who seek to influence 
clients in an unethical manner. Of the firms in the survey, 42 percent have carried 
out projects in a foreign country as a joint venture or as a part of a consortium. 
One-third of these firms said that they had experienced the problem of a 
cooperating firm that sought to influence a client in a way that the respondent 
found difficult to acknowledge. Most of these firms complained to their partners 
about the specific practice.24 
 
Cases of corruption can cause vast reputational damage, and it is obvious that 
most firms that face a corruption scandal are cautious about publicity. When 
asked about the typical reaction from the company if a serious violation of ethical 
codes, such as corruption, were detected, the responses were as follows: 42 
percent would initiate an “internal inquiry,” while 13 percent would have an 
“internal discussion.” Only 11 percent thought they would involve the police, and 
just one firm would open the way for investigation by an external committee or 
consultancy. However, the survey question is difficult to answer. The firms’ 
reactions would obviously depend on the actual circumstances, and 32 percent 
said that they in fact did not know how they would react. The survey reveals a 
significant anxiety about discussing the problem with persons outside the firm. 
                                                 
23 The unclear liability of the firm in such situations should not be a loophole in laws against 
corruption. Too many firms have escaped prosecution by placing the guilt on a scapegoat. In 
Norway, for instance, only individuals had, until recently, been held responsible for the offence of 
bribery. 
24 However, some firms may carry the concept of due diligence a bit too far. Some respondents 
said that illegal methods, similar to the practices of intelligence services, are applied by firms in 
international markets to be assured that potential business partners will not operate in a way that 
may represent a risk to the firm. 
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8 Conclusion  
The aim of this project was to understand the strategic choices and preferences of 
a group of business leaders in situations when they experience corruption and in 
similar ways a challenging business climate. Most of these business leaders live in 
a country with relatively low levels of corruption, and they are thus expected to 
have “good home country norms.” The distinctive feature of this study is its 
specific focus on such a group’s way of handling corruption when operating with 
trade and investments in international markets. Some of us would perhaps 
consider this group to be among those who are best able to cope with the 
problems of corruption – since it is supposed to be “cleaner” and at the same time 
able to operate successfully in challenging sectors and countries. However, the 
impact of home country norms for choices made in international markets is 
uncertain. Many firms in this survey did not themselves consider such aspects 
decisive, and also respondents to the embassy survey described local corruption as 
a challenge for all foreign firms. Moreover, a significant share of the firms in this 
business survey said that they consider corruption “a part of the game” in some 
foreign markets, and preferred to “adjust to local practices” when being 
challenged by corruption, rather than, for instance, leaving the specific market. 
The barrier to taking action against the practice when losing contracts in such a 
situation is also high. This attitude was often explained by a “concern about future 
business cooperation.”  
 
Many respondents revealed confusion about the legal status of certain forms of 
corruption. Several respondents found it easy to respect relevant regulations, 
while at the same time admitted the use of business practices that clearly violate 
Norwegian or local law. Even so, those firms that found themselves unable to 
respect the law in certain situations were the most informed about the OECD anti-
bribery convention. There were also significantly more losses of contracts due to 
corruption in the group of firms that had implemented anti-corruption codes, 
compared to the category without such codes.  
The propensity to be involved in corruption differed significantly between 
different categories of firms. Size, sector, type of international experience, and the 
number of years in foreign markets proved to be critical factors in this respect. In 
addition, firms that operated in competitive environments were actually more 
inclined to take part in corruption, compared to those more able to make profits. 
This is perhaps surprising, considering the fact that corruption is not a problem 
when the competition for important contracts is free and fair. However, intuition 
suggests that firms operating on the margin can have a stronger incentive to take 
certain shortcuts.    
 
Procurement procedures have been established, and in many countries 
significantly improved, in recent years to ensure free and fair competition. 
Nevertheless, tender procedures are not believed to be an efficient obstacle to 
corruption. Avoiding or influencing such procedures are still the main purposes of 
bribery. Bid rigging and forged tender procedures appear to be serious problems 
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in international business, and the study emphasizes the challenge of designing 
procurement procedures that can efficiently prevent corruption. This is 
particularly an issue in tenders for complex contracts and large firms. The results 
in this study imply that common procurement procedures are far better able to 
ensure free and fair competition when the participating firms are small and 
medium-sized. Another matter that is most relevant for the large and complex 
contracts is the influence of political pressure, which was described by the 
respondents as an alternative to corruption or as a form of corruption. This 
problem should obviously be included in debates about the quality of procurement 
procedures.  
 
While corruption in tender procedures tends to concentrate on certain advantages 
vis-à-vis competitors, it is also important to understand the underlying driving 
forces behind corruption. A critical problem in this regard appears to be a worry 
that competitors will offer bribes. As a logical consequence, instilling anti-
corruption commitment in firms should involve a signal of reliable anti-corruption 
commitment to other firms, which often will require a more creative incentive 
program than the introduction of internal anti-corruption codes. The survey also 
found that top executives are informed and responsible, not only formally, if 
corruption does take place, and the business-risk of corruption is strongly 
connected to decisions made at this level.  
 
As a final point, this study exemplifies the possibilities of getting responses to a 
large number of questions related to this very sensitive topic. In that sense I hope 
it may serve to establish guidelines for future larger or more specific surveys on 
similar issues. Such empirical studies can have a significant value in supporting or 
rejecting assumptions, or can make us aware of correlations and mechanisms. 
Particularly in combination with more theoretical analyses, this can be a fruitful 
approach to understanding corruption.  
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Abstract
A recent business survey in Norway reveals that firms rarely re-
act to corruption, even when they have lost important contracts as
a result. This disinclination to take action is explored in the light of
market structures, business eﬃciency, judicial institutions and polit-
ical corruption. The paper develops a theory about how these four
variables deter firms from reacting against corruption, and, in par-
ticular, how the potential for collusion reinforces the incentives to
remain silent. Considered separately, each of the factors are unable to
explain the low frequency of anti-corruption reactions between firms.
Considered in combination, however, the various impediments suggest
a more complete explanation: When conditions in market structure
suggest that the best response would be to take action, political con-
ditions may favour inaction. When a potential whistle-blower expects
support from local politicians or legal institutions, the given oﬀender
may be impervious to sanctions; its role in the market will not be al-
tered by the given case. The sum of preconditions for action suggests
that firms rarely react against corruption.
(JEL L10, K42)
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1 Introduction
Several studies describe corruption as an obstacle to local welfare-eﬀects from
business and industry (Bardhan, 1997; Kaufmann et al., 2005; Shleifer and
Vishny, 1993). This problem has triggered debates about the responsibil-
ity of multinationals to refrain from corruption-related temptations in their
interaction with local markets and governments (Rose-Ackerman, 2002; Seu-
bert, 2005; Bray, 2005). Several measures have also been taken to strengthen
international anti-bribery regulations (OECD, 2005).
The presence of business-corruption implies that firms lose contracts be-
cause competitors oﬀer bribes. An interesting aspect of this corruption thus
relates to the responses of the victimized firms: What is the common re-
action if a contract is lost because a competitor has oﬀered a bribe? Firms
that lose contracts because competitors oﬀer bribes are often the best placed
to perceive instances of corruption. The potential impact on the business
climate if firms were to react against each others’ bribery is significant. This
suggests that multinationals may have a broader responsibility in respect
of combatting corruption than simply adopting a passive “we-do not-pay-
bribes-ourselves” stance.
In practice, reactions against competitors who oﬀer bribes rarely take
place. Firms prefer to stay silent about this form of corporate oﬀense even
when they have lost important business opportunities and wasted significant
amounts in tender expenses as a result. They rarely lodge complaints against
the tender procedures, they do not seek legal redress by initiating a court
action, and they seldom ask their home country to intervene at a diplomatic
level. Furthermore, they do not make liability claims for lost tender expenses,
and they do not make their suspicions public in other ways.
These preferences were revealed in a recent business survey (Søreide,
2006). The survey was conducted in cooperation with the Confederation of
Norwegian Enterprise (NHO), the largest business organization in Norway,
and the respondents were Norwegian exporters. Two thirds of the responding
firms believed that they had lost important contracts because competitors
had oﬀered bribes. Even so, a clear majority of these firms would never
make a whistle-blower reaction against competitors who engaged in corrupt
practices.
A lack of proof was the reason cited for inaction by 12 percent of the
respondents. The explanation most frequently cited, though, was a concern
about ”future business cooperation”, which was referred to by 31 percent of
2
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the firms. Curiously, firms that had never cooperated formally with other
firms in the industry were just as concerned about the adverse impact of any
whistle-blowing on future business cooperation as those which had this kind
of cooperation. The concern about business cooperation was significantly
stronger among highly profitable firms, whereas firms that operated under a
stronger degree of price pressure where more concerned about how customers
would consider a whistle-blower reaction about corruption.
These findings on business cooperation and market power do not neces-
sarily point at issues related to collusion between firms. They do, however,
reveal a strong link between profitability, relations with other firms in the
market, and a low propensity to react proactively against corruption.
However, the quality of local institutions also appeared important. Firms
were significantly more prepared to react proactively to perceived instances
of corruption in a country where the level of corruption is perceived to be
low than in a country where corruption is perceived to be widespread.
This connection between the propensity to speak out and the perceived
level of corruption was not further explored in the survey. One possible
interpretation is that firms will not react against bribery unless they expect
local judicial institutions to respond to a complaint with proper investigation
of the facts. The level of corruption referred to by the survey-respondents
at this issue could also relate to other arenas. For instance, firms may not
wish to react against cases of bribery if local politicians benefit from this
corruption.
The present article builds on data generated by the business survey and
aims at explaining some of the survey results with the help of economic
theory. It is thus an attempt to shed light on the way in which industry
structure and institutional quality may aﬀect a company’s incentive to react
against corruption.
Connections between industry structure and corruption-related decision-
making have not been much explored. Svensson (2000) describes the level of
bribes as a function of profits and sunk cost. Ades and Di Tella (1999) found
corruption to be more widespread in countries where companies obtain high
rents, where antitrust regulation function poorly, and where domestic firms
are sheltered from foreign competition. Evidence for a similar connection is
provided by the World Bank’s investment climate studies, in which a number
of business climate qualities have been estimated. According to these data,
published by Batra, Kaufmann and Stone (2003), there is a strong correlation
between the function of antitrust institutions in a given country and the firms’
3
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reported problems related to corruption, as is illustrated in Table 1.1
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Table 1. Percentages of business people in various countries who consider the
level of corruption and local antitrust policies, respectively, as obstacles to
business. The quality of the judiciary and the level of organized crime are
included with weak colours.
The results of the study reported in Table 1, in combination with the
survey results (Søreide, 2006), suggest that: (i) industrial structure is an im-
portant factor in understanding corruption-related decisions; (ii) the oppor-
tunity for firms to collude is higher in markets where corruption is common.
These suggestions are not controversial. The pertinent question is whether
industrial structure and the opportunity for collusion can explain the absence
of whistle-blowing reactions against perceived cases of corruption. I will ex-
plore this issue by drawing on standard theories of industrial organization.
From this perspective, I will consider the importance of heterogeneity among
firms, the quality of local institutions and the presence of political corruption.
Although the empirical evidence shows a link between corruption and col-
lusion, there are few theoretical models on this topic. Corruption is, for in-
stance, not an issue in Levenstein and Suslow’s (2004) extensive review of the
literature on cartel stability and success. An important contribution is made
by Lambert and Sonin (2003), however, who apply game theory to explain
1Own estimates based on data in Batra et al (2003). The correlation is significant at
the 1% level, with a correlation coeﬃcient of 0.48.
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why corruption stabilizes collusion in public procurement tenders. They find
corruption and collusion to be ”strategic complements”, a statement that
may apply for other situations than public procurement. Corruption can,
intuitively, function as a barrier to entry in so far as clients can be bribed by
the cartel. Corruption may also have a stabilizing function because it can be
diﬃcult for colluders to withdraw from the cartel if they have been involved
in corruption.
A firm’s potential profit if a cartel can be established, as compared to
competitive market structures, is an important part of the present study.
One relevant background paper is therefore Schmalensee’s (1987) study of
the trade-oﬀ between collusion and Cournot-competition in the case of het-
erogenous firms. Friedman and Thisse (1994) analyze the stability of a given
cartel in a symmetric oligopolistic market with homogenous firms and where
it is diﬃcult to prevent entry. They describe how entrants who are disliked
by a local cartel may end up as cartel members with profits that gradually
become equal to the incumbent firms. Like this present paper, they too
point to connections between profits and incentives to blow the whistle on
corporate crime. The present paper diﬀers from the Friedman-Thisse study
by concentrating on corruption, heterogeneity between firms, a political en-
vironment and judicial institutions. A good overview of the economics of
collusion is provided by Ivaldi et al. (2003).
This paper builds on this body of work and continues by describing a
simple theory about the importance of and connection between elements
that may prevent a firm from reacting to a case of corruption. Under which
circumstances will a company react actively against the bribery conducted
by competitors?
It begins by considering the issue of market structures and the potential
benefits from collusion. A firm with ambitions about some form of cooper-
ation with competitors will usually be cautious in its interactions with its
competitors, and I assume that firms in this position will not take action
against their competitors’ corporate crime. The point of this exercise is to
sort out firms that may consider themselves inhibited by market incentives
from speaking out about corruption.
Secondly, the paper examines the role of local judicial institutions. The
perceived ability of these institutions to respond eﬀectively to an allegation
of corruption is demonstrated to exert considerable influence over a firm’s
decision to take anticorruption action or not.
The third aspect considered is political corruption. Politicians in key
5
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positions may respond to information about a case of business corruption,
by encouraging or preventing the investigation of the facts. The final question
thus regards the extent to which political corruption will prevent a firm from
reacting against a case of bribery.
The conclusion draws together the propositions described in the paper
into a general model of why firms rarely take action against corruption.
2 Why not react?
A firm is convinced that it has just lost an important business project be-
cause a competitor has oﬀered a bribe. Whether it decides to reveal its
grievance or stay silent about it depends on its assessment of the expected
costs and benefits. Although there are several options in this situation, this
analysis concentrates on the choice between (1) blowing the whistle about
the corruption and (2) remaining silent about it. For simplicity I will assume
that the firm is able to prove that an incident of corruption has taken place.
However, the eﬀects in many cases would be similar if the firm was only able
to reveal suspicions of corruption.
There are four main reasons why a firm may decide to react proactively
against the oﬀense. First, it may be motivated by a desire for revenge; the
bribery has cost it an important contract. Secondly, it may be the prospect
of undertaking a liability claims. International law has made it possible for
companies to sue for compensation in respect of lost tender expenses in cases
of bribery, which can amount to huge numbers. Thirdly, by reacting against
the bribery, the firm may want to signal its anti-corruption practices to the
market; this can improve its market image both overseas and back home.
Fourthly, the firm is driven by principles; its ability to prove the oﬀence
presents it with a specific opportunity to improve the local business climate.
In this paper I will not consider the morality, the connection to the given
country, or, in other ways, the background of the potential whistle-blower.
The focus is rather on describing the costs and benefits of whistle-blowing
on corruption for a firm that is operating in a market as one of several
competitors, while also being subject to political conditions.
As a possible cost, executives are worried that speaking out about corrup-
tion will mean that in the future they will be unable to establish a profitable
cooperation with their competitors, some form of a cartel. They will not
reveal the bribery conducted by competitors if they wish to keep an oppor-
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tunity to collude with the same competitors.2 The relevance of calculating
on collusion when considering a reaction against a case of bribery follows
directly from the correlation illustrated in Table 1: antitrust institutions
function poorly when corruption is part of the business climate. This implies
that the opportunity to obtain cartel profits is higher than elsewhere.
One possible benefit of whistle-blowing for the whistle-blower is the chance
of eliminating one or more competitors, while emerging from the incident
with its own reputation for clean and honest business practice enhanced.
This incentive to react against corruption corresponds to the third category
of motive, the signal-eﬀect.
However, the business survey revealed a common worry that reacting
against corruption might lead to undesired consequences, such as jeopardizing
diﬀerent forms of future business cooperation. These can be oﬃcial forms
of cooperation, like consortial agreements, i.e. they do not have to resemble
collusion. And during interviews, which were conducted as part of the survey
project, several executives said that they preferred not to make any fuss
about competitors’ corruption although it had cost them contracts. I will
therefore assume that firms will react against corruption only if they expect
some benefit.
2.1 Market incentives
Consider an exogenously given number, N > 1, of heterogenous firms that
meet regularly in the same oligopolistic markets. They each produce the
quantity of qi ∈ [0,∞) at the variable cost of ciqi, and thus a marginal cost
of ci < 1. The firms produce a homogenous output, the demand for which is
given by the inverse linear demand function, p(Q) = 1−Q, whereQ = ΣNi=1qi.
Cournot competition implies the following profit for each firm:
max
qi
πCi (qi, qqi) = qi
"
1− qi −
Ã
N
Σqj
j 6=i
!
− ci
#
(1)
We do not need information about the distribution of costs in an oligopoly
to determine price and quantities since the equilibrium can be found by the
2This assumption is independent of the possible benefits of competitors in the market,
which in many cases would suggest an opening for collusion. The business-survey suggests
a concern in these situations, which according to basic profitmaximization is unfounded.
If there already is a cartel in the market, the theory and the results would be similar.
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sum of marginal costs across the producers (Bergstrom and Varian, 1985).
Using the average marginal cost, c = ΣNi=1c/N, we can derive from (1) that
pC = 1+Nc
N+1
and qCi = c−ci+ 1−cN+1 , which leads to the following profit function
of each firm:3
πCi =
µ
c− ci +
1− c
N + 1
¶ ∙
1 +Nc
N + 1
− ci
¸
(2)
=
[N(ci − c) + ci − 1]2
(N + 1)2
The potential cooperation between the firms would imply some form of
cartel profit that represents potential revenues that are higher than Cournot-
competition, given by a joint profit maximization:
max Πm = Qpm −
N
Σ
i=1
qici (3)
The eﬃciency of a considered cartel, in terms of production shares ac-
cording to production costs, is not given. From the theory of collusion we
know that a completely eﬃcient cartel of heterogenous producers will seldom
occur (see, for instance, Ivaldi et al., 2003) and a firm would rarely make
such an assumption. We can assume that eﬃcient firms consider collusion
only if they expect at least as large a market share as other firms in the car-
tel. Less eﬃcient firms, with higher than average marginal costs, will always
benefit from collusion. In the given context, where the firms only consider
the opportunities to get a higher profit than in Cournot-competition, we can
thus make the simplifying assumption that potential cartel members will get
the same market share. The revenues of a cartel member will still depend on
their own eﬃciency.4
Optimization over the average marginal cost, c = ΣNi ci/N, leads to the
symmetric output of qm = 1−c
2N
, the price pm = 1+c
2
and the total production
of Q = Nq = 1−c
2
. Each firm would thus expect at least the following profit
if a cartel is established:
πmi =
(1− ci)2
4N
(4)
3The result is found by solving for the aggregate production level. The first-order
condition will then lead to: qi = 1 −Qc − ci, and Q = N(1−c)N+1 , which is substituted into
the qi− expression and rewritten.
4See the appendix for the case of heterogenous quantities and increasing marginal cost.
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The firm’s decision on whether or not to react to a case of corruption
depends on its comparison of a potential cartel profit, in (4), with its present
Cournot-profit. The profit under both circumstances obviously depends on
the number of firms in the market, N , as well as the firm’s relative produc-
tivity. Solving for πCi > π
m
i , we find how large the marginal cost advantage
would have to be to make a firm consider a whistle-blower reaction, without
the risk of giving up higher profits.
c− ci >
(1− ci)(2N +N
3
2 +
√
N)
2N2
(5)
Proposition 1 The greater the cost advantage and the higher the number of
firms in the market, the less likely is the firm to be prevented from whistle-
blowing by market incentives.
Proof. The argument about cost advantage is given by (2), (4) and (5).
The derivative of (5) with respect to N is negative:
∂
∂N
(1− ci)(2N +N
3
2 +
√
N)
2N2
=
ci − 1
³
4
√
N +N + 3
´
4N
5
2
< 0.
The more eﬃcient the cartel is expected to become, the more productive
the firm would have to be to put its potential cartel profit at risk. The
greater the number of firms in the market, the lower the cartel profit will be,
and the less there is to lose if a reaction against bribery makes it diﬃcult to
collude.5
Thus far, the analysis applies common terms to describe why a firm’s
tolerance or intolerance of bribery conducted by a competitor may depend
on the possibilities to obtain cartel profits, its own eﬃciency, and the number
of firms in the market. This provides us with the features of firms that
would be unlikely to be deterred from a reaction against corruption by their
own profit-incentives. Whether these firms will actually reveal incidents of
corruption is a secondary issue, which depends on their assessments of other
consequences of such an action.
5The correlation in Table 1 suggests that this potential cartel profit may depend on
the level of corruption. If cartel eﬃciency decreases in the quality of antitrust institutions,
the firm will expect higher cartel profits the higher the levels of corruption. Its incentive
to collude, rather than blow the whistle about corruption, increases accordingly.
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2.2 Local judicial institutions
The term ”whistle-blower” usually refers to individuals who speak out about
some form of misconduct carried out by other actors in his or her own en-
vironment. The oﬀenders will always dislike the whistle-blowing, and they
might wish to react against the whistle-blower in some way. This aspect can
also be present in interactions between corporations.
Executives will seldom speak out about competitors’ involvement in cor-
ruption, unless they expect local institutions to respond to their allegations
in a constructive way, i.e. with an impartial and thorough investigation of
the allegation and subsequent prosecution of the alleged oﬀender(s). Expec-
tations about the likelihood of a successful prosecution of a firm or firms that
have been involved in corruption are therefore relevant to the decision taken
by a potential whistle-blower.
It follows directly from the given analysis that a legal sanction that is
severe enough to provide the potential whistle-blower with a cost advantage,
could influence the firm’s decision if it changes the sign of E(πCi ) − E(πmi ).
However, a legal sanction against bribery will not usually imply an increase
in the sanctioned firm’s marginal production costs. The typical sanction is
debarment from future tenders or a penalty in the form of a fine. It will not
influence the optimal Cournot-competition production quantities, qCi , but it
may lead the firm whose bribery has been detected to leave the market.
To cover the possibility that more than one competitor is involved in the
corruption, let n ≥ 0 denote the expected number of firms that will exit
the market. The expectation of n depends on the potential whistle-blower’s
assumptions about the quality of local judicial institutions. The expected
profit in a more competitive market is now described as a function of n:
πCi =
[(N − n)(ci − c) + ci − 1]2
(N − n+ 1)2
(6)
The expression in (6) is illustrated in Figure 1 with profits on the vertical
axis and the number of firms on the horizontal axis. The weaker curves
describe the case of Cournot-competition when n = 1 and n = 3, respectively.
The dashed curve is the competitive outcome when no firm leaves the market.
The potential for cartel profits is still considered, and is represented by the
solid curve. The potential whistle-blower is an “ordinary producer” in this
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picture, no more than average eﬃcient, ci = c.6
0
0.05
0.06
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
N
πi
collusion 
competition 
n=1 n=3
a
b
c d
Figure 1: Collusion versus Cournot profits. Collusion is the solid curve.
The size of a penalty, θ, required to make an average firm exit the market,
would have to be equal to this firm’s Cournot-profit.7 And, if θ = πCj we
have the following result:
Proposition 2 For a given penalty, a firm’s incentive to react against an
incident of bribery decreases in the oﬀender’s eﬃciency.
Proof.
cj < c⇒ πC − θ > 0⇒ n = 0 (7)
cj > c⇒ πC − θ < 0⇒ n > 0
and ∂πCi /∂n > 0 (in 6).
The prosecution and sanction of a producer that has been involved in cor-
ruption will, accordingly, be more beneficial to the potential whistle-blower
if the producer is relatively ineﬃcient.
6The average marginal cost is not adjusted to changes in N for the two dotted lines
in Figure 1. The point is only that the entrant does not need to have a cost-advantage
compared to the incumbent firms to benefit from the Cournot-situation.
7This size of such a penalty is not unrealistic. US penalties for corruption can amount
to ten times the profits from the given contract. Besides, the size of πCj could be close to
zero for the least eﬃcient producers.
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This is perhaps an unexpected result as most firms would prefer to elim-
inate eﬃcient competitors. What it describes is that the chances of reduc-
ing the number of competitors is higher when the oﬀender is an ineﬃcient
producer. The expected benefit in continued Cournot competition is thus
expected to be higher when the oﬀender is ineﬃcient, given that any penalty
imposed is independent of the oﬀender’s productivity. The benefit of a po-
tential cooperation with competitors, and the “cost” of speaking out about
the bribery, both decrease in the oﬀender’s ineﬃciency. In this respect, the
analysis underscores the importance of eﬃcient penalties.
A firm’s decision will depend on its expectations about the outcomes of
a possible prosecution, i.e. the eﬃciency of local judicial institutions, which
could include an economic crime unit. The higher the perceived level of
corruption in a country, the less eﬃcient are these institutions expected to
be: The more frequent the corruption, the weaker public institutions will
be, in general, and the easier it will be for an oﬀender to bribe its way out
of the mess.8 The potential whistle-blower’s incentive to react pro-actively
decreases accordingly.
This intuition corresponds to the reported survey result, that a firm’s
propensity to react to an incident of corruption is higher, the lower the per-
ceived level of corruption in the given country. Note also that this connection
suggests that firms involved in corruption have strong incentives to try to
convince their competitors that corruption is more widespread in the local
context than it really is.
Homogenous firms In the case of homogenous producers there is no mar-
ginal cost variation, and the expected response of local judicial institutions
becomes critical to whistle-blowing decisions. A firm would always protect a
potential for collusion, and never react against corruption, unless it expects
a prosecution to lead some competitors to exit. Let ci = c and n > 0 , and
(6) can be simplified as follows:
πCHi =
(1− c)2
(N − n+ 1)2 (8)
To find the expected number of firms, n, that would have to go out of
this business in order for a firm to undertake an anti-corruption reaction,
8See Andvig and Moene (1989) for a multiple equilibria model of corruption levels, and
where this argument is described.
12
78
compare (8) and (4). Apply r = (N − n)/N to determine πCHi > πmi . If so,
we find that r = 1
N
± 2√
N
, and thus the given condition on n:9
n > 1 +N − 2
√
N (9)
A firm would consider speaking out about the bribery only for certain
combinations of N and n > 0. When the firm’s executives have little or
no confidence in local judicial institutions, and think that a whistle-blowing
reaction would be unlikely to trigger investigation by the authorities, they
will assume n = 0, and will always keep the opportunities for a cartel solution,
regardless of N. The case of homogeneity demonstrates one way in which the
eﬃciency of local judicial institutions influences those who are best placed
to uncover corruption, namely, the firms competing to tender, to speak out
about these oﬀences. The more identical the producers, the more critical is
the quality of local judicial institutions in this setting.
2.3 Political corruption
I will now consider how the presence of political corruption can also influence
a firm’s incentive to react against a case of bribery. We know that political
interests and commercial interests are often closely entangled in many of the
countries where corruption presents a significant challenge. Some politicians
strive to advance their personal interests, to the benefit of particular firms,
while oﬃcially proclaiming welfare improvement to be their one and only
aim.10 This is well described by Shleifer and Vishny (1993, 1994) and more
recently by Kaufmann and Vicente (2005).
Greedy politicians will obviously have a greater opportunity to obtain
bribes when the firms get some form of cartel profits rather than compete,
and they will have greater opportunities to get away with bribe-taking when
corruption is common. Political corruption therefore suggests further oppor-
tunities for the firms to collude and obtain higher profits. This adds to the
pragmatic issues that a potential whistle-blower will consider.
9Applying r to determine πC
0
i > π
m
i leads to (rN + 1)
2 < 4N ⇒ N2r2 + 2rN + (1 −
4N) < 0
⇒ r = −2N±
√
4N2−4N2(1−4N)
2N2 = −
1
N ±
√
16N3
2N2 =
1
N ± 2√N
10Bjorvatn and Søreide (2005) demonstrate the implication of this trade-oﬀ between
political and personal interests in cases of privatization.
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As noted, I assume that a firm will react against a case of business cor-
ruption only if it expects some consequence. The possible consequences were
described in the previous section, i.e. some form of legal sanction against the
firms that oﬀers bribes. This sanction is now assumed to depend on the atti-
tude of politicians in key positions. I will assume that politicians have some
choice in how they react when someone speaks out about corruption. They
can try to silence the complaint by ignoring it, hinder judicial investigations
and prevent prosecution of the case by direct or indirect strategies. Or, they
can consider the whistle-blower act as an opportunity to clamp down on the
corruption. Perhaps they have been aware of the problem, though found it
diﬃcult to attack legally without a certain case.11
In the cases where local politicians would support a whistle-blower the
consequences of an expected investigation will often be unpredictable. An
eventual sanction may lead the oﬀender to leave the market, but obviously,
this is not known to the whistle-blower when it blows the whistle. The
important question for the potential whistle-blower relates to the political
response. It will indeed make a diﬀerence if there is some reason to expect
investigations, as follows by political support (n ≥ 0), rather than no response
at all, n = 0. Expectations of no responses could imply politically impeded
investigations, but also opportunities for a potential whistle-blower to rather
obtain cartel profits if keeping quiet. Whether the politicians give their
support to the prosecution of a case of corruption depends on how they
value possible personal benefits versus public obligations and welfare.
The presence of political corruption is independent of the given competi-
tion in the market. I will assume, however, that the size of the bribes they
can obtain increases with the market profit, i.e. the politicians have some
bargaining power when negotiating on the size of the bribes and can demand
higher bribes when the firms’ revenues are higher.12
11Note, a response to a whistle-blower reaction would improve the reputation of corrupt
politicians and judicial institutions. Thus, corrupt politicians can have incentives to sup-
port a specific anti-corruption reaction. Politicians in key positions are treated here as
one group. The view of politicians in opposition are not considered, although it can be
highly relevant.
12The bribes are of course paid in exchange for some benefit, for instance, the opportu-
nity to operate as a cartel, the grant of contracts or tax advantages. The specific “product”
in the corrupt transaction is not described in the model. Whether the politicians were
involved in the specific case, is not determined. To retain the focus of analysis on the
behaviour of competing firms, I will assume that the politicians’ own involvement in the
corruption will not be investigated.
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Corrupt politicians will thus prefer as few firms as possible if there is
Cournot-competition in the market. A whistle-blower reaction about cor-
ruption will then be supported only in so far as the potential oﬀender can be
forced to exit the market, and only in cases where the politicians will have
no risk of having their own corruption uncovered.
However, politicians who benefit from bribes from the firms in a market
will benefit even more if the firms collude. Cartel profits will quickly exceed
the revenues in Cournot competition when the number of firms increases.
Besides, when negotiating on the bribes, the politicians’ bargaining power
will probably increase if the firms cooperate in a way that is illegal.13
A distinction between collusion and competition is thus clearly relevant
also in this setting: The more profit in the market the more likely corrupt
politicians will be to protect the firms in the market. Hence, the more profit
in the market, the more hazardous it will be for the potential whistle-blower
to speak out about a case of corruption when political corruption is a common
problem.
Assume for now that the firms in the market are homogenous producers.
The potential for bribes depend on the total market profit, Nπi. The degree
of political corruption will depend on how much weight, γ ∈ [0, 1] , politicians
place on the potential for personal benefits, at the expense of local consumer
surplus, CS. The politicians’ utility function follows:
Up = γ
£
ΣNi=1πi
¤
+ (1− γ) [CS] (10)
The consumer surplus depends on the market structure. Following the
conventional term, (1− p)Q(p)/2:
CSC = (1− (1 +Nc
N + 1
)(
N(1− c)
N + 1
))/2 =
N2 (1− c)2
2 (N + 1)2
(11)
CSm =
(1− (1 + c)/2)
2
(
1− c
2
) =
(1− c)2
8
.
Equations (4) and (8) determine the size of ΣNi=1πi, and thus the politi-
cians’ utility, in (10), in case of collusion, Ump , and Cournot-competition, U
C
p ,
respectively:
13The stronger bargaining power if firms take part in collusion is only a comment, and
an aspect that is not part of the analysis. See the appendix for the case of ties between
politicians and only one of the firms in the market.
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Ump = γ(
N(1− c)2
4N
) + (1− γ) (1− c)
2
8
(12)
UCp = γ(
N(1− c)2
(N + 1)2
) + (1− γ)N
2 (c− 1)2
2 (N + 1)2
(13)
Note, the attitude of corrupt versus benevolent politicians in their inclina-
tion, γ, to let personal benefits influence the choices they make in public duty,
is independent of the (homogenous) firms’ production costs. Let Ump = U
C
p
and solve for γ, to get the critical value, γ∗ ∈ [0, 1] , for which the politicians
would be indiﬀerent to supporting prosecution or encouraging corruption and
collusion.
γ∗ =
3N + 1
5N − 1 (14)
The utility functions are illustrated in Figure 2, with the utility, (12) and
(13), on the vertical axis, and the number of firms, N, on the horizontal axis.
The politicians’ utility in case of collusion is independent of the number of
firms in the market.14
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Um,UC
N = number of firms
a
b
UC(γL)
Um(γL)
UC(γH)
Um(γL)
Figure 2: The politicians’ expected utility
14The firms are identical and their monopoly-price is independent of their number.
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In this figure UC(γL) and U
m(γL), the dashed curves, denote the utility
of benevolent politicians (when γ is low), in the two cases of competition and
collusion, respectively. The politicians are less interested in the potential
sizes of bribes from firms in the given market. They are more concerned
about consumer surplus. The relative utility of these benevolent politicians
obviously increases in the number of firms, when compared with a potential
situation of collusion.15 This is illustrated with the a in Figure 2. Firms
in the given market will not be ”protected” if someone speaks out about
their oﬀenses. A whistle-blower is more likely to be heard, a reaction about
corruption may trigger investigations and sanctions.
The situation with high levels of political corruption, by contrast, is de-
noted with UC(γL) and U
m(γL), the solid curve in Figure 2. The politicians
are far less concerned about the consumer surplus. These politicians’ utility
increases if the firms are able to oﬀer higher bribes. The benefit of collusion,
compared to the case of competition, is described by b in Figure 2. Also this
relative benefit increases with the the number of firms.
The result of this exercise can summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 The higher the number of firms, N, (i) the more likely the
politicians are to support the whistle-blower if γ < eγ, and (ii) the more likely
they are to dislike it if γ > γ∗.
Figure 3 illustrates γ∗ as a function of N .
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1 2 3 4 5 6
N =number of firms
γ*
No support to the whistle-blower
Support to the whistle-blower
Indiﬀerence to the whistle-blower, γ∗, as a function of the number of firms in the
market, N.
15Of course, the benevolence of these politicians may just reflect a well-functioning
democracy, and a wish for re-election.
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When the parameter γ → 0, the politicians are concerned about the
consumer surplus only, which increases in the number of Cournot-competing
firms. When γ → 0, by contrast, the politicians will mind only about profits,
which obviously falls in the number of Cournot-competing firms.
3 Conclusion
The situation in many markets is that firms that oﬀer bribes will seldom
need to worry about reactions from those most able to uncover the practice,
namely, their competitors. Survey results presented in the introduction and
data collected by the World Bank suggest a strong connection between prof-
itability, relations with other firms in the market, and the propensity to react
against corruption.
Questioned about the absence of whistle-blowing reactions, executives in
the business survey tended to explain that firms do not react because there
is no point in doing so, or because they lack proof that corruption has taken
place. This paper has explored the motivation to keep quiet more thoroughly,
by detailing costs and benefits, and has suggested additional details in the
explanation.
The results suggested, first, that firms will not react against a case of
business corruption if that may disturb their opportunities to obtain cartel
profits. The strong empirical correlation between corruption and the oppor-
tunities to operate as a cartel supports this theory. And, second, the more
eﬃcient the oﬀender of the crime, the lower is the motivation for a potential
whistle-blower to react. The penalty is then likely to have lower or no im-
pact on the oﬀender’s role as a competitor in the market. Besides, as a third
aspect, a whistle-blower reaction on corruption can cause other obstacles if
there are connections between local politicians and firms in the given mar-
ket. The presence of such connections, however, can imply opportunities for
cartel profits, and the potential whistle-blower’s incentives to speak out may
decrease.
When these diﬀerent aspects have been examined the preconditions for a
whistle-blower reaction appear as follows: (i) A firm will not speak out about
corruption unless it is a relatively eﬃcient producer. (ii) A firm is less likely
to speak out about corruption if the oﬀender is an eﬃcient producer. (iii) A
firm will not speak out if local politicians in key positions benefit personally
from the given market.
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The theories described in this article are able to explain the conclusions
of the business survey: Firms will not engage in whistle-blowing against
corruption-related challenges in the local business climate unless local levels
of corruption are considered to be low. The theories also suggest a possi-
ble explanation to the correlation between corruption and the function of
antitrust institutions shown in Table 1: The possibilities to collude may in-
fluence firms’ incentive to react against incidents of corporate crime. The
greater or better the possibilities for collusion, the lower is the incentive to
react against corruption.
Note, however, the preconditions for reaction are not absolute, they are
suggested by these exercises as mechanisms that are likely to explain an
aspect of business practices. There are obviously important reasons why
firms should expose corruption, also when these conditions are not present.
Respondents to the business survey described the worry of having competi-
tors who oﬀer bribes as the most important underlying motivation behind
bribery (Søreide, 2006). This suggests that firms are induced to oﬀer bribes
themselves only by the thought that competitors are oﬀering bribes. The
signal-eﬀect of reacting against a case of corruption can thus have an impor-
tant influence on the business climate.
If the level of corruption is high, or the eﬀectiveness of local judicial
institutions is low, there are still benefits to be gained by reacting against the
problem. Anti-corruption eﬀorts are part of public politics in most countries
today. A high level of corruption does not imply that all public oﬃcials are
corrupt; there will usually be some investigators or politicians who are both
able and willing to respond to allegations of corruption and to prosecute the
case.
Penalties and debarment of firms will usually require proof, which in many
cases can be diﬃcult to supply. However, a lack of proof was not described by
the survey respondents as the most important reason for keeping quiet about
bribery. Indeed, there are several alternative channels for responding to this
form of corporate crime, and they do not all require proof. Firms can follow
formal procedures, and lodge an appeal to the client or tender authorities. In
this case, they will only have to draw attention to the existence of other bids
that oﬀered better price-quality combinations than the winning bid. They
can encourage local authorities to take a closer look at the deal; they do not
have to identify the firm(s) suspected of oﬀering bribes.
Other forms of redress include making representations through intelli-
gence services, embassies, journalists or anti-corruption groups, such as anti-
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corruption oﬃces established by the local government or chapters of Trans-
parency International. Alternatively, a company may submit a letter of com-
plaint to the firm that has paid a bribe. According to the business survey,
none of these channels are much applied by Norwegian firms, although the
problem of corruption appeared to them as a significant challenge.
The policy implications of this study are obvious. The findings emphasize
the value of considering business climate improvements in the light of the
incentives for firms to react against corruption. The study also demonstrates
the value of local judicial institutions. Where the quality of these institutions
is high, this has a direct impact on the incentives of firms to react against
an unfavourable business climate rather than take part.
However, there are indeed directions in which this research should be
continued. This present analysis assumes, for instance, that firms only con-
sider the profitability of alternative strategies when deciding how to respond
to corruption; the paper does not explore cases when firms are inherently
honest or very risk averse. Technicalities such as quantity limitations and
discount rates are important aspects of commercial decision-making, and are
not considered here. And, although the findings help to explain the correla-
tion between corruption and collusion, the study does not identify the further
implications of this correlation, for instance, on polarization of business cli-
mates. Moreover, the paper describes, but does not solve, the problem that
only firms with above average profitability can act responsibly, that is, more
responsibly than firms with low to average profitability. Overcoming this
obstacle to ethical business practice constitutes a major challenge in so far
as consumer surplus and welfare obviously depend on competitive market
structures.
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5 Appendix
The potential cartel optimizes over quantities at heterogenous and
increasing marginal costs The setting is as given in Section 2.1. The
firms produce a homogenous output, the demand for which is given by the
inverse linear demand function, p(Q) = 1 − Q, where Q = ΣNi=1qi. Assume
sunk fixed cost and the variable cost of ciq
2
i
2
.
max Πm = Q
∙
pm −
N
Σ
i=1
ciq
2
i
2
¸
(15)
Marginal cost, MC, is thus ciqi, while average MC is ΣNi ciqi/N. If average
production is q = Q/N while c represents the average ”technology” applied
by the cartel, the colluders’ average marginal cost is MC = cq = c(Q/N).
Each cartel member’s output depends on its relative marginal costs. For the
average participant,
MCi =MC ⇒ ciqi = c(Q/N)⇒ qi =
cQ
ciN
Applying the average variable cost, V C = cq2/2 = c (Q/N)
2
2
, in (15), implies:
Πm = pmQ−N(V C) = (1−Q)Q− cQ
2
2N
The first order condition of this expression leads to the optimal total
quantity, Qm = N
2N+c
, which provides us with a total cartel profit of Πm =
N
2(2N+c)
. The individual firm’s quantity is thus
qi =
cQ
ciN
=
c( N
2N+c
)
ciN
=
c
(2N + c)ci
and its profit:
πmi =
c
2(2N + c)ci
(16)
Cournot-competition under the same assumptions implyQC = N
1+N+c
and
qi =
1+c
(1+N+c)(2+ci)
), which leads to:
πCi =
1
2
(1 + c)2
(1 +N + c)2 (2 + ci)
2 (17)
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πmi > π
C
i is true for all values of ci, and the potential whistle-blower
will always prefer collusion, and never speak out about cases of business-
corruption if this could harm the wished for cooperation. The assumptions of
increasing marginal costs and optimization across qi implies that the benefit
of relative eﬃciency is larger in collusion compared to Cournot-competition.
A firm would never react against corruption under these assumptions. The
expected eﬃciency of the considered cartel is thus important in a firm’s
propensity to confront a competitor that is responsible for corporate crime.
If higher levels of corruption imply opportunities for more eﬃcient forms of
collusion, no firm would speak out about bribery given the negative influence
this could have on its cooperation with its “competitors”.
Political corruption: Ties between politicians and only one of the
firms Consider the case when politicians in key positions obtain personal
benefits from only one of the local firms, benefits which take the form of
either illegal bribes or legal ownership shares. Although the politicians max-
imize the same utility function, (10), the significance of the diﬀerence in the
situation follows directly from the analysis in Section 2. The politicians’ ben-
efits depend directly on the profit of “their” specific firm. The calculation of
this profit and the trade-oﬀ underpinning the politicians’ choice are identical
to the calculations involved in the potential whistle-blower’s decision about
revealing corruption or not. However, the perspective diﬀers if we now con-
sider the benefits of another firm with political ties. By help of (4) and (2)
we consider the revenues and marginal costs of the firm, j, and not the po-
tential whistle-blower, firm i. Firm i, will influence firm j’s profit by raising
or reducing the average marginal cost, c.
Following this line of argument we hypothesize that a potential whistle-
blower would not be supported by corrupt politicians with personal benefits
in one of the firms in the market unless: (i) the potential whistle-blower is an
ineﬃcient producer, and (ii), the firm oﬀering bribes, or other benefits to the
given politicians, is relatively eﬃcient. It follows from (2) that ∂πCj /∂c > 0 :
The firm with political ties would benefit under Cournot-competition if the
whistle-blower is relatively ineﬃcient since this would raise the average mar-
ginal cost in the industry. But, from (5) we know that a local producer will
keep to the cartel solution, unless this firm has a certain marginal cost ad-
vantage. Only an ineﬃcient firm could increase the briber’s relative marginal
cost advantage, as specified by (5), so that the Cournot alternative becomes
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the more profitable solution, ∂πCj > ∂π
m
j . According to (4) and (2), however,
the firm would always try to establish some form of collusion if operating
with lower than average marginal costs, and in this case there would be no
whistle-blower for the politicians to support.
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Abstract
The presence of business-corruption in a market provokes firms to
make choices between legal business approaches and illegal bribery.
The outcome of a chosen strategy will usually be uncertain at the
time the decision is made, and a firm’s decision will depend partly on
its attitude towards risk. Drawing on the empirical data provided by
a survey of 82 Norwegian exporting businesses, the paper proposes a
theory about firms’ choices between legal and illegal business practices.
It begins by describing the risks, uncertainties and benefits attached to
bribery, and specifies their impact on firms’ propensity to oﬀer bribes.
It then demonstrates how risk averse firms can be more inclined to
oﬀer bribes than risk neutral, and even risk attracted firms. Although
the analysis diverges from existing theory in stressing the diﬀerences
between illegal and legal forms of rent-seeking, the findings correspond
to the results reported in the literature on legal forms of rent-seeking.
(JEL D81, F23, K40)
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1 Introduction
Firms with similar ethical codes and compliance systems can respond to
corruption-related challenges in very diﬀerent ways. Whereas many firms
operate honestly and consistently with their codes of conduct, others oﬀer
secret bribes to procure contracts and/or other business benefits. The con-
sequences of their chosen behavior are often uncertain, partly because they
depend on external factors which are diﬃcult to predict. A firm’s attitude
towards risk is thus intuitively an important element in any attempt to un-
derstand its propensity to oﬀer bribes. However, the connection between
attitude towards risk and bribery is not obvious.
The decision to oﬀer a bribe carries several kinds of risk. The punishment
for firms detected in bribery is now higher than ever, at least in the USA.1
Customer reaction to a firm involved in corruption can be severe. At the
same time, the benefits to be gained from bribery are often uncertain as
bribery is an essentially illegal agreement that generally cannot be enforced
in a court. Besides, the oﬀer of one bribe may be followed by a demand for
others, initiating an open-ended process of extortion.
The hazards of bribery suggest an incompatibility between risk aversion
and bribery. However, the strategy of operating honestly also involves uncer-
tainty and risk. When corruption is perceived to be widespread, it is more
probable that a firm will have competitors who oﬀer bribes. A firm that
adopts an honest approach is more likely to fail in its attempt to procure
contracts.2 The distribution of unfair benefits and contracts among firms
according to their diﬀerent attitudes towards risk is therefore diﬃcult to
predict.
The propensity of firms to oﬀer illegal bribes has not been fully explored
by economists. This is in spite of a rapidly increasing literature on the phe-
nomenon of corruption, the environments in which it thrives, the incentives of
1Titan Corporation paid $3.5 million to support the President of Benin’s election cam-
paigns and was subsequently fined $ 28.5 million under the US Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act (FCPA). During 1998-2003 the Switzerland-based ABB oﬀered bribes of more than
$ 1.1 million in Nigeria, Angola and Azerbaijan. It too was prosecuted in United States
and under the FCPA, and had to pay fines amounting to $16.4 million Further examples
of FCPA prosecutions are available on the homepages of the US Securities and Exchange
Commission (www.sec.gov) and of anti-corruption organisations, such as Transparency
International (www.transparency.org).
2See Ehrlich and Becker (1972) who explain the implications of this form of self-
protection.
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politicians or public oﬃcials to demand bribes, and the welfare consequences
thereof. In an early contribution to this literature, Huntington (1968) de-
scribed bribery as the way of approaching ”an over-centralized bureaucracy”
(Huntington, 1968: 386), an approach also shared by Leﬀ (1964). This atti-
tude has largely fallen out of favour in economic theory. Myrdal (1968) was
one of the first to challenge the ‘grease money model’ by showing how bribery
creates incentives for public oﬃcials to put pressure on potential bribers, and
actually causes bureaucratic delays. Rose-Ackerman (1978) described how
corruption is an obstacle to welfare from several diﬀerent perspectives, in-
cluding that of firms. Andvig and Moene (1990) explain changes in the level
of corruption on the basis of both supply and demand of bribes. The risk
of being caught in corruption is included in their theory. Kaufmann and
Wei (1999) also reject the grease money hypothesis, that bribery increases
eﬃciency, and find a positive correlation between the propensity of firms to
oﬀer bribes and the time they waste through bureaucratic delays. Svensson
(2003) considers the connection between the ability of an enterprise to pay
bribes and its propensity to do so. Monezes and Montiro (2005) describe
corruption in the context of auctions, and find the size of the bribes to in-
crease in relation to the value of the benefit up for auction when the bidders
are risk neutral.
Good recent overviews of the economic literature on corruption are pro-
vided by Bardhan (1997), Rose-Ackerman (1999, 2004), Aidt (2003) and
Lambsdorﬀ (2005). However, the connections between a firms’ propensity to
oﬀer bribes, its attitude towards risk, and its reliance on self-estimated prob-
abilities are not clear in this literature. There are, however, several results in
the more general rent-seeking literature that are relevant, in particular those
presented by Hillman and Katz (1984), Skaperdas and Gan (1995), Kon-
rad and Schlesinger (1997), which I will discuss below, but also by Foster
(1981) and Skaperdas (1991). An important question for the present paper
is thus the extent to which these results are applicable to understanding the
propensity of firms to oﬀer business bribes.
Rent-seeking is an investment of resources made to obtain an uncom-
pensated benefit as the result of a ”favorable decision” on some public pol-
icy. Business corruption is indeed a form of such practice. However, most
of the rent-seeking literature does not diﬀerentiate between legal lobbying
and illegal corruption (Buchanan, Tollison and Tullock, 1980). Lambsdorﬀ
(2002) explains, in terms of welfare implications, the distinctions between
rent-seeking in its general forms, and the specific category of corruption. He
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points to the lack of transparency in cases of corruption and the consequences
of these forms of misuse of authority. Bribery also diﬀers from legal lobbying
in that both parties to the transaction benefit from the oﬀence. Legal lobby-
ing, by contrast, only benefits the lobbyist and can constitute an annoyance
to the decision-makers. Bhagwati (1982) discusses the distinction between
legal and illegal forms of rent-seeking, but concludes that it is unimportant
in analytical work on this topic.3 Tirole (1997:78), by contrast, underscores
the problems of generalizing about the phenomenon of rent-seeking: “As the
rent-seeking games vary considerably in practice, we are obliged to analyze
the issue case by case.”
This paper focuses on the case of business-corruption from the perspec-
tive of the firms. It aims at defining the uncertainties and risks of bribery,
and specifying their impacts on firms’ propensity to oﬀer bribes. A theory
about business corruption is developed using empirical data from a business
survey. The paper begins by presenting background information about this
survey and some of its results (Søreide, 2006). This study provided impor-
tant information about aspects of real life business corruption. For instance,
it revealed how corruption imposes uncertainties on firms and the benefits
they might expect from taking part in corruption.
The third section develops a more analytical approach to the question of
bribery. It begins by presenting assumptions about the choices firms make
between a legal and an illegal business approach. The significance of various
uncertainties is examined, including the risk that the award of a tender might
be influenced by corruption, the chances of getting contracts by an honest
approach, and the risk of being caught in oﬀering bribes. These uncertainties
are treated as self-estimated probabilities, and it is demonstrated how they
are likely to influence a firm’s business approach.
The significance of business attitudes towards risk is examined in the
fourth section. The section starts with a discussion of relevant results re-
ported in the rent-seeking literature, and explains important diﬀerences be-
tween legal and illegal rent-seeking. The significance of risk aversion and
risk attraction is then examined in terms of the model that was presented
in the third section. This model diﬀers from the rent-seeking models in four
important ways: (i) there is a choice between a legal form of rent-seeking
and illegal bribery; (ii) there is a risk of choosing the wrong strategy and be
3Bhagwati (1982) applies the broader term ”Directly unproductive profit-seeking ac-
tivities” (DUP).
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excluded from the competition, i.e choosing an honest approach when the
benefit is awarded in a corrupt procedure, and vice versa; (iii) there is a risk
of being apprehended in a crime and sanctioned; (iv) this study focuses on
the choice between a legal and illegal business strategy; rent-seeking models
explain the connection between the size of the rent-seeking investment and
the probability of obtaining a benefit.
However, the final results correspond to some extent with the most rele-
vant results in the established rent-seeking theory, although the underlying
assumptions and circumstances are diﬀerent in the present study.
2 The perspective of firms
The survey was conducted among Norwegian exporters during 2004, with
the broad objective of getting detailed empirical information about firms’
experiences of corruption in overseas markets, their attitudes to it, and the
actual choices they make in response (Søreide, 2006). Although the survey
chose to focus on Norwegian industry for primarily practical reasons, this
proved to be an excellent choice in terms of presenting an interesting case for
the study of firms’ propensity to oﬀer bribes. Norwegian industry is oriented
to overseas markets and well exposed to international business cultures and
attitudes. Its primarily sectors of operation are among the most prone to
corruption, notably construction, communications (IT/telecom), and energy
(gas, oil, electricity). Even so, Norway scores well on corruption rankings,
such as the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) by Transparency Interna-
tional (2005), and is also commended by the OECD for its implementation
of new anti-bribery legislation (OECD, 2004). Thus, many Norwegian firms
probably experience the challenge of combining the pressures of operating in
markets where corruption is considered a common problem with the obliga-
tion to respect the new restrictions on bribery.
The survey-project, which was conducted in cooperation with the Confed-
eration of Norwegian Enterprise (NHO), had three components: (i) A pilot
study involving interviews with executives in charge of international sales
and marketing in seven large Norwegian firms:4 (ii) a mail survey question-
naire with about 100 questions on corruption to which top managers in 82
exporting firms responded. (iii) a smaller survey of Norwegian embassies in
4These were large firms, three of them on the FT list of the 500 largest companies.
5
95
countries outside the OECD area.5
The secrecy surrounding business corruption makes it diﬃcult to estimate
the actual scale of the practice. The respondents to the present business
survey though described corruption as a widespread phenomenon in interna-
tional business. And, the embassy representatives did not find it uncommon
that foreign firms make use of business practices that most likely deviate
from their own oﬃcial anti-corruption codes of conduct.
A clear majority of the embassy representatives thought that Norwe-
gian firms are sometimes or often confronted with corruption, and that an
adjustment to local informal conventions would imply adopting procedures
that would be considered unacceptable in Norway. Similarly, 18 of the 24
embassy respondents believed that a refusal to make irregular or informal
payments could reduce business opportunities significantly. More than one
third of the embassy respondents was either in doubt or likely to recommend
firms to adjust to the local culture, even if this implied bribery.6
The majority of the responding firms reported encountering some form of
corruption in their international operations. When asked about the extent to
which “unethical business practices have placed the firm in a more adverse
competitive position”, almost 70 per cent claimed that unethical business
practices by competitors had certainly or probably cost them important con-
tracts. 42 per cent said that they had reason to believe that competitors
influence tender procedures unduly. Few respondents admitted to practising
bribery themselves. Ten per cent had agreed to meet a request for payment
from an agent, an adviser or a consultant in the knowledge that this payment
would most likely be used for bribery. 27 per cent of firms reported that they
had been required to give valuable presents or bribes to be able to operate
in certain markets.
The respondents did not respond to questions explicitly on risk aversion,
but they can be categorized on competitive pressure as they were asked how
pressured they were on the prices on their main products. The exposure to
competitive pressure will perhaps inform about a firm’s ability to take risk.
However, it can be diﬃcult to interpret this indicator. Competitive pressure
may reflect a firm’s ability to survive in spite of lost contracts, but also a
more pressured situation where one single contract can be very important,
5Details and results are presented in Søreide (2006).
6The embassy respondents were also prepared to take up complaints about specific
instances of business corruption at higher political levels.
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and where the firm is forced to take greater risk. Nevertheless, exposure
to competitive pressure tells us only about a firm’s financial situation and
external market conditions, not its attitude towards risk in the sense of utility
functions.
The responding firms that considered themselves strongly exposed to
competition were significantly more likely to believe that they had lost con-
tracts because of corruption. They were also more inclined to think that
tender procedures were pre-determined, and they were more likely to con-
sider corruption a significant challenge to their foreign direct investments
(FDI).7 It is not clear if these results reflect actual higher levels of corrup-
tion in competitive markets, or rather greater suspicion about corruption in
markets where the firms compete with more homogenous products. What
it does reveal is a perception of higher extents of business-corruption among
the firms which are exposed to competitive pressure.
The specific benefits obtained by business corruption take various forms.
Probably the most common objective is to secure a contract. But by oﬀering
bribes firms can obtain other more indirect benefits such as reduced levels of
taxation, ignorance of profitable collusion in the market, or a change in the
legislation that provides the firm with market power or reduces its expendi-
ture. The most common objectives of tender corruption, apart from securing
a contract, were assumed by the respondents to be (in the following order):
exemption from tender rules; secret inside information about the criteria used
to evaluate tenders; secret information about competitors’ bids; and advan-
tageous adjustments in tender specifications. According to the respondents,
the most important underlying motivation for bribery was “the fear of losing
contracts because someone else has bribed the decision-makers”.
Most firms preferred not to make any public reaction when losing con-
tracts because competitors oﬀer bribes, although five per cent would appeal
to the tender authorities.8 The survey asked what the firms would do if the
challenge continued, and if complaints were ignored and/or rejected. 25 per
cent replied that in such a case they would “adjust their strategies to the lo-
cal business climate”, 30 per cent considered “corruption part of the game”,
7All results are significant within the five per cent level. According to a probit analysis,
the respondents who considered themselves exposed to strong competitive pressure were
26 per cent more likely to believe that competitors had oﬀered bribes.
8However, 26 per cent would request a formal explanation from the client. This is
something they are supposed to get in any case, according to common tender rules, and
is not a proactive response to corruption.
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and very few would retreat from the market. The propensity to complain
about the situation, whether to the authorities, through political channels or
in other ways, was dependent on the level of corruption.9
These results, based on responses provided by firms with significant expe-
rience of international markets, reveal the extent to which corruption disturbs
the business of many firms and introduces uncertainties into their overseas
operations. On the other hand, the results also reveal a general reluctance
to retreat from markets simply because of business corruption as well as a
marked disinclination to speak out about corruption-related challenges and
expenses.10 One implication of these findings is that business corruption cre-
ates major challenges for Norwegian exporters, forcing them to chose between
a legal business approach and illegal bribery.11
3 Uncertainty and bribery
I now develop a more analytical approach to the question of bribery. The
survey results will form the basis for a simple theory about how a firm’s
propensity to oﬀer bribes is subject to its calculation of probabilities. The
purpose of the exercise is to illustrate a firm’s uncertainties and risks in the
choice between a legal and an illegal business approach. This then provides
the context for a discussion of business attitudes towards risk in section 4.
3.1 Assumptions
Consider a firm whose goal is to make profits in a market where it operates
in competition with other firms. The firm makes a number of choices, and
this involves considering various forms of rent-seeking: The firm can hope
to obtain benefits by lobbying on behalf of its industry and hope to win
contracts by promoting its products with honest business procedures. Or, it
9The respondents were anxious about various consequences of speaking out about cor-
ruption. The impact on future business cooperation was the most frequent concern, al-
though the possibility of customer sanctions was also an important consideration.
10However, one third of the firms surveyed had decided not to enter a market because
of business corruption.
11There are, however, judicial grey zones between legal and illegal practices, and a firm
may well adopt a combination of strategies, from legal forms of rent-seeking at one end of
the continuum to the payment of large illegal bribes at the other end of the scale.
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can seek to obtain benefits by oﬀering illegal bribes to corrupt representatives
of a bureaucracy, or to a client, at the risk of being caught in corruption.
As noted, the benefits obtained by rent-seeking or business corruption
can take many forms. It can be a contract, a concession, a legal adjustment
which produces tax cuts for the firm, or a political decision which favours
some form of business strategy or reductions in the firm’s production costs.
Let us assume in this setting that a firm aims for an exclusive benefit, κ > 0,
awarded by the authorities, for instance a license to operate or trade, that will
be awarded to only one of several interested firms.12 Pursuing this benefit,
the firm’s choice between a legal and an illegal business approach is not
straightforward since important parameters and outcomes are uncertain. The
firm will have to rely on its own estimations of the diﬀerent probabilities. I
will now describe uncertainties and risks in this situation, they will also be
illustrated in Figure 1.
The level of corruption The perceived level of corruption, c ∈ [0, 1] , is
important in a firm’s choice between a legal and illegal business approach.
The firm assumes that the authorities’ decision-making process will be influ-
enced by corruption with a probability which reflects the perceived extent of
corruption, c, in the given institutions (or the country). This perceived ex-
tent of corruption also indicates the probability of succeeding with an honest
business procedure (1− c). From the perspective of the firms, however, the
extent of corruption is only an estimated parameter; corruption is essentially
a hidden phenomenon about which firms form opinions but about which they
seldom have certain knowledge. Their opinions about levels of corruption will
be based on various kinds of evidence, including rumors, experience of other
markets, published cross-country indices of corruption, or country analyses.13
Firm specific probabilities A firm’s probability of gaining κ through its
chosen strategy depends also on aspects that are independent of the presence
of corruption. These can be market conditions and eﬃciency, but also per-
sonal relationships, which can be decisive in these settings. This firm specific
12The benefit κ will now be thought of as constant, and can not be increased by a
bribe. This study concerns the uncertainties and risks of taking part in bribery, and
rent-augmentation is not a central question.
13The challenges of estimating the level of corruption in a country in a particular country
are discussed in Søreide (2005).
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probability, ρi ∈ [0, 1] , will diﬀer between the case of bribery, ρb, and the
case of legal rent-seeking, ρh, because firm specific conditions for success will
diﬀer in the two alternative strategies.14
A legal business approach With a legal and honest business approach,
the firm will invest an amount h > 0 in various forms of rent-seeking expen-
ditures, like lobbyism, promotion, etc., but also the cost of taking part in the
competition, like tender expenses. The probability for success depends on the
business climate, (1 − c), and its own specific qualities, ρh. The probability
of gaining the contract will thus depend on other factors than the size of the
investments made by (all) firms to be able to participate in the competition.
If the firm chooses an honest approach, by investing no more than the
amount h in the procedures, it runs the risk of losing the contract, not only
because of its own qualities, ρh, but also because the authorities’ decision-
making process is corrupt, which happens with the probability c. The cost
of failing in the choice of strategy is identical to the investment, h. If the
firms succeeds its outcome is κ− h.
An illegal business approach Also in the choice of an illegal business
strategy a firm will have expenses similar to those invested in legal rent-
seeking. Before it oﬀers a bribe, the firm may have invested significantly
in the process of market positioning, establishing the right contacts, and
also tender expenses. These expenses are not part of the illegal bribe, still
an investment which is lost if the firm fails in its business strategy. In the
following, this cost will be assumed symmetric to the alternative case of a
legal business approach, and equal to the rent-seeking expenses of h.
The firm’s probability for success in the choice of an illegal business strat-
egy depends on the level of corruption, c, and the firm specific probability,
ρb. If the firm succeeds it gains the business benefit, κ, by oﬀering an illegal
bribe, b > 0, while also investing h in the process. However, the firm will
not necessarily gain the business benefit if it decides to oﬀer an illegal bribe,
even if the level of corruption is assumed high. The representatives of the
authorities may reject the proposed bribe, and the firm does not make any
bribe payment. In such a case, the firm will not know whether it has been
rejected because the public oﬃcials are honest (c reflects a probability), or
14The probabilities are individual and will diﬀer between firms. However, I will consider
only one firm’s perspective here, and will not need the i-notation.
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because they already have agreed a hidden agenda with another competitor.
In either case, a rejected proposal of a bribe excludes the firm from the num-
ber of candidates, and the firm has waisted an amount h in a failed attempt
to get the benefit through corruption.
The risk of sanctions The firm’s concern if taking part in corruption,
relates to the probability of getting caught and prosecuted for the crime,
and incurring a penalty, θ > 0. The probability of this outcome is likely
to decrease in relation to the level of corruption, although it is diﬃcult to
determine the specific correlation.15 Assume that (1− c)γ denotes this prob-
ability, and that γ ∈ [0, 1]. The investigation and successful prosecution of
a firm for corruption do not necessarily imply that the firm will forfeit the
contract or other benefit it gained through the corruption. These cases tend
to take time to come to court, and the firm has often secured the commercial
benefit and/or carried out the content of the illegally secured contract by
the time it is sentenced for the crime. The business benefit, κ, is therefore
assumed independent of the consequence if caught in corruption, θ > 0.
Figure 1 summarizes the diﬀerent risks, and illustrates the uncertainties
in the choice between a legal and an illegal business approach. The proba-
bilities are denoted in italics, on the branches. The possible outcomes are
described at the decision nodes.16 To read the figure, assume that a strategy
has been chosen, either legal, H, or illegal, B. The right-hand branch for
both strategies denotes the probability, c, that the decision-making process
is corrupt, the left-hand branch denotes the probability that this process is
honest, (1−c). For each strategy there is a given individual probability, ρh or
ρb, that the firm’s chosen strategy will succeed. An illegal strategy includes
the additional risk of being caught in the crime.
The choice between a legal and an illegal business approach can now be
formalized into a simple model. Let E(H) denote a firm’s expected revenue if
15The connection between the level of corruption and the probability of being caught
in the crime is explained by Andvig and Moene (1990). However, firms can be caught by
local institutions, by institutions in their country of origin, by their own security systems,
and by the SEC in the USA if registered on a US stock exchange.
16The figure has the form of a tree only as an illustration; it does not reflect interaction
between several players. Note also, the aim of this figure is to illustrate the diﬀerent
uncertainties and risks of firms in this situation, not to describe one single mechanism by
the simplest possible model.
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κ –b-h
1-(1-c)γ (1-c)γ
κ -b-θ-h
c
-h
ρb 1-ρb
(1-c)
Illegal strategy, B
-h
Legal strategy, H
ρh
1-ρh
κ-h -h
(1-c) c
-h
Figure 1: Outcomes and risks that a firm will consider in its choice between a
legal and illegal business strategy.
it chooses an honest business strategy, and let E(B) be the expected revenue
in the choice of bribery. The forms of these expressions follow directly from
Figure 1:
E(H) = (1− c) [ρh(κ− h) + (1− ρh)(−h)]− ch
= κ(1− c)ρh − h (1)
E(B) = cρb(κ− b− h)− cρb(1− c)γθ − (1− c)h− c(1− ρb)h
= cρb [κ− b− (1− c)γθ]− h (2)
Figure 2 illustrates (1) and (2), which are denoted H and B, respec-
tively.17 The vertical axis describes the expected value of the chosen business
approach, E(H) or E(B), while the horizontal axis is the perceived level of
corruption, c.
A firm is indiﬀerent between a legal and an illegal business approach
for the levels of corruption, c∗, at which the curves intersect, i.e. where
E(H) = E(B). The expected value of an honest business approach decreases
in the perceived level of corruption, c, while the expected value of an illegal
business approach increases in this level.18
17The parameter values applied in Figure 1: κ = 8, b = 2, h = 0.5, ρh = 0.4, ρb = 0.4,
θ = 5, γ = 0.7.
18∂E(B)/∂c = K − b − (1 − c)γθ. These parameters can take values which result in
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c = the level of corruption
B
H
Expected 
value
0
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
c*
Figure 2: The expected revenues of bribery versus legal rent-seeking.
3.2 Comparative statics
The size of the business benefit Intuitively, the size of the benefit, κ,
will have some impact on a firm’s decision to operate legally or to participate
in corruption. The specific connection, however, is not obvious. The sanction
if caught in corruption, θ, is assumed independent of κ, and the expected
outcomes of both bribery and of a legal rent-seeking strategy will increase if
the potential business advantage, κ, increases:
∂E(H)
∂κ
= (1− c) ρh (3)
∂E(B)
∂κ
= cρb
The impact of an increase in κ on a firm’s propensity to oﬀer bribes, will
thus depend on the firm’s perception of the level of corruption, c. Hence,
∆c∗ > 0 if ∂E(H)/∂κ > ∂E(B)/∂κ, which is the case when (1− c) ρh > cρb,
and the impact on a firm’s propensity to oﬀer bribes is uncertain. It will
∂E(B)/∂c < 0, i.e. that E(B) decreases in the level of corruption. Note, however, that
E(B) < 0 if [K − b− (1− c)γθ] < 0, and a firm will not choose the illegal strategy unless
∂E(B)/∂c > 0. The value of E(B) increases therefore in c, when conditions under which
a firm may consider this strategy is met.
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depend on the level of corruption, and the firm’s estimated probability to
succeed in the two alternative strategies, ρh and ρb.
19
The bribe and the rent-seeking expenses The impact of a change in
the size of the bribe, b, or the rent-seeking expenses, h, is visible in (1) and
(2). A change∆h will alter both curves in Figure 2 exactly the same, and the
firm’s decision, c∗, will not change. When h is equal in the two alternative
strategies it is unimportant for the firm’s decision to operate legally or take
part in corruption. The eﬀect if h diﬀers in the case of corruption and the
case of legal rent-seeking is also visible in (1) and (2). An increase only in the
rent-seeking expenses as part of a legal strategy would decrease the expected
outcome of an honest business approach. Bribery becomes relatively more
rewarding, and c∗ is reduced, which means that bribes will be oﬀered at lower
levels of corruption.20
A change in the size of the bribe that is required in the given context to
get the benefit through corruption, b, alters only the expected outcome of
bribery, E(B). An increase in the size of the bribe, ∆b, increases c∗, and the
propensity to oﬀer bribes is reduced.
The risk of sanctions An increase in the size of the fine, θ, if apprehended
and penalized for bribery, will have an eﬀect only on the expected value of an
illegal strategy, ∂E(B)/∂θ = −cρb (1− c)γ . An increase in θ will reduce the
propensity to take part in corruption, by increasing c∗. The eﬀect is stronger
if the firm’s probability of obtaining the contract through corruption, ρb, is
low. When this probability is high, the firm has a higher expected revenue
of bribery, and will be more likely to oﬀer bribes, in spite of the risk of being
sanctioned with a significant penalty, θ.
19The expected benefit of bribery would be reduced if θ were a function of κ. The
empirical connection between these parameters is not obvious. The penalty will usually
be in proportion to the firm’s total turnover. Whether it also increases in relation to the
size of the business benefit obtained is unclear. This has been the trend in some of the
latest court cases in the USA. Fines imposed in other cases of corruption have borne little
relation to the resulting commercial gains.
20The probability of obtaining the benefit is independent of the size of the rent-seeking
expenses, h. In this way the model diﬀers from the rent-seeking theories, where the
probability of gaining the benefit increases proportionally to h. Which one of them is the
most realistic assumption depends on the circumstances, and the connection is not even
obvious even when it comes to lobbying.
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The eﬀect of a large penalty will also depend on the connection between
the level of corruption and the risk of being caught in the crime, γ.When the
risk of being caught is lower for high levels of corruption (i.e. γ is high) the
risk of sanctions decreases in the level of corruption, and hence the impact
of a change in θ decreases in the level of corruption. Accordingly, if there is
a strong connection, γ, between the local level of corruption and the risk of
being apprehended in bribery, the consequences of being caught in corrup-
tion, θ, will have to be larger for higher levels of corruption than for lower
levels of corruption, if the sanction is supposed to have the same deterrent
eﬀect on potential bribers for all levels of corruption, c.21
3.3 Overestimating the level of corruption
As noted, the extent of corruption is an uncertain variable in this model. The
likelihood of a firm operating with unfounded perceptions about the level
of corruption is thus significant, since the extent of corruption is diﬃcult to
estimate and is a variable that varies between countries, markets, sectors and
individuals. The results of the business survey revealed a higher perception of
corruption among the firms that were exposed to competitive pressure. There
can be several explanations to this result, but it is possible that firms exposed
to competitive pressure may consistently overestimate levels of corruption.
For instance, in competitive markets firms may have lost contracts with oﬀers
that were very close to the winning bid, rather than because of corruption
practiced by competitors as they allege.
To understand the consequence of overestimating the level of corruption
in the local marketplace, let us assume that a firm thinks that the level of
corruption is c+, while it actually is c− < c+. Figure 3 illustrates this situation
and its consequences when c− < c∗ < c+, with the level of corruption on the
horizontal axis and the expected value of the strategies on the vertical axis.
The figure thus shows how an overestimation of the extent of corruption
can lead the firm to make the ”wrong” choice of business approach, given the
expected values described by (1) and (2) and c− < c∗ < c+. If E(B, c+) >
21The connection between the level of corruption and the risk of being caught in corrup-
tion, γ, will be reduced by the risk of being sanctioned in courts in other countries than
the country where the benefit κ is to be awarded. This risk is increased by US legislation
(the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act) and the OECD convention on combatting bribery of
foreign public oﬃcials in international business transactions, a convention which now has
entered into force in about 30 countries.
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Figure 3: The loss in expected outcome if the extent of corruption is over-
estimated.
E(H, c+) the firm would choose an illegal business approach, B, whereas its
highest probability of securing the business benefit might in fact lie in the
choice of a legal rent-seeking approach, H. The expected loss in case of such
an error of judgement is E(H, c−)−E(B, c−), as is illustrated in Figure 3.
To oﬀer a bribe to representatives of the decision-making authority can
obviously result in failure if the latter are honest. If, on the other hand,
these representatives are corrupt, an honest business approach reduces the
firm’s likelihood of securing the commercial benefit in question. If firms that
are exposed to competitive pressure consistently overestimate levels of cor-
ruption, they also consistently suﬀer higher loss in revenues due to business
corruption.
4 The significance of risk aversion
The significance of risk aversion in the given context is interesting as it may
alter the choice between a legal and illegal business strategy. I will begin by
summarizing how the connection between risk aversion and rent seeking has
16
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been explained in economic theory. A discussion follows about the ability
of this theory to explain business corruption as a specified instance of rent-
seeking. Finally, I will describe the significance of risk-aversion in the given
context of business corruption, and discuss the results in light of the rent-
seeking theory.
4.1 Results on risk aversion and rent-seeking
Conventional approaches to understanding the implication of risk aversion for
rent-seeking draw on the concept of the decision-makers’ utility function.22
According to this approach, risk aversion would entail that the utility of
participation in the given rent-seeking contest is lower than the utility of
the expected value of taking part in the rent-seeking contest, i.e. a fixed
amount, κ, achieved with certainty gives higher utility than the participation
in a lottery where κ is the expected gain. Risk attraction would correspond
to the opposite opinion: in this case participation in the contest would be
preferred. Risk neutrality means that the firm is indiﬀerent between the two
alternative situations.
This definition of risk aversion has been applied to understanding the
impact of risk aversion on the more general issue of rent-seeking. Hillman
and Katz (1984) find risk aversion to reduce the investments in rent-seeking
activity in cases where rents are particularly large and where there is com-
petition among the rent-seekers. The consequence is a limited spread in the
dissipation of rents, in the sense that risk averse firms will invest less in rent
seeking, and be less likely to obtain the given benefit. This result, however,
holds only if the rent is large, such as monopoly profits.
Skaperdas and Gan (1995) examine the implications of risk aversion in
several forms of rent-seeking contests where two rent-seekers have diﬀerent
attitudes towards risk. They demonstrate how the significance of risk aver-
sion depends on assumptions about the rent-seekers’ particular utility func-
tion. They compare the expected utility of competitors with diﬀerent contest
success functions (CSF) in winner-takes-all forms of contests. Most of the
rent-seeking literature assumes a CSF such that ρi = (hi)/(hi + hj), in the
22Standard risk aversion refers to von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. The
form of the utility function determines how the individual compares the expected utility
of an investment versus the utility of the sum invested. See Kimball (1993) for a broad
discussion. Shapiro and Titman (1985) and Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993) explain why
firms act as if they were risk averse, in the sense of this conventional form of risk aversion.
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case of two competitors, i and j, and where h is the rent-seeking invest-
ment. Skaperdas and Gan suggest an additional case, a logit CSF where
ρi = exp(khi)/ [exp(khi) + exp(khj)] , and determine the impact of risk aver-
sion under both cases. They find risk aversion is likely to increase the relative
rent-seeking eﬀorts in the first case, while the impact is ambiguous in the sec-
ond case.
Skaperdas and Gan (1995) also study the impact of risk aversion under
the circumstances when firms can borrow money to fund their rent-seeking
activities. The firms are thus liable for the repayment of the loans even if
they are unsuccessful and lose the contest in question. The surprising result
in these cases is that a Nash equilibrium exists in pure strategies, in which
the more risk averse agent will always make greater rent-seeking eﬀort and
thus increase its probability of securing the benefit. Skaperdas and Gan draw
the intuitive conclusion that “the more risk averse are more fearful of ruin,
bankruptcy and disaster and they thus put more eﬀorts into avoiding it”
(Skaperdas and Gan, 1995:960).
Konrad and Schlesinger (1997) separate the eﬀects of rent-seeking expen-
ditures into two categories. The first category refers to rent-augmentation
games, in which eﬀorts are made to increase the value of the given benefit.
The second category denotes the more common model of rent-seeking, in
which eﬀorts are directed to increasing the probability of securing the bene-
fit. The authors suggest that the eﬀect of risk aversion diﬀers between these
two forms of rent-seeking. Rent-augmentation will always increase the (mar-
ginal) risk, and lead the risk averse decision-maker to decrease its investment.
By contrast, rent-seeking, aimed at increasing the probability of securing the
benefit, is proved to have an ambiguous impact on the marginal risk.
Risk aversion is thus proved to have an indeterminate eﬀect on rent-
seeking eﬀorts in the context of winner-takes-all contests, and in this respect
the results by Konrad and Schlesinger (1997) correspond to the conclusions
drawn by Skaperdas and Gan (1995).
4.2 The relevance to business corruption
The analyses presented by Hillman and Katz (1984), Skaperdas and Gan
(1995) and Konrad and Schlesinger (1997) oﬀer important insights into how
the propensity of firms for involvement in corruption is subject to their atti-
tude towards risk, even if they fall short of specifying the precise relationship.
The results reported by all three studies clarify the connections that can be
18
108
applied to understand the connection between the size of business bribes,
firms’ initial financial situation and the expected revenues of the given con-
test.
However, there are also some important distinctions between the basic
forms of rent-seeking considered in these studies and the typical features of
business corruption, as they were described under Figure 1. Hillman and
Katz (1984), Skaperdas and Gan (1995) and Konrad and Schlesinger (1997)
all assume that rent-seekers have symmetric possibilities of increasing their
likelihood, ρh, of securing the benefit, κ, by investing an amount, h, in rent-
seeking. One firm’s probability of securing the benefit is assumed to decrease
in relation to its competitors’ rent-seeking investments. This assumption will
usually be realistic for legal forms of rent-seeking. However, once rent-seeking
eﬀorts encompass illegal transactions and favoritism, assumptions about the
fair distribution of opportunities appear optimistic. In cases of business
corruption it could be more realistic to suppose that one firm’s investment
in illegal rent-seeking, b, actually excludes its competitors from the contest.
In most of the cited analyses, rent-seeking investments are limited by
the rent-seekers’ financial situation. Few, if any, rent-seekers will choose
a strategy which implies expected deficit, and there is a restriction on the
size of the rent-seeking expense, h. This assumption will not apply in many
cases of business corruption. The expenses related to bribery, b, will not
necessarily imply a reduction in the firm’s endowment as the cost can be
covered by the contract that is awarded as a result, for instance by inflating
a price. Moreover, corrupt civil servants will be as willing as contractors to
make arrangements to cover these expenses as both sides benefit from corrupt
transactions. In the cases of legal rent-seeking, by contrast, it is obvious that
the rent-seekers must cover all expenses.
The lack of a distinction between legal and illegal forms of rent-seeking
in current economic theory also implies that there is no risk of sanctions,
θ, a threat which both has potentially serious consequences and is diﬃcult
to predict. The legal rent-seekers’ risk-related worries will usually be lim-
ited to the possible loss of their rent-seeking investments, h < κ. In illegal
rent-seeking, however, the additional risk of being apprehended may imply a
penalty which may be larger than κ. Threat of insolvency can thus constitute
a direct risk in cases of business corruption, whereas it is either indirect or
absent in cases of legal rent-seeking. However, there is one relevant parallel
between legal and illegal rent-seeking, in this respect. The result presented
by Skaperdas and Gan (1995) on risk aversion and liability includes an el-
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ement of risk which analytically resembles that of a penalty. They explain
that in cases of “soft budget constraints”, where the rent-seeking expenses
can exceed the firm’s financial endowment, legal rent-seekers also take the
risk of insolvency. As noted, Skaperdas and Gan find risk-aversion to increase
rent-seeking expenditures under these circumstances. The risk is defined as
a reduction in expected utility, and the increase in eﬀorts, h, is explained
by the self-protection argument. Higher eﬀorts in respect of rent-seeking
investments reduces the probability of deficit.
The argument made by Konrad and Schlesinger (1997) concerning rent-
augmentation will not necessarily apply to business corruption. Their model
describes circumstances in which rent-seeking is invested on behalf of a group
(for instance when construction companies cooperate to lobby for a more
extensive highways building programme than the authorities have planned).
An illegal bribe will seldom be oﬀered on behalf of a group of companies.
Besides, an individual firm will seldom oﬀer an illegal payment to increase
the value of a contract, unless it already is certain that it will be oﬀered
the contract in question. The rent-augmentation argument will usually be
relevant to business corruption in cases when a firm already knows that it
is assigned the given benefit, and the elements of risk and uncertainty are
reduced.23
To summarize, current rent-seeking models explain the implication of
risk aversion with a focus on the legal forms of rent-seeking. However, as
explained, there are some aspects of business corruption that may result
in diﬀerent conclusions when it comes to the connections between (illegal)
bribery, the various uncertainties and the rent-seekers attitudes toward risk.
The most relevant contrasts between firms’ decision to oﬀer illegal bribes and
their decision to take part in legal rent-seeking are as follows: One, bribery
may exclude competitors from the contest; under legal rent-seeking entry
into the competition and engagement in rent-seeking is open to all. Second,
a bribe may lead corrupt authorities to promise the briber the benefit in
question. This eﬀect is seldom present in cases of legal rent-seeking. Third,
the risks attached to involvement in bribery are usually larger than the risks
involved in taking part in legal rent-seeking.
In addition, the illegality if bribery involves a lack of transparency; legal
23The issue of creating a rent by help of corruption and legal rent-seeking is a related but
diﬀerent situation. Rent-creation activities are well illustrated by Naylor’s (1998) study
of the modern arms business.
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lobbying occurs in the open.24. Both parties of the transaction benefit under
illegal rent-seeking; legal forms of lobbyism benefit only the firms and the
lobbyists, while it may annoy the decision-makers. Besides, business cor-
ruption requires that someone with influence is willing and able to misuse
his or her power, and the possibilities to gain from bribery depends on the
extent of corruption. Lobbyism, by contrast, is an element in the freedom of
expression, and a recognized way to voice opinion and gain influence.25
4.3 Risk aversion and the propensity to oﬀer bribes
Concern about the risk of being caught in corruption diﬀers between firms.
Their ability to take risk/deficit varies, their sunk cost varies, and executives
have diﬀerent levels of risk aversion. Some investors may even be attracted
to risk. The rent-seeking theory suggests a relationship between a firm’s
attitude towards risk and its propensity to oﬀer bribes. This theory suggests
the following proposition, which will be examined using the model in (1) and
(2), a model that includes important features of the distinction between legal
and illegal rent-seeking.
Proposition 1 Increased risk aversion may increase the propensity to oﬀer
bribes.
Let the actual expected outcomes of the contest be determined by the
expressions in (1) and (2). Let ui > 0 be firm i0s utility, πj is the firm’s
revenue, where j denotes the diﬀerent outcomes, as described by Figure 1.
Let risk aversion be determined by a concave utility function, up = π
1/2
j ,
let risk attraction be determined by a convex function, uo = π2j , and let
risk neutrality be the case where the utility of the competition is equal to
expected revenues, i.e. the case illustrated by (1) and (2), un = πj. The
subscripts, p, o, n on the firm’s utility denote risk aversion (pessimist), risk
attraction (optimist), and risk neutrality, respectively. Hence, we have three
24This distinction has an impact on the size of the rent-seeking expenses. The size of
payments made to the personal benefit of corrupt oﬃcials can be very small, and still have
a larger eﬀect than oﬃcial rent-seeking, as was early explained by Buchanan et al. (1980).
However, the diﬀerence between these expenses will also depend on bargaining power and
other aspects (level of corruption, size of contracts, business sector), and it is diﬃcult to
determine a general rule about business bribes versus legal rent seeking expenses.
25Lambsdorﬀ (2002) explains several of these arguments in detail, and categorizes the
welfare consequences of legal rent-seeking versus illegal corruption.
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functions of a firm’s utility of the expected outcome of each of the optional
strategies, H and B: risk attraction, risk neutrality and risk aversion. The
appendix explains the calculation of the utility in these cases.
Figure 4 and 5 describe a firm’s propensity to oﬀer bribes when its decision
is dependent of the firm’s attitude towards risk. The curves represent the
expressions in (1) and (2), now also with diﬀerent attitudes toward risk. Both
figures are drawn with expected utility on the vertical axis, and the level of
corruption on the horizontal axis. The parameter values are the same for both
figures.26 Figure 4 compares the cases of risk neutrality and risk aversion.
Figure 5 compares the cases of risk neutrality and risk attraction.
Utility
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c*nc*p
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Up
B
Un
B
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1c
c
Figure 4: Utility of alternative choices in the cases of risk neutrality (solid curves)
and risk aversion (dashed curves).
Figure 4 illustrates that a risk averse utility function reduces the critical
level of corruption, c∗, in this example. The firm is indiﬀerent between a legal
business strategy, H, and bribery, B, at a lower level of corruption, which
means that a risk averse firm will be more likely to oﬀer bribes than a risk
neutral competitor. Figure 5 illustrates the opposite eﬀect. A risk attracted
firm will have a higher expected outcome than the risk neutral, whatever
strategy it chooses. However, in the choice between a legal and an illegal
26Paramter-values for both Figure 4 and 5: κ = 7, h = 0.5, b = 2, ρb = 0.7, ρh = 0.7,
γ = 0.7, θ = 4
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Figure 5: Utility in the cases of risk neutrality (solid curves) and risk attraction
(dashed curves).
business approach, the risk attracted firm will be more likely to stay honest.
The model in (1) and (2), the utility functions described above, and Figure
4 and 5 make an example that is able to prove Proposition 1: those who
participate in corrupt business practice are not necessarily more attracted to
risk than those who prefer an honest business approach. The connection can
actually be the reverse. Firms with risk averse attitudes can be more likely
to oﬀer bribes than their risk attracted or tolerant competitors.
4.4 Discussion
The result from this analysis seems surprising given the hazards associated
with bribery, noted in the introduction. However, the result corresponds to
Skaperdas and Gan’s (1995) conclusions about risk aversion in the context
of financial liability, although the underlying assumptions and functions in
the two models are very diﬀerent.27 Will this result also imply that the
significance of the diﬀerences between illegal corruption and legal rent-seeking
27The parallel results reported by Konrad and Schlesinger (1997) suggested an indeter-
minate eﬀect, and do not contradict the result in the present paper.
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are of limited importance when it comes to the relationship between risk
aversion and the tendency to invest in rent-seeking?
Not necessarily, the correspondence between the two forms of analysis is
not complete. The present result corresponds only to one specific result in the
rent-seeking theory, that of an additional financial obligation and potential
indebtedness. This result will not inform about the ability of rent-seeking
theories in general to explain illegal business corruption. Besides, the present
study does not explain a firm’s willingness to make rent-seeking investments,
which is the focus in corresponding rent-seeking models. This paper rather
assumes that a firm in any case will invest in some form of rent-seeking,
while the main question relates to its choice between legal and illegal business
practice.
The intuition in the result follows from the self-protection argument; the
marginal risk of losing the benefit in question increases with increasing levels
of corruption. The mechanisms, however, are explained by the expressions
in (1) and (2). The attitudes towards risk determine the forms of the util-
ity functions (concave, linear, or convex). Given these expressions, a risk
attracted firm will generally have a higher expected benefit of the contest,
compared to a risk averse firm. One firm’s decision between a legal and il-
legal business approach, whatever its attitude towards risk, will depend on
the parameter-values in (1) and (2).
However, the important question in this analysis relates to the relation-
ship between the corruption levels for which the diﬀerent curves in Figure 4
and 5 intersect; the left-hand side of this corruption level, c∗, implies honesty,
the right hand side implies an illegal business strategy. The parameter-values
are only important to the extent to that they alter the relationship between
the diﬀerent critical corruption levels, which are subject to the diﬀerent at-
titudes toward risk.
Figure 6 and 7 below illustrate an example where this relationship is
altered, and where a risk attracted firm will be more likely to oﬀer bribes
than a risk averse. These figures present the same curves with the same axes
as Figure 4 and 5, now with a change in the paramter values. The firm is
thus indiﬀerent between honesty and bribery, E(H) = E(B), at a lower level
of corruption, i.e. c∗ has a low value. The arrow in Figure 6 points to the
change in the relationship between the indiﬀerence level of risk neutrality, c∗n,
and the indiﬀerence level of risk aversion, c∗p. Similarly, the arrow in Figure
7 points to the change in the indiﬀerence level of risk neutrality, c∗n, and the
indiﬀerence level of risk attraction, c∗p. The parameter values in Figure 6 and
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7 are identical.28 The figures describe the diﬀerence between a risk averse
firm and a risk attracted firm; the risk averse will stay honest for higher levels
of corruption under the circumstances given by the parameter values. The
risk attracted will oﬀer bribes for lower levels of corruption.
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H Un
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c
Figure 6: Utility of alternative choices in the cases of risk neutrality (solid curves)
and risk aversion (dashed curves).
When a firm consider E(H) > E(B) for most levels of corruption, c, its
critical level, c∗, is high, which means that the firm is likely to stay honest,
unless the level of corruption is very high. In this setting, however, a risk
averse firm will have a stronger propensity to oﬀer bribes than a risk neutral
firm, under the given assumptions. When the firm considers E(H) > E(B)
only for low levels of corruption, the critical level of corruption, c∗, is low. In
this case, when most firms consider bribery the more rewarding strategy, the
risk attracted firms have the highest propensity to oﬀer bribes in the given
example.
The relation between E(H) and E(B) is determined by the parameter
values. The circumstances in a real world will seldom suggest that E(H) <
E(B) for low levels of corruption. This may, however, be the case when there
is a combination of several factors, for example, when the expected size of
28Parameter values applied in both Figure 6 and 7: κ = 9, h = 3, b = 0.1, ρh = 0.8,
ρb = 0.8, γ = 1, θ = 0.3.
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Figure 7: Utility in the cases of risk neutrality (solid curves) and risk attraction
(dashed curves).
the bribe, b, is very low; when the legal rent-seeking expenditures, h, are
high; when the sanction if caught in the crime, θ, is negligible; and/or when
the firm has a very high individual probability to win through with an oﬀer
of a bribe, ρb, perhaps because of very good contacts. Under more realistic
assumptions, however, the example shows that risk aversion will increase a
firm’s propensity to oﬀer bribes when the level of corruption is high.
5 Conclusion
This paper explains the various elements of uncertainty and risk associated
with business corruption. A main objective has been to describe how these
factors will influence a firm’s decision to approach a business opportunity by
legal or illegal business practices.
The exercise demonstrated that the size of a potential business advantage
will not necessarily increase a firm’s propensity to oﬀer bribes; this connection
depends on the level of corruption. The risk of sanctions has an obvious
impact on this porpensity. However, for the sanction to have a constant
deterrent impact on the firms’ behavior, the costs incurred by firms caught
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in corruption will have to increase if the level of corruption increases. The
perceived level of corruption in markets is assumed to be important in a
firm’s decision-making. The model describes the expected cost for a firm if
it incorrectly assesses this level. Overestimating corruption levels may lead
the firm to oﬀer a bribe when honesty would secure a better outcome for the
firm, while underestimating corruption levels may lead the firm to be honest
when oﬀering a bribe would secure a more profitable result.
The second part of the analysis examined the significance of risk aversion.
Although a considerable literature had already described the connection be-
tween risk aversion and rent-seeking, it considers mainly the legal forms of
rent-seeking, and is not necessarily applicable to understand business cor-
ruption. However, when standard theory of risk aversion was applied on
the model presented on business corruption, the most relevant results in the
rent-seeking literature appeared to correspond with the results on business
corruption: Risk aversion will not necessarily prevent a firm from taking part
in corruption. On the contrary, this study demonstrates that increased risk
aversion can actually strengthen the propensity to oﬀer bribes.
In the real world there are greyzones between legal and illegal business
practice, and the distinction between the two will not necessarily be as
clearcut as the models developed in this paper assume. However, real life
choices will resemble the models in that firms generally will have to choose
between strategies that are closer to illegal or legal business practice. The
number of court cases involving business corruption is increasing, and the
diﬀerence between legal or illegal business practice will become clearer in the
years to come.
There are some very clear directions in which the research should be con-
tinued. The business survey revealed that business corruption takes many
diﬀerent forms, and that it can have various objectives. Better understand-
ings of the phenomenon will obviously require the inclusion of more details
on the specific circumstances. The diﬀerences between legal and illegal rent-
seeking can also have implications beyond those considered in this study,
for instance, on the scale of the investment. As noted, the size of the ille-
gal bribe can sometimes (though not always) exceed the investment in legal
rent-seeking. The factors that determine the size of these investments are
unclear and require further research.
Finally, the consequences of overestimating the extent of corruption re-
quire closer investigation. The business survey is relevant here because it
revealed that firms exposed to competitive pressure are more likely to con-
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sider corruption a challenge in business. This suggests that the connection
between market power and the propensity to take part in corruption should
be a key issue for future research.
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7 Appendix
This appendix explains the calculation behind the curves in Figure 4-7. Let
the expected outcomes of the contest be determined by the expressions in (1)
and (2). Let ui > 0 be firm i0s utility, while risk aversion is determined by a
concave utility function, up = π
1/2
j , risk attraction is determined by a convex
function, uo = π2j , and risk neutrality by the expected revenues, un = πj. j
denotes the diﬀerent outcomes, so that π1 = κ − h, π2 = −h, π3 = κ − b,
and π4 = κ− b− θ. This leads to three expressions of utility in the choice of
a legal business startegy, H, and three expressions to describe uility in the
choice of an illegal strategy, B:
uHn (c) = (1− c)(ρhπ1 + (1− ρh)π2) + cπ2
uHp (c) = (1− c)(ρhπ
1/2
1 + (1− ρh)π
1/2
2 ) + cp2
uHo (c) = (1− c)(ρhπ21 + (1− ρh)π22) + co2 (4)
And in the case of an illegal business approach:
uBn (c) = cρb(1− (1− c)γ)π3 + cρb(1− c)γπ4 + c(1− ρb)π2 + (1− c)π2
uBp (c) = cρb(1− (1− c)γ)π
1/2
3 + cρb(1− c)γπ
1/2
4 + c(1− ρb)π
1/2
2 + (1− c)π
1/2
2
uBo (c) = cρb(1− (1− c)γ)π23 + cρb(1− c)γπ24 + c(1− ρb)π22 + (1− c)π22 (5)
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Abstract
This paper analyses how corruption may aﬀect privatization. In
particular, we study how corruption aﬀects the acquisition price and
the post-privatization market structure. The model predicts that pri-
vatization in highly corrupt countries will result in a higher degree
of market concentration than in less corrupt countries. The acquisi-
tion price is also likely to be higher when the government oﬃcials in
charge of the sale are highly corrupt than if they are honest or mod-
erately corrupt. Finally, and perhaps surprisingly, we demonstrate
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1 Introduction
Market reforms, such as privatization and deregulation, are often aimed at
improving economic eﬃciency by reducing the role of the state and increas-
ing the degree of private sector competition. Assessments of privatization
campaigns typically conclude that the eﬀect on the local economy has been
positive (Boubakri and Cosset, 1998; Meggison and Netter, 2001). However,
as emphasised by Kikeri and Nellis (2002:15), the measure of success is often
very narrow, typically only dealing with the profitability of the privatized
company. If improved profits are due to higher prices to consumers, the net
welfare eﬀect is not necessarily positive.
In many cases, and in particular in developing and transition economies,
concerns have been raised about the privatization process, both in terms of
the price paid for the assets and the resulting eﬀect on the local economy.
Stories about corruption flourish. In the words of Joseph Stiglitz (2002:58):
“Perhaps the most serious concern with privatization, as it has so often
been practiced, is corruption. (...) Not surprisingly, the rigged privatiza-
tion process was designed to maximize the amount government ministers
could appropriate for themselves, not the amount that would accrue to the
government’s treasury, let alone the overall eﬃciency of the economy.”
One way to design the privatization process so as to maximize bribes to
the government ministers, is to oﬀer the acquiring firm a monopoly posi-
tion in the post-privatized market. This would increase the acquiring firm’s
willingness to pay for the state assets. Indeed, there are clear signs that cor-
ruption and market concentration go hand in hand. In an empirical study,
Ades and Di Tella (1999) report that: “...corruption is higher in countries
where domestic firms are sheltered from foreign competition by natural or
policy induced barriers to trade, with economies dominated by a few num-
ber of firms, or where antitrust regulation is not eﬀective in preventing anti-
competitive practices. The size of the eﬀect is rather large...” This conclusion
is consistent with Djankov et al (2002) who argue that countries with heavier
regulation of entry have higher corruption and larger unoﬃcial economies.
One explanation of the correlation between corruption and market con-
centration can be that market concentration causes corruption. Rent-seeking
firms may wish to oﬀer bribes to maintain a monopoly position, or to gain
access to such a privileged position. The causality may also go the other
way: Motivated by bribes, rent-seeking politicians may allow for market con-
centration. It is the latter mechanism we focus on in the present paper.
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Particularly in connection with privatization, the hypothesis that corruption
can shape the market structure seems plausible. In our model, selling the
state assets to a local firm creates monopoly whereas selling to an outside
firm creates duopoly competition.
A number of studies show that privatization does not necessarily lead
to increased competition and eﬃciency. Manzetti (1999:328) argues that
many cases of privatization in South-America have resulted in more market
concentration, not less. Puntillo (1996) and Black et al (2000) report that
the hasty process of privatization in Russia in the 1990s often resulted in
very limited improvements in productivity and negligible state revenue.
One reason why corruption may be a particularly severe problem in the
sale of public assets, is that it is typically very diﬃcult to place a value on
these assets. Hence, it is not easy for a third party to judge whether or not
the price announced after the sale of the asset is reasonable or not. In the
case of privatization, Rose-Ackerman (1999:35) notes that: “Corrupt oﬃcials
may present information to the public that makes the company look weak
while revealing to favored insiders that it is actually doing well.” There may
be a gap between the actual price of the asset and the one announced to the
public, with the diﬀerence ending up in the pockets of corrupt bureaucrats
and politicians.
The ambition of the present paper is to analyse how the propensity of
government oﬃcials to be corrupt may influence the outcome of privatization.
Our paper is closely related to Norbäck and Persson (2004), which also deals
with privatization and market structure. They analyse a bidding contest
between a foreign and a local firm for some state assets. A priori, one should
perhaps think that a foreign firm facing high trade costs and high greenfield
investment costs is the more likely winner of the auction for the state assets.
When the alternative modes of entering the market are very costly, this
should be reflected in a high willingness to pay to enter through acquisition.
However, Norbäck and Persson demonstrate that a foreign firm facing high
entry costs does not necessarily oﬀer the highest bid. High entry costs for the
foreign firm aﬀects the domestic firm’s willingness to pay for the assets. If
by acquiring the assets the domestic firm can keep its foreign rival out of the
market, or at least keep it at some distance from the market, the domestic
firm could have the higher willingness to pay for the state assets.
While Norbäck and Persson emphasise the way in which diﬀerences in
entry costs aﬀect the outcome of the privatization process, our focus is on
how political preferences, and in particular the degree of government-level
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corruption, aﬀects this process. In contrast to Norbäck and Persson, the
present paper deals with a situation where the government is not necessarily
concerned with the acquisition price alone. In our model, the government
oﬃcials in charge of the sale of state assets take into account consumer sur-
plus, the producer surplus of a locally owned firm (if one exists), the revenue
that goes to the public, and the revenue that goes to the oﬃcials themselves.
The goal of the paper is to analyse how government oﬃcials’ propensity to be
corrupt aﬀects the trade oﬀ between these potentially conflicting objectives,
and thereby how corruption aﬀects the outcome of privatization, in terms of
choice of buyer, acquisition price, and economic eﬃciency.
We demonstrate that the sale of the public asset by a highly corrupt
regime may result in a highly concentrated industry structure and there-
fore reduced economic eﬃciency. Moreover, the analysis demonstrates that
the acquisition price is likely to be higher when the government oﬃcials are
highly corrupt than when they are moderately corrupt or honest. Interest-
ingly, we also show that the equilibrium price of these assets and level of
embezzlement of state revenues may well fall as the oﬃcials’ propensity to
be corrupt increases.
Other related contributions include Shleifer (1998), Shleifer and Vishny
(1994), Laﬀont and Meleu (1999), and Coolidge and Rose-Ackerman (1997),
who discuss the link between corruption and the decision to privatize, and
Kaufmann and Siegelbaum (1997) who discuss corruption and the optimal
design of privatization. In the present study, we take the sale of the public
asset as given, and analyse how a government’s propensity to embezzle state
revenues may aﬀect the outcome of privatization.
2 The model
The government of a country has decided to privatize a state-owned firm.1
We do not discuss why the government has decided to privatize the company.
It could be part of a reform program imposed on the country by the IMF
as a condition for new loans. It could be the result of domestic political
pressure to reform the economy as the result of, say, the electoral victory
of a right-wing party. Or, privatization could be motivated by the greed of
1Our analysis is also relevant for other types of policies, such as the issuing of new
investment and production licenses or the re-allocation of natural resources necessary for
local production.
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corrupt politicians in need of quick cash.
There are two firms in the market, in addition to the state-owned firm.
The state-owned firm is to be sold to one of them. One firm is an “out-
sider”: it can enter the market only through acquisition. The other firm is
an “insider”: this firm is already established in the market. If the insider
acquires the assets, it gets a monopoly position after privatization.2 If the
outsider acquires the assets, the resulting market structure is duopoly. We
concentrate on the simplest possible form of Cournot-competition. The firms
sell an identical good q, the demand for which is given by q = 1− p, where p
is the market price for the good. Marginal production costs are identical be-
tween the two firms and are normalized to zero. In case firm 1 buys the state
owned firm, it will gain a monopoly position in the post-privatized market.
Its operating profits are then given by:
πm =
1
4
, (1)
where superscript m denotes monopoly. The net profits of firm 1 in case
it acquires the state assets are given by:
µm = µ1 = πm − θ∗1 =
1
4
− θ∗1, (2)
where θ∗1 denotes the equilibrium acquisition price, to be derived later.
Consumer surplus in case the inside firm acquires the assets is given by:
σm = σ1 =
1
8
, (3)
where superscript 1 indicates that firm 1 is the acquiring firm. If the
outside firm acquires the state owned firm, the post-privatization market
structure will be characterized by duopoly. Each firm would then receive
operating profits:
µ2 = πd =
1
9
, (4)
where superscript d indicates duopoly. Consumer surplus in this case is
given by
2The insider could then service the market using either its existing plant or the acquired
plant, or both plants. In the present model, each of these alternatives is equally profitable.
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σd = σ2 =
2
9
, (5)
where superscript 2 indicates that the state owned firm has been taken
over by firm 2. The diﬀerence between monopoly and duopoly profits repre-
sents firm 1’s reservation price for the state assets:
θmax1 = π
m − πd = 1
4
− 1
9
. (6)
The outside firm has acquisition as its only entry option. Since losing the
tender would yield zero profits, the reservation price of firm 2 in its bid for
the state assets is given by:
θmax2 = π
d =
1
9
. (7)
Note that θmax1 > θ
max
2 , implying that the inside firm has a higher willing-
ness to pay for the state assets. On the other hand, σ1 < σ2. The advantage
of selling the state assets to the outside firm is that it delivers higher con-
sumer surplus.
Transfers to the public from the sale of the state owned firm is given by ri.
The size of the transfers to the public depends on whether the government
oﬃcials in charge of the sale are honest or corrupt.3 When the government
oﬃcials are honest, all of the revenues generated from the sale goes to the
public. When they are corrupt, they will only make an exogenously given
minimum payment λ > 0 to the public, and keep everything else for them-
selves. The embezzlement of state revenues is given by ci = θi−λ.4 Transfers
to the public, when the government oﬃcials are honest and corrupt, respec-
tively, are thus given by:
ri =
θi if honest
λ if corrupt.
(8)
Similarly, the amount of embezzlement is given by:
ci =
0 if honest
θi − λ if corrupt.
(9)
3We simplify by assuming that the goverment oﬃcials share the same preferences.
4We abstract from other sources of corruption income, and therefore do not consider
the potential for corruption after the sale of the state assets.
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Private sector welfare, which we shall also refer to as a measure of eco-
nomic eﬃciency, is defined as consumer surplus, σ, plus the net profits of
locally owned firms, µ. The sum of these two surpluses can be seen as a
measure of economic eﬃciency in the economy. In addition, private sector
welfare includes the transfers, r, to the private sector. Private sector welfare
when firm i acquires the state asset can therefore be written as
ωi = σi + µi + ri. (10)
Of course, µi = 0 if there are no locally owned firms present in the market.
The government oﬃcials’ choice of buyer is based on two considerations. On
the one hand, they have to please the public in order to survive politically,
for instance in order to be re-elected. This is an argument in favour of
maximizing ω. On the other hand, the government oﬃcial may wish to
obtain personal benefits from the sale of the state owned firm, given by c.
Let the oﬃcials’ utility derived from selling the state assets to firm i be given
by:
U i = (1− β)ωi + βci, (11)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the weight placed on personal benefits from the sale
relative to the welfare of the private sector. We shall sometimes refer to β as
the propensity of oﬃcials to embezzle state revenues, and sometimes as the
degree of fraudulence amongst the oﬃcials. For β < 1
2
, the oﬃcials place a
higher value on public welfare than on their personal revenues from the sale.
In this case, no corruption takes place. We shall refer to such oﬃcials as
“honest”. It may reflect a situation where political competition is suﬃciently
tough to make private sector welfare the priority issue. If β > 1
2
, personal
income carries the larger weight in the objective function, and corruption
takes place. In this case, the oﬃcials are “corrupt”. The closer β is to
unity, the more corrupt, or the more fraudulent, are the government oﬃcials.
Hence,
Lemma 1 For β < 1
2
, the government oﬃcials are honest. For β > 1
2
, the
oﬃcials are corrupt. The larger is β > 1
2
, the more corrupt are the oﬃcials.
When the government oﬃcials are corrupt, and the firms are aware of
this fact, the firms also know that at least part of what they pay for the
state assets will end up in the government oﬃcials’ pockets. The firms can
7
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therefore be seen as paying bribes. Our analysis would, however, remain
intact if the firms pay for the state assets in good faith.5
The two firms simultaneously bid for the state owned enterprise. The
winner of the auction is the firm oﬀering the higher utility to the government
oﬃcial. Note that this is not necessarily the firm oﬀering the higher price
for the state assets, since the oﬃcial also takes private sector welfare into
consideration.
In order to derive the outcome of the auction, it is instructive to refer to a
standard result in Bertrand competition. When firms produce a homogenous
goods but diﬀer in their marginal costs, the Nash-equilibrium price will be
marginally below the marginal cost of the higher-cost producer. Hence, the
lower-cost producer supplies the entire market and makes a positive profit,
while the higher cost producer makes zero profits. Our model is slightly
more complicated than this standard case, since the two firms can be seen as
supplying diﬀerent qualities, in the sense that one firm generates more private
sector welfare than the other. The successful firm is the one that supplies
the preferred combination of price and quality, and thereby the higher utility
for the oﬃcials in charge of the sale.
As we shall see, which of the two firms is the more eﬃcient contributor
to utility depends on the government oﬃcials’ preferences, as given by β.
A high β implies a large degree of fraudulence, and since fraud is based on
income from the sale of the state assets, a greater emphasis on the acquisition
price. The inside firm has a higher willingness to pay for the assets and can
therefore contribute more “eﬃciently” to the government oﬃcials’ utility in
this case. When this is the case, we shall refer to the inside firm as the more
eﬃcient firm. Similarly, a low β implies a large emphasis on private sector
welfare. Since selling the assets to the outside firm results in higher consumer
surplus, the outside firm can in this case be seen as the more eﬃcient firm.
The more eﬃcient firm and the equilibrium acquisition price can be found
as follows:
5There are certainly legitimate reasons for the government to have a high β, and there-
fore prefer to sell the assets to the highest bidder, even if the result is higher market
concentration. For instance, in a situation with a high public debt, the government may
wish to sell the assets to the highest bidder in order to pay back as much of the debt as
possible. While our analysis focuses on corruption, and on β as a measure of the degree of
corruption, our results could easily be interpreted in terms of oﬃcials’ legitimate emphasis
on government revenue.
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Lemma 2 a) Let θ∗i be such that for θi = θ
∗
i , U
i (θi) = U j
¡
θmaxj
¢
. If θmaxi >
θ∗i , then firm i is the more eﬃcient firm, and therefore acquires the state
assets. Assume that the government oﬃcials, if indiﬀerent between two bids,
sell the assets to the more eﬃcient firm. If θmaxi > θ
∗
i , the equilibrium price
pair is given by (θi, θj) =
¡
θ∗i , θ
max
j
¢
.
b) The two firms are equally eﬃcient when U i (θmaxi ) = U
j
¡
θmaxj
¢
, imply-
ing that θmaxi = θ
∗
i and θ
max
j = θ
∗
j . In this case, the equilibrium price pair is
given by (θi, θj) =
¡
θmaxi , θ
max
j
¢
, and the state assets are sold to firm i with
probability a half, and to firm j with an equal probability.
Proof. a) For the less eﬃcient firm j, a higher price than θmaxj would
lead to negative profits. A lower price by firm j is a weakly dominated
strategy, since it gains nothing by doing so. For the more eﬃcient firm i,
raising the price above θ∗i reduces profits, since it pays a higher price for the
assets. Oﬀering a lower price is also not profitable, since it would then lose
the tender. In equilibrium, therefore, j oﬀers θmaxj , i oﬀers θ
∗
i , and firm i wins
the contest.
b) If both firms bid their reservation prices θmaxi and θ
max
j , and these bids
realize the same level of utility for the government oﬃcials, then there is
clearly no incentive for any of the two firms to deviate from their bids. The
government is indiﬀerent between selling to firm i or firm j, and the firms
are assumed to win the auction with equal probability.
Using equations (8) to (11), we can express the government oﬃcials’ util-
ity as a function of the acquisition price when selling to firm i as:
U i (θi) =
(1− β) (θi + σi + µi) if honest
(1− β) (σi + µi + λ) + β (θi − λ) if corrupt.
(12)
Similarly, the utility of the oﬃcials if selling to firm j at j’s reservation
price, is given by:
U j
¡
θmaxj
¢
=
(1− β)
¡
θmaxj + σ
j + µj
¢
if honest
(1− β) (σj + µj + λ) + β
¡
θmaxj − λ
¢
if corrupt.
(13)
Using (12) and (13), the condition U i (θi) = U j
¡
θmaxj
¢
results in:
θ∗i =
σj + µj − σi − µi + θmaxj if honest
(1−β)
β (σ
j + µj − σi − µi) + θmaxj if corrupt.
(14)
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When firm 1 is foreign owned, given that firm 1 is the more eﬃcient firm,
the acquisition price is given by:
θ∗1 =
σd − σm + θmax2 = 524 if honest
(1−β)
β
¡
σd − σm
¢
+ θmax2 =
7+β
72β if corrupt.
(15)
If firm 2 is the more eﬃcient firm, the acquisition price is:
θ∗2 =
σm − σd + θmax1 = 124 if honest
(1−β)
β
¡
σm − σd
¢
+ θmax1 =
17β−7
72β if corrupt.
(16)
When firm 1 is locally owned and the government oﬃcials are honest,
their utility is independent of the acquisition price paid by firm 1. To see
this, note that in this case µ1 = πm−θ1, resulting in U1 = (1− β) (σm + πm).
Clearly, in this situation firm 1 has no incentive to oﬀer a positive bid for the
state assets, so that θ1 = θmax1 = θ
∗
1 = 0. Hence, if firm 1 is the more eﬃcient
firm, the acquisition price is given by:
θ∗1 =
0 if honest
(1−β)
β
¡
σd + µd − σm − µm
¢
+ θmax2 =
11β−3
72(2β−1) if corrupt.
(17)
If firm 2 is the more eﬃcient firm, the acquisition price is:
θ∗2 =
σm + πm − σd − µd = 1
24
if honest
(1−β)
β
¡
σm + µm − σd − µd
¢
+ θmax1 =
5(5β−3)
72(2β−1) if corrupt.
(18)
Which firm is the more eﬃcient contributor to utility for the government
oﬃcials? To answer this question, we compare θ∗1 and θ
∗
2 with the two firms’
reservation prices, θmax1 and θ
max
2 . Clearly, no firm would make an oﬀer in
excess of its reservation price. Hence, a necessary condition for firm 1 to
acquire the state owned firm is that θmax1 > θ
∗
1 and for firm 2 that θ
max
2 > θ
∗
2.
Using equations (6), (7), and (15) to (18), irrespective of whether firm 1 is
locally owned or foreign owned, it can be shown that:
Lemma 3 For β = 7
9
, θmax1 = θ
∗
1 and θ
max
2 = θ
∗
2, and the two firms are
equally eﬃcient in providing utility for the government oﬃcials. For β < 7
9
,
θmax2 > θ
∗
2 and θ
max
1 < θ
∗
1, and firm 2 is the more eﬃcient firm. For β >
7
9
,
θmax1 > θ
∗
1 and θ
max
2 < θ
∗
2, and firm 1 is the more eﬃcient firm.
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We shall call government oﬃcials characterized by β ∈
¡
7
9
, 1
¢
“highly”
corrupt and those characterized by β ∈
¡
1
2
, 7
9
¢
“moderately” corrupt, as
illustrated in Figure 1.
The diﬀerent types of government oﬃcials.
Using equations (6), (7), (15) to (18), and Lemma 3, we can conclude
that:
Proposition 1 a) Honest government oﬃcials sell the state assets to the
outside firm. The equilibrium price is θ∗2 =
1
24
, irrespective of whether firm 1
is locally owned of foreign owned.
b) Moderately corrupt government oﬃcials sell the state assets to the out-
side firm. In case firm 1 is foreign owned, the acquisition price is θ∗2 =
17β−7
72β
and in case firm 1 is locally owned, θ∗2 =
5(5β−3)
72(2β−1) . The acquisition price
increases in β.
c) Highly corrupt government oﬃcials sell the state assets to the inside
firm. In case firm 1 is foreign owned, the acquisition price is θ∗1 =
7+β
72β , and
in case it is locally owned, θ∗1 =
11β−3
72(2β−1) . The acquisition price falls in β, and
equals θmax2 for β = 1.
d) For β = 7
9
, the government oﬃcials are indiﬀerent between selling to
the inside or the outside firm. With a fifty percent probability, the assets are
sold to the inside firm at a price θ∗1 = θ
max
1 =
5
36
, with an equal probability,
the assets are sold to the outside firm at a price θ∗2 = θ
max
2 =
1
9
.
While the issue of who owns firm 1 does not influence the decision of
whether to sell the assets to the inside or outside firm, it does, however,
aﬀect the acquisition price when the government oﬃcials are corrupt. It
can be shown that θ∗1 is larger under local ownership than under foreign
ownership. The reason is that a locally owned firm has to compensate for
11
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the fact that it pays for the state assets using “local” money, a fact which
reduces private welfare, by oﬀering an even higher price. Similarly, θ∗2 is
smaller under local ownership of firm 1 than when this firm is foreign owned.
Intuitively, the disadvantage of a locally owned inside firm in the bidding
contest is the outside firm’s advantage.
Defining economic eﬃciency as private sector welfare, we can also show
that:
Proposition 2 Selling the state assets to the outside firm creates a higher
level of private sector welfare than selling the assets to the inside firm. Hence,
privatization administered by highly corrupt government oﬃcials leads to
lower private sector welfare.
Proof. If the inside firm is foreign owned and the oﬃcials are corrupt,
ω1 = σm + λ and ω2 = σd + λ. Clearly, ω2 > ω1 since σd > σm. If the inside
firm is locally owned and the oﬃcials are corrupt, ω1 = σm + πm − θ∗1 + λ
and ω2 = σd+πd+λ. Since the acquisition price for firm 1 is θ∗1 ≥ θmax2 = 19 ,
it is easy to demonstrate that ω2 > ω1 also in this case.
In this way, our paper demonstrates that competition between firms in a
highly corrupt environment does not necessarily lead to an eﬃcient solution
for the economy as a whole. This should be contrasted with our result that
competition for the state assets in an honest or moderately corrupt environ-
ment leads to a sale of these assets to the outside firm, and hence an eﬃcient
allocation of resources.
Figure 2 illustrates the relation between the government oﬃcials’ propen-
sity to embezzle state revenues and the two firms’ reservation prices and the
equilibrium acquisition price, marked with a bold line, for β > 1
2
.
The figure shows that the acquisition price rises in β for β ∈
¡
1
2
, 7
9
¢
, then
falls in β for β ∈
¡
7
9
, 1
¢
, with a discrete increase in the acquisition price at
β = 7
9
.
There are three important insights that one can derive from our analysis.
First, privatization in a highly corrupt system is likely to lead to a less
eﬃcient resource allocation than privatization in a less corrupt system. More
precisely, when the government oﬃcials’ emphasis on personal benefits is such
that β > 7
9
, the assets are sold to the inside firm, and the post-privatization
market structure will be characterized by monopoly. For β < 7
9
, the assets
are sold to the outside firm, resulting in duopoly and thus a higher level
of economic eﬃciency. This result is consistent with the empirical findings
12
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Figure 1: Corruption and the acquisition price.
of Ades and Di Tella (1999) and Djankov et al (2001) that corruption is
positively correlated with market concentration.
Second, the acquisition price tends to be higher when the government
oﬃcials are highly corrupt than when they are moderately corrupt or honest.
This is true because the highest acquisition price oﬀered by firm 2 is θ∗2 =
θmax2 , at β =
7
9
, whereas the lowest acquisition price oﬀered by firm 1 is
θ∗1 = θ
max
2 , at β = 1. Hence, for β < 1, θ
∗
1 > θ
∗
2, and for β = 1, θ
∗
1 = θ
∗
2. This
means that for a given λ, embezzlement is typically higher when selling to the
inside firm than when the assets are sold to the outside firm. Intuitively, the
inside firm has to oﬀer a higher price for the assets in order to compensate
for the fact that it generates lower private sector welfare than the outside
firm. In this way, corruption and economic ineﬃciency go together.
Third, increased propensity to embezzle state revenues for a moderately
corrupt oﬃcial, i.e., β ∈
¡
1
2
, 7
9
¢
, leads to a higher acquisition price, and
hence, for a given λ, to higher level of embezzlement. On the other hand,
increased fraudulence for a highly corrupt oﬃcial, i.e., β ∈
¡
7
9
, 1
¢
, leads to
a lower acquisition price and hence less income from embezzlement. The
observation that the size of corruption decreases as the government oﬃcials’
13
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fraudulence increases, is perhaps surprising. Even so, the intuition is quite
simple. To acquire the state asset, the inside firm must compensate for the
loss in consumer surplus caused by monopoly relative to duopoly. The less
the government cares about private sector welfare, the less the inside firm
needs to pay for the assets in order to outbid its competitor, the outside firm,
whose comparative advantage in the bidding contest is precisely the delivery
of private sector welfare. When the oﬃcials are moderately corrupt, the level
of embezzlement increases in β. Intuitively, the less the oﬃcials care about
private sector welfare, the more the outside firm needs to pay in order to win
the auction.
3 Concluding remarks
The present paper describes how corruption may aﬀect the outcome of a pri-
vatization process, both in terms of acquisition price and post-privatization
market structure and therefore economic eﬃciency. We show that govern-
ment oﬃcials primarily concerned with generating personal benefits from the
sale of the state assets will be more inclined to sell the assets to an inside
firm, giving this firm a monopoly position in the market. When these oﬃcials
are honest, or just moderately corrupt, on the other hand, they will prefer
to sell the assets to an outside firm, which results in duopoly competition
after privatization. Since duopoly competition yields higher private sector
welfare than monopoly, our model shows that privatization in a highly cor-
rupt environment is likely to lead to a less eﬃcient resource allocation than
privatization in a less corrupt environment.
We also show that the acquisition price is likely to be higher in a highly
corrupt environment than in a moderately corrupt one. The reason is that
the inside firm has to compensate for the fact that it delivers very low pri-
vate sector welfare by oﬀering a higher price for the assets. Moreover, we
demonstrate that when the government oﬃcials are highly corrupt, increased
fraudulence leads to a lower acquisition price and hence less embezzlement
of state revenues in equilibrium. Hence, the more corrupt are the highly
corrupt government oﬃcials, the cheaper they are to buy.
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 Corruption Survey                                           
 
This is a survey on corruption in international business transactions. It is carried out by CMI researcher Tina 
Søreide in cooperation with NHO. The study is part of a PhD. project at the Norwegian School of Economics 
and Business Administration (NHH) and financed by The Norwegian Research Council (NFR).  
 
Corruption, or similar ways of making influence on decision-makers, is a challenge for those who want to enter 
or operate in certain markets. The objective of this survey is to examine some aspects of the problem, and 
particularly how Norwegian firms encounter unethical business practices when operating in foreign areas. The 
data collected will be applied for research purposes. The information obtained will be treated strictly 
anonymously and confidentially. Neither your name nor the name of your company will be mentioned in any 
documents related to this study.  
 
The survey focuses on corruption and similar undue business practices related to the assignment of important 
contracts; generous bribes, gifts or benefits offered typically to influence the tender procedure or the outcome of 
negotiations. More explanations to terms in use, the underlined terms, can be found on the last page. If you 
would like to add any comments related to your responses, or on the topic in general, we encourage you to do so 
on the last page. Any questions can be directed to Tina Søreide at CMI or Jon Vea at NHO.*  
    
 
Questionnaire      
General information                                                                                                                                           
A1 
 
What is your position in the company?  
 
 
 
Please indicate your field of responsibility 
 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
 
A2 
 
Where is your headquarter localized?  
 
 
 
Circle the answer that applies the most 
Norway 
Other Scandinavian country 
Other European country 
USA/Canada 
Outside the areas mentioned 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
A3 Ownership 
 
 
 
 
 
                            Size of state ownership:     ----------------% 
     
                            Nationality of leading owner:    
   
                            ---------------------------------------------- 
 
A4 Annual turnover worldwide for your company 
 
 
 
>1 billion NOK 
100-1000 million NOK 
<100 million NOK 
1 
2 
3 
A5 Major activity of company 
 
 
 
 
Please specify 
 
(If part of a larger conglomerate, circle the category most 
applicable for your unit) 
Agri /food industries 
Arms and defence 
Banking, finance and insurance 
Construction (roads, dams, tunnels, buildings, ships, etc.) 
Consultancy 
Light manufacturing (textiles, crockery, toys, etc.)   
Heavy industry, including mining and quarrying 
Oil, gas and power generation/transmission 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
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 Pharmaceutical/medicare 
Telecoms and IT 
Tourism, transportation and civilian aerospace 
Other kind of service 
9 
10 
11 
12 
A6 For how long has your company been operating with either 
trade or investments in foreign markets?  
0-10 years 
10-30 years 
more than 30 years 
1 
2 
3 
A7 
 
 
Are the prices for your main products or services pressed to 
a level that makes it hard to make profits?  
No 
Generally not 
Usually 
Yes 
1 
2 
3 
4 
A8 In which parts of the world does your firm do business? 
 
 
 
 
Please rank the three most important markets with numbers  
 
 
 
 
USA and Canada 
West and North European countries 
South European countries 
East European countries and central Asia 
Latin America and the Caribbean 
The Middle East and North Africa 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Mainland China (excl. Taiwan and Hong Kong) 
The rest of Asia 
Oceania 
… 
… 
… 
… 
… 
… 
… 
… 
… 
... 
A9 Is part of your firm’s production located outside of 
Norway?  
 
No 
Yes, in other OECD countrie(s) 
Yes, outside the OECD area  
1 
2 
3 
A10 Have you ever traded with or carried out a project for a 
governmental institution in any of the foreign countries 
where you operate? 
     No 
 Yes, sporadically 
Yes, many times 
I do not know 
1 
2 
3 
4 
 
Experiences with unethical business practices 
B1 If any, please rank the three geographical areas in which 
unethical business practices are influencing your operations 
the most. 
 
 
 
 
Please rank with numbers  
 
USA and Canada 
West and North European countries 
South European countries 
Latin America and the Caribbean 
East European countries and central Asia 
The Middle East and North Africa 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Mainland China (excl. Taiwan and Hong Kong) 
The rest of Asia 
Oceania 
… 
… 
… 
… 
… 
… 
… 
… 
… 
... 
B2 Do you ever experience a gap between formal and informal 
rules in any of the areas just mentioned?  
 
 
Never 
Seldom 
Frequently 
Often 
Always 
I do not know 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
B3 Do you ever experience that problems related to corruption 
impede foreign direct investments in any of the mentioned 
areas?  
 
 
 
 
Never 
Seldom 
Frequently 
Often 
Always 
We do not have the relevant experience 
I do not know 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
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 B4 When competing for a contract in the areas mentioned, do 
you ever have reason to believe that your competitors 
influence tender procedures unduly?  
                                              Never 
Seldom 
Frequently 
Often 
Always   
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
B5 
 
a) Has your company ever decided not to operate in a 
specific country or region mainly because of 
corruption or similar problems? 
 
b) Has your company ever decided not to operate in a 
specific sector or segment of the market mainly 
because of corruption or similar problems? 
 
          a)                                                                                   No 
Yes 
I do not know 
 
          b)                                                                                  No  
Yes 
I do not know 
1 
2 
3 
 
1 
2 
3 
B6 Have you experienced that unethical business practices by 
competitors have placed your company in a more adverse 
competitive position?  
 
No 
We think it has made us lose a contract(s) 
We are convinced that it has made us lose a contract(s)  
We often lose contracts because of corruption 
I do not know 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
B7 a)   If losing an important contract (probably) because of 
corruption, or similar practices, what is your most typical 
reaction(s)?  
 
 
Please circle all that apply 
 
 
b) If you generally chose not to complain, or if complaints 
are ignored or rejected, what do you typically do? 
 
 
 
 
No big reaction, corruption is part of the game 
We ask for a formal explanation from the customer 
We lodge an appeal to the customer or the tender authorities 
We prefer not to report the case 
We retreat  from the country 
I do not know 
 
No big reaction, corruption is part of the game 
We adjust our strategies to the business culture 
We retreat from the country 
We report the case in alternative ways 
I do not know 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
B8 Independently of the experiences of your own business 
unit, what do you think is the most common reason for a 
company to keep quiet when encountering a competitor in 
bribery?  
 
 
 
Please rank the most important alternatives with numbers 
Concern about sanctions from the bribing company 
Concern about sanctions from other companies 
Concern about future business cooperation 
Concern about sanctions from customers 
Lack of knowledge about the illegality of the act 
Lack of proof 
 
Other? Please specify-------------------------------------------- 
I do not know 
… 
… 
… 
… 
… 
… 
… 
… 
… 
B9 Would you be more inclined to react on such bribery if it 
takes place within a country where corruption is perceived 
to be unusual?  
Yes 
No 
I do not know 
1 
2 
3 
B10 a) Has your company ever carried out a project in a 
foreign country as a joint venture or as a part of a 
consortium?  
 
b) If so, has your company ever experienced that a 
cooperating firm has aimed at influencing clients 
in a way that you find difficult to acknowledge?  
 
 
c) And if yes on (b), did your company (typically) 
utter some kind of reaction against this practice? 
 
           a)                                                                                Yes 
No 
I do not know 
 
           b)                                                                                Yes 
No 
I do not know  
 
           c)                                                                                Yes 
No 
I do not know 
1 
2 
3 
 
1 
2 
3 
 
1 
2 
3 
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 B11 a) Have any of your projects ever been financed by 
either bilateral or multilateral aid?  
 
 
 
b) If so, do you have the impression that there is more 
or less corruption, or similar trade of influence, 
connected to aid projects? 
 
Yes 
No 
I do not know 
 
No difference compared to other projects 
More 
Less 
I do not know 
1 
2 
3 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Intermediaries, advisers and agents 
C1 Does your company have contacts positioned at, or with 
access to, a high level of the government in any of the 
countries where you operate? 
 
 
Please circle all that apply 
 
No 
Yes, in Norway 
Yes, in some other countries within the OECD area 
Yes, in foreign countries with a less familiar culture 
 Yes, in all the countries where we operate 
I do not know 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
C2 
 
 
 
 
What kind of assistance is typically preferred by your 
company when entering foreign markets? 
 
 
 
Please rank the most important alternatives with numbers 
 
Agents and advisors with ties to relevant decision-makers 
Bureaucrats and/or politicians 
International business advisors and/or country analysts  
Relatives of people in governmental institutions 
Lawyers with the relevant competence 
 Agents able to deal with local formalities 
Local business advisors without ties to the government 
I do not know 
… 
… 
… 
… 
… 
… 
… 
… 
C3 If relevant, what is the typical way for your company to 
compensate a middleman? 
 
 
Please circle all the answers that apply 
 
Periodic payments 
A lump sum 
A pre-agreed percentage share of the total contract amount 
A success-fee  
A combination 
Other 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
C4 Given that you reimburse the agent in terms of a share of 
the total contract, what is the typical percentage?   
 
 
 
1-5% 
6-10% 
11-15% 
Above 15% 
I do not know 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Tenders and negotiations  
D1 Does your company place any effort in obtaining or 
maintaining a relationship to a potential customer prior to 
pre-qualification for a contract?  
 
No, this is not important 
Yes, this is an obvious benefit 
Yes, this is essential 
I do not know 
1 
2 
3 
4 
D2 Are you ever able to influence or asked to advise clients on 
tender specifications?  
 
 
                                              Never 
Seldom 
Frequently 
Often 
Always 
I do not know   
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
D3 Does it ever happen that tender specifications are designed 
to fit with the offer of one specific company?  
 
 
                                              Never 
Seldom 
Frequently 
Often 
Always 
I do not know   
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
D4 Will there often be negotiations between the tender 
participants and the decision-makers during the tender 
No 
Usually not 
1 
2 
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 procedure?  
 
Sometimes 
Yes, we negotiate at all stages of the procedure 
Yes, but all communication during tender is copied to all 
participating companies 
I do not know 
3 
4 
 
5 
6 
D5 Do you consider standardised tender rules (like 
international competitive bidding) an obstacle to corruption 
and similar ways of making influence on clients?  
No, tender rules are not an obstacle to corruption 
Tender rules do not necessarily prevent corruption 
Generally, tender rules do prevent corruption 
Yes, tender rules prevent corruption efficiently 
I do not know 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
D6 In which geographical areas, if any, do you typically 
experience that standardized procurement procedures are 
not applied when contracts are awarded?   
 
 
 
Please circle all the areas that apply. 
 
USA and Canada 
West and North European countries 
South European countries 
East European countries and central Asia 
Latin America and the Caribbean 
The Middle East and North Africa 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Mainland China (excl. Taiwan and Hong Kong) 
The rest of Asia 
Oceania 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
D7 When operating internationally, do you ever experience a 
demand for a quid pro quo, like the use of local resources, 
the building of infrastructure or other contributions to the  
local society?  
 
 
Never 
Seldom 
Frequently 
Often 
Always 
I do not know 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
D8 Have any state institutions from Norway ever taken part in 
the negotiations to ensure a contract, or to guarantee for 
financial aspects? 
No 
Yes 
I do not know 
1 
2 
3 
D9 Have you ever experienced that a competitor has won a 
contract by help of political pressure? 
 
No 
Yes 
I do not know 
1 
2 
3 
D10 Do you perceive your industry free and unbiased when it 
comes to the international competition for important 
contracts?  
 
 
No, the procedures are always biased 
The procedures are often biased 
The procedures are sometimes biased 
The procedures are seldom biased 
The procedures are never biased 
I do not know 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Operating in markets where corruption is more common 
E1 When operating in foreign markets, do you ever have to pay 
some irregular “additional payments” to get things done?  
Never 
Seldom 
Sometimes 
Frequently 
Often 
Always 
I do not know 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
E2 What is the maximum acceptable size of such payments in 
your industry?  
0 - 1000 NOK 
1 000 - 10 000 NOK 
10 000 -50 000 NOK 
50 000 -100 000 NOK 
Above 100 000 NOK 
I do not know 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
E3 Is it required to offer valuable gifts or pay a bribe to clients USA and Canada 1 
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  or public officials, directly or through an agent, to be able 
to operate in certain countries?   
 
 
 
 
Please circle all the geographical areas that apply 
 
 
West and North European countries 
South European countries 
East European countries and central Asia 
Latin America and the Caribbean 
The Middle East and North Africa 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Mainland China (excl. Taiwan and Hong Kong) 
The rest of Asia 
Oceania 
I do not know   
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
E4 How common would you expect it to be, for companies in 
your line of business, to influence clients by help of 
corruption or similar undue business practices? 
 
 
I think it never happens 
I think it happens in around 1-10% of the cases 
I think it happens in around 10-20% of the cases 
I think it happens in 20-30% of the cases 
I think it happens in more than 30% of the cases 
I do not know 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
E5 If companies in your line of business operate unduly, for 
instance by establishing secret ties to specific decision-
makers, what would you suggest that they typically would 
be aiming at?  
 
 
 
Please rank the most important alternatives with numbers 
Adjustments in tender specifications 
Being part of a bid for a larger contract or concession 
Improve economic conditions, like tax reductions 
Obtain the contract through direct negotiations 
Secret information about evaluation or tender specifications 
Secret information about the other companies’ bids 
Promises of neglected quality controls 
Reduce political risk 
 
Other benefits? Please specify    ……………………………. 
I do not know 
… 
… 
… 
… 
… 
… 
… 
… 
 
… 
… 
E6 Under what circumstances could it be acceptable for a 
company to influence clients by help of a significant 
benefit, a valuable gift or a bribe?  
 
 
As long as the firm may end up with an important contract 
When there is no other way of operating in the market 
When the contract is necessary to avoid insolvency 
It is not accepted under any circumstances 
I do not know 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
E7 Does your own company sometimes provide clients with 
less tradable benefits, like … 
 
 
 
 
 
Please circle all that apply 
excursions and trips? 
promises of career opportunities in the firm? 
a seat in the company board? 
education for their children? 
tickets to expensive sports-arrangements, musicals, etc.? 
 
Other benefits? Please specify    ……………………………. 
I do not know 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
 
6 
7 
E8 To your knowledge, has your company ever accepted a 
request from an agent, an adviser or a consultant about 
money that probably would be applied for bribery?  
No 
Probably not 
Probably 
Yes 
I do not know 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
E9 Has your own company during the last decade tried to 
obtain a contract, a license or a concession in a way that is 
important to keep confidential?  
 
No 
Seldom 
Probably not 
Probably 
Often 
I do not know 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
E10 Would you be informed if someone in your company paid a 
bribe, on behalf of the company, to obtain an important  
No 
Probably not 
1 
2 
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 contract or a significant benefit?  Probably 
Certainly 
I do not know 
3 
4 
5 
E11 a) Would you, generally, be able to discover it if a 
significant part of the compensation to an agent is 
applied for bribery?  
 
b) Have you ever considered it a benefit not to be 
informed if the agent applies the compensation for 
questionable payments? 
         
No 
Yes 
I do not know 
 
No 
Yes 
I do not know 
1 
2 
3 
 
1 
2 
3 
E12 Considering the following alternatives, what would you 
suggest is the most important underlying motivation for 
companies in your line of business to offer bribes?  
 
 
 
‘The fear of losing contracts because someone else has bribed 
the decision-makers’ 
‘Because the goods or services offered would never be chosen 
in a fair competition’ 
‘To persuade decision-makers to buy goods or services that 
otherwise would not have been demanded’ 
 I do not know 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
4 
Perceptions about Scandinavian conditions 
F1 Do you think Scandinavian companies in general are less or 
more likely to pay bribes than companies from other OECD 
countries? 
 
Less 
No difference 
More 
1 
2 
3 
F2 Do you think Scandinavian companies are less or more 
exposed to demands for bribes than companies from other 
countries?  
Less 
No difference 
More 
1 
2 
3 
F3 Do you generally perceive the competition for important 
contracts free and fair when operating in Scandinavia?  
 
No, the procedures are always biased 
The procedures are often biased 
The procedures are sometimes biased 
The procedures are seldom biased 
Yes, the procedures are never biased 
I do not know 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
F4 Do you think corruption and similar ways of making 
influence on clients, affect the outcome of tender 
procedures in Norway?  
 
Never 
Seldom 
Sometimes 
Frequently 
Often 
Always 
I do not know 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Control 
G1 Do you think anti-corruption efforts made by your own 
business organization have influenced the attitudes against 
bribery in your company?  
No 
No, we already had a clear attitude against bribery 
Yes, it has influenced our attitude to some extent 
Yes, it has clearly altered our attitude 
I am not familiar with their campaigns 
I do not know 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
G2 a) Are you familiar with the OECD-convention against 
bribery of foreign public officials?  
  
 
b) Are most employees in relevant positions informed by 
the company about the content of this convention? 
a)                                                                                     No 
Yes 
 
b)                                                                                     No 
Yes 
I do not know 
1 
2 
 
1 
2 
3 
G3 Given that you are familiar with the Norwegian anti- No 1 
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 corruption legislation, do you find it difficult to respect? 
 
 
 
 
If yes, please specify why? 
(There is more space for comments on the last page) 
 
Usually not 
Often 
Yes 
I am not familiar with the legislation on this area 
 
------------------------------------------------------ 
 
------------------------------------------------------ 
2 
3 
4 
5 
G4 What do you consider the major reason for not paying 
bribes when operating in foreign markets? 
 
 
 
 
Please rank the most important alternatives with numbers 
 
It is illegal 
It is immoral 
It may harm the reputation 
It may place our employees in an unsafe situation 
It is expensive 
Accounting practices make it difficult 
 It is not part of our company culture 
Corruption disturbs the function of markets 
I do not know 
… 
… 
… 
… 
… 
… 
… 
… 
… 
G5 a) Does your company have a set of internal written 
codes of conduct that restricts employees from 
paying bribes? 
 
b) Do you have routines to detect violations of these 
codes?  
 
 
c) What is the typical reaction from the company if a 
serious violation of ethical codes (like corruption) 
is detected?  
 
 
No 
Yes 
 
No 
Yes, we some routines 
Yes, we have efficient routines 
 
No big reaction 
Internal discussions 
Internal inquiry 
Investigation by an external committee or consultancy 
Involve the police 
I do not know 
1 
2 
 
1 
2 
3 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
G6 Do you have efficient routines to detect false consultancy 
fees, fake invoices or illegal transactions, made for instance 
to avoid taxes?  
 
No 
Yes 
I do not know 
1 
2 
3 
G7 a) Do you have routines to detect your own 
employees in receiving bribes?  
 
 
b) Has your company ever detected an employee in 
receiving a bribe? 
 
No 
Yes 
I do not know 
 
No 
Yes 
I do not know 
1 
2 
3 
 
1 
2 
3 
G8 Does your company encourage employees to report the case 
internally if they uncover bribery or other types of crime 
carried out by the firm? 
No 
Not actively 
Yes, we do 
I do not know 
1 
2 
3 
4 
G9 
 
 
a) Has your company’s attitude towards corruption 
changed during the last years?  
 
 
 
 
b) If your attitude has changed, when do you think 
the change took place?  
 
 
          a)                                                                                   No 
Yes, paying bribes was more accepted previously 
Yes, paying bribes was less accepted previously 
I do not know 
 
          b)                                                                   Last autumn  
During the last two years 
During the last five years 
1 
2 
3 
4 
 
1 
2 
3 
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c) Do you think the competition for important 
contracts in your industry has become more fair 
and unbiased during the last years? 
 
During the last decade 
I do not know 
 
          c)                                                                                   No 
Yes 
I do not know 
4 
5 
 
1 
2 
3 
We would appreciate any thoughts you might like to add related to your responses or to the topic in general. Comments on this survey are 
of course also welcome. (Please add a sheet if the space here is too limited) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for your contribution! 
 
Explanation to terms in use 
An agent is a company or a person that assist you in facilitating the business in a foreign country. The term 
includes intermediaries, middlemen, information brokers and advisors on local business. The representative is 
not an employee of the firm.  
Alternative ways of reporting on corruption, in cases where a complaint to the tender authorities is (expected to 
be) ignored, are to inform newspapers (either in the country of business or in the home-country of the bribing 
firm), political authorities, embassies, anti-corruption groups, etc. 
Bribe: In this survey we mainly refer to grand scale corruption, generous gifts offered typically to influence the 
assignment of important contracts. The receiver of the bribe is often, but not always, employed by the state. 
Business relates to export and imports of goods and services, also included are foreign direct investments. The 
term does not refer to strictly financial investments.  
Consortium: An international business and/or banking agreement that includes more than two companies, often 
with the aim of cooperating on a larger business project or to control a significant share of a market. The 
responsibility of each company is restricted to what it delivers in the specific project.  
Corruption: Corruption is often defined as the misuse of entrusted authority for private gain. An official 
demands or is offered a bribe, in money or other values, either to do what s/he is supposed to do in any case or to 
make a certain decision that probably not would have been made without the bribe.  
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is the acquisition abroad of physical assets, such as plant and equipment, with 
operating control residing in the parent corporation. Greenfield investment is the form of FDI where you invest 
in new facilities rather than acquiring already operating firms.   
International Competitive Bidding (ICB) refers to tender rules that are developed to provide all eligible 
prospective bidders with timely and adequate notification of a tender and an equal opportunity to bid for the 
contract.  
Joint venture: Partnership or cooperative agreement between two or more companies restricted to a single 
specific project. Each company will typically have joint liability.   
OECD countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United 
States. 
OECD-convention: The OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transactions entered into force on February 15, 1999. The Convention makes it a crime to offer, 
promise or give a bribe to a foreign public official in order to obtain or retain international business deals. 
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This questionnaire is part of a Norwegian survey on corruption in international business transactions. It is carried 
out by CMI researcher Tina Søreide in cooperation with NHO. The study is part of a Ph.D. project at the 
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration (NHH) and financed by The Norwegian Research 
Council (NFR).  
 
Corruption, or similar ways of making influence on decision-makers, is a challenge for those who want to enter 
or operate in certain markets. The objective of this survey is to examine some aspects of the problem, and 
particularly how Norwegian firms encounter unethical business practices when operating in foreign areas. 
Information is gathered by help of questionnaires and interviews in the headquarters of Norwegian firms. This 
part of the project aims at complementing the study by addressing Norwegian embassies and consulates with a 
few questions.  
 
The data collected will be applied for research purposes. The information obtained will be treated strictly 
anonymously and confidentially. Neither your name nor the name of your country of operation will be 
mentioned in any document related to this study. In fact, the procedures applied prevent us from obtaining 
identifiable information. Any questions can be directed to Tina Søreide at CMI or Jon Vea at NHO.* 
   
Questionnaire      
 
1 
 
How would you categorize your area or country of operation? 
 
Developing country 
Medium income country 
Rich country 
1 
2 
3 
2 
 
How frequently do you think corruption is part of the business culture 
in your country of operation?  
 
 
 
Please circle the answer that applies the most 
Never 
Seldom 
Sometimes 
Frequently 
Often 
Always 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
3 How often would you assume that Norwegian firms operating in the 
area are confronted with challenges related to illegitimate business 
practices, irregular payments and corruption?  
 
 
Never 
Seldom 
Sometimes 
Frequently 
Often 
Constantly 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
4 Will adjustment to local informal conventions in your country of 
operation ever imply business procedures that would be considered 
less acceptable in Norway?  
 
 
 
 
 
Never 
Seldom 
Sometimes 
Frequently 
Often 
Always 
I do not know 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
5 Is it likely that the refusal of making irregular or informal payments 
might reduce the opportunities for foreign firms to make business in 
your country of operation?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
No 
Seldom 
Sometimes 
Frequently 
Often 
In general, yes 
I do not know 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
                                                 
* tina.soreide@cmi.no or jon.vea@nho.no 
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 6 Do you ever notice that foreign firms that operate in the area make use 
of business practices that most likely deviate from their own official 
codes of conduct?  
 
Never 
Seldom 
Sometimes 
Frequently 
Often 
Always 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 Would you recommend Norwegian firms to adjust to local culture, 
even if it could imply business behaviour that would not be accepted 
in Norway? 
 
 
 
No 
Seldom 
Maybe 
Sometimes 
Usually 
Yes 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
8 Given that a Norwegian firm has lost an important contract due to 
corruption, would you be willing to mention the issue to local 
authorities?  
 
 
 
No 
Probably not 
Probably 
Certainly 
I do not know 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
9 Have you ever reacted against corruption by raising the issue at a 
higher political level?  
 
 
No 
It has happened 
Several times 
1 
2 
3 
We would appreciate any thoughts you might like to add related to your responses or to the topic in general. (Please add a sheet if the space 
here is too limited) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for your contribution! 
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